Eritrea In Search of National Consensus

(Geneses of National Conferences/Congresses)

In his article �National Reconciliation with whom� (2/19/2002 at awate.com - in Tigrenya), Arhe Hamednaka has undertaken the concept of National Reconciliation: He took the debate to a different angle and back to square one. Hamednaka, expressed the need for National Reconciliation based on mutual recognition and respect for the various Eritrean interests. However, he disagreed with all the others on its timing and the reconciling parties. He emphasized that national reconciliation will not be possible before the demise of PFDJ. The reasons, according to Hamednaka, are some Eritreans who blindly support DIA and when he tells them �I am a devil, they reply, no, you are an angle�. Such people should be included after been resurrected from that blindness. He weighed up the idea that an ideal reconciliation is one that includes all social segments and political colours of our society including PFDJ supporters. He arrives at a conclusion that for National Reconciliation to materialize all opposition forces should urgently join hands to form National Salvation Alliance for common action and defeat the evil. Only then a genuine National Reconciliation would be possible. That, definitely means, common action to bring about the downfall of PFDJ precedes National Reconciliation, and is not a product and consequence of it, (Incidentally; unexpectedly and in contrast to the AENF�s declared stand, the statement issued by the Annual Conference of ELF�s European Branches, posted - April 30, 2002 in messelna.com -, is congruent with Hamednaka�s vision of National Reconciliation through action). Implicitly Arhe Hamednaka perceives no reconciliation between opposition organizations belonging to the same camp. According to him reconciliation should be between those who want change on the one hand and those who support the regime on the other hand. It is more probable that Arhe had the South African experience in mind - Reconciliation after the demise of apartheid. I think, what Arhe had implicitly tried to say is that it wouldn�t have been possible to reconcile South African society while apartheid was in place and it would be so in Eritrea while PFDJ is in power.

Of course, it has to be remembered that when the debate on the subject started, the people who advocated it had in mind the EPLF-PFDJ and the opposition as the two parties to be reconciled. However, gradually and when it was clear even to the most optimists that PFDJ was beyond redemption to accommodate such national consensus and especially after the emergence of the so-called �Reformers- phenomenon the debate on the concept shifted to mean reconciliation within the opposition camp. I understand the genuine concerns and the logic behind Hamednaka�s idea. Looking at it from this angle, deep in my mind I feel that in spite of the huge amount of literature on this particular subject produced in this web site, there are still some dark corners that should be explored and some ends tied together before we define the concept and phrase all its component terms.

I am convinced that since the forties the Eritrean people aspired for national unity and national consensus on national political matters. But so far it is as divided as it has been then, if not worse. However, along the road of searching for this unity many mistakes were committed and on its name many atrocities have been perpetrated. I am also convinced that it is high time for interested Eritrean intellectual democrats to reach consensus between themselves to redefine the terms �National Unity� and �National Reconciliation�, and to identify �what and whom� to reconcile. I have the notion that a back reflection to our history along the road of searching for national unity and consensus is imperative. We can learn some lessons from them. This has been the driving force that made me think about the geneses of national Conferences/Congresses in search of national consensus.

JemEyet Hubelwaten or MaHbr Fikre hager:

(Condensation of national consciousness)

This gathering denoted the feeling of been transformed or promoted from simple colonial subjects to citizens of a nation in which they would have the right to decide their own fate. It was the beginning or birth of Eritrean national self-consciousness. It was not a conscious political choice; it was rather a celebration of the transformation from slavery to political conscious society. It is difficult to call it a political party rather it was a sort of practising self-esteem and human dignity and trying the deep waters of being political beings. The love and celebration did not last long, the British had to leave and the new political beings had to face the responsibilities and liabilities of their new status. A national conference became a necessity to decide on the country�s future. Eritrea was at cross roads; it was the first test to the newly acquired political consciousness.

Bet Gergis Conference:

(Divergent interests and identity crises)

There, in Bet Gergis, the amateur Eritrean political elite failed the test. They failed to reach a national covenant embracing principles of coexistence, mutual recognition and tolerance through compromises. They came to the conference with different agendas and diametrically opposed goals. The historical and cultural bondage of most Eritrean Abyssinians with the other part of historical Abyssinia was still strong. Sixty years of different socio-economic transformations had not been enough to cut or weaken the umbilical chord. Distrusting, hating and fearing Moslems was still alive and viable. Ethiopian bribery and promises of higher posts and Gasha-Mrets (land in Ethiopia) were appealing to the Kbesan elite (especially the Hamasien Asmara based elite) and intimidation and excommunications by the Orthodox Church was a nightmare haunting all the troubled souls. Most Eritrean Abyssinian elite of the time suffered identity crises and divided consciousness between their cultural and religious sentiments on the one hand and their newly acquired identity on the other hand, between joining Christian Ethiopia on the