[Editor�s Note: The following memorandum on Eritrea, dated 29 Oct 1940, is from the British Archives and was prepared for the Major General Commanding Troops, Sudan by Major E. A. Chapman-Andrews, the Political Liaison Officer.  The Major sent a copy to Sir M Lampson, the British High Commissioner in Cairo who in turn forwarded it for the consideration of Viscount Halifax, a diplomat who held a variety of roles including, Foreign Secretary, Viceroy of India, Ambassador to the USA.

The correspondence shows how views are thought up, pushed and made into policies through behind-the-door dialogues without including those who are going to be affected by it: the people.  The actors change, but the Eritrean people continue to be denied to have a voice on how they want to be governed.]   

Political memorandum on Eritrea.

MOST of the country which before the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-36 was known as Eritrea has changed hands several times in the course of history.  Its main gateway from the sea, the island port of Massowah, built by one of the Ptolemies, fell into the hands successively of the Arabs, Turks, Egyptians and British before 1885 when, in the words of Admiral Cairmi's proclamation, "the Italian Government, in accord, with the English and Egyptian Governments and without doubt also with the Abyssinian," ordered the Italian flag to be hoisted there. Actually King Menelik of Shoa, (afterwards Emperor Menelik II) was at that moment negotiating, for the port in Cairo, but though angry on being presented with a fait accompli he did not protest.

2. The hill country inland, too, notably the Bogos area, with Keren as its chief town, Agordat and even Kassala have changed hands several times: but when in 1872 Munzinger Pasha, on behalf of the Khedive of Egypt, occupied Keren, King John of Tigre (the Emperor John IV) protested in writing to the Khedive and. claimed "Keren and Halhal and all the Hamasein area. Our empire extends in this area as far as the coast. We hope that the coastal area which has been lost will be returned to us." This "hope," however, was not realised, for, as stated above, when the Egyptians withdrew, the British condoned the Italian occupation of Massowah, and incidentally of other places along the coast. The Egyptian withdrawal was necessitated by events elsewhere, namely, the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan and the beginning of the British occupation of Egypt, and it is interesting to note that, when in 1884 Admiral Sir W. Hewitt negotiated with the Emperor John IV at Adowa for the safe passage to Massowah of the Egyptian garrison besieged by the Mahdi's forces at Kassala, he, as representing both Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, agreed that �the country called Bogos (Keren) shall be restored to His Majesty the. Negoosa Negust."

3. It is clear, therefore, that, although they had never effectively administered the greater part of it, the Ethiopians considered, up to 1885, that the whole of Eritrea right down to the sea was by right theirs. But after 1885 the situation changed rapidly. The Italians pushed into the interior and (1886) took a hard knock from Menelik at Dongeli. Menelik, however, did not wish to weaken himself by fighting the Italians, in case John got too strong for him, so (1889) he did a deal with the Italians. By the Treaty of Ucciali, the Italians recognised him as Negoosa Negust, King of the Kings of Ethiopia, while he in return confirmed them in possession of Danakil coast (which as far as Perim Island they had acquired by treaty from the Sultan of Aussa), and recognised that their common frontier should �follow the high table,� and that "Asmara shall be within the Italian boundary." But shortly afterwards (1893), John having been killed by the Dervishes at Metemma (1889) and the Italians having read (as the Ethiopians thought) too much into the treaty, Menelik denounced it and prepared for war. The Italians pushed on, took Agordat and Kassala from the Dervishes; then turned and advanced to Adowa, where they were decisively defeated in 1896.

4. Two treaties of the highest importance follow, viz., the so-called Treaty of Peace (really an armistice agreement) at Addis Ababa in 1896 and the Treaty of Addis Ababa, 1900. Their importance lies in the incontrovertible fact that they were freely negotiated by Menelik, the undoubted master of a united Ethiopia, in his hour of triumph. In them were fixed the frontiers between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and these frontiers (but for a rectification of the Sudan frontier agreed with Great Britain, 1902) stood until the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-36. The attached map [i] illustrates these settlements. It will be observed that Agordat, Keren and Asmara are well within the Italian boundary.

5. It follows, therefore, that on treaty or juridical grounds the Emperor Menelik's successors can have no claim to Eritrea. Even assuming that His Majesty's Government were to recognise the Emperor Haile Selassie I as Emperor of Ethiopia de jure at any stage of the present conflict, His Majesty would have no valid juridical claim to intervene in the administration of Eritrea. The same would be the case if His Majesty's Government were to declare, as a war aim, their intention of restoring His Majesty Haile Selassie I to the throne of Ethiopia.

6. In actual fact, His Majesty's Government have made no such recognition or declaration. So far as I know, His Majesty�s Government have declared, firstly, that they have facilitated the return of the Emperor to Africa and will do all in their power to furnish aid to the Ethiopians and co-ordinate their activities against the Italians; and, secondly, that His Majesty's Government have no territorial ambitions in Italian East Africa. The recognition by His Majesty�s Government of the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia is not affected by these declarations. It follows, therefore, that His Majesty The King is at war with the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, and that any territory in Italian East Africa which may be occupied by His Majesty�s forces must, juridically, be considered to be " occupied enemy territory " over which, until the final peace settlement, the Commander of His Majesty's Forces in occupation would have sole authority. Even if this juridical position were changed by the de jure recognition of the Emperor Haile Selassie I as Emperor of Ethiopia, such a change could not affect Eritrea or, of course, the military commander's right and duty to take such measures in Ethiopia itself as military necessity might demand.

7. In the event of the military occupation of Ethiopia and Eritrea or part of them, the practical administrative situation would be complicated by the fact that the Italians have abolished the old frontier between Ethiopia and Eritrea and given the latter name to a greatly enlarged territory. Assuming that the Emperor Haile Selassie I were accorded de jure recognition by His Majesty's Government and that military necessity did not forbid the political expediency of allowing him some measure of administrative authority, it would, in my, opinion, be most logical and practical to accept the existing Italian boundary between Eritrea and Shoa for administrative purposes and to leave the final settlement of the frontier until the treaty of peace.

8. It should here be recorded that, although the Emperor is somewhat uneasy in mind because His Majesty's Government have made no formal declaration concerning his status, he considers His Majesty's Government morally bound to restore him to his throne because-

(a) They persuaded him to return to Africa.

(b) Before he left England, the Prime Minister addressed him in a letter as � His Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia.�

(c) The Foreign Office approved his draft proclamation in the name of  �Haile Selassie I, Elect of God, Emperor of Ethiopia."

Incidentally, the proclamation contained the following article, addressed to the tribes of Eritrea:-

�To people of the Hamassein, of the Akelegousae, of the Serae, of the Ben Amir, of the Habab and of the Mensa, whether you are on this side of the Mareb or the other side, I say rally to your brothers in the struggle. "t none of you remain an instrument in the hands of the Italians to be used against your motherland Ethiopia, or against our friends the English. I know the desires of your hearts, and these are shared by me and by the whole of the Ethiopian nation. Your destiny is close bound up with the destiny of the rest of Ethiopia. It will be fulfilled by right and with justice.�

9. His Majesty Haile Selassie I has nevertheless a firm hold on reality. He will not quarrel about " la peau de l'ours " at least until the animal is dead. He realises that he is in no position to make demands and that his best hope lies in helping us defeat the Italians. And in this task, once British forces have begun the conquest of Italian East Africa, I am convinced he will prove of the greatest help if properly handled. He alone has the power to unite the Ethiopians, and, in my opinion, it will pay us, militarily, to keep his prestige high. In this way we shall avoid falling into the dangerous trap now being set by Italian propaganda - that the Emperor is the tool of the British, who will take the country for themselves. The Emperor properly handled, will mean the difference between advancing towards and through a friendly countryside and a suspicious or hostile one. It will, in my opinion, be the same in the highlands of Eritrea, and it may be of military advantage, and therefore politic, to use his influence, if not to give him authority, there. Two Eritrean battalions deserted to him during the Italo-Ethiopian war, and more might have come over if he could have given the Italians a hard knock and held out some hope to the Eritreans of his ultimate victory. Moreover, many of his best advisers and most loyal servants are Eritreans. There is no doubt that, despite Menelik's treaties, there is a strong Irredentist feeling among the divided Amharic- and Tigrina- speaking peoples and feelings of kinship between them and the Tigre-.speaking group. Before the Italo-Ethiopian war the keenest, most nationalistic and patriotic among the growing band of educated young men around the Emperor (who was a sincere and progressive reformer) were Tigreans.

10. The frontiers of the new Ethiopia cannot be finally settled until the treaty of peace, and it will then be necessary to weigh questions of geography, race, religion, language, culture, grouping of populations, economics, and even politics, which I have not attempted to consider in this memorandum; but we shall by then have a closer knowledge of these problems, on which others, notably El Kaim, Duncan Cumming Bey, who has made a special study of Eritrea for many years, are better qualified than I to speak.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS, Major,

Political Liaison Officer

October 27. 1940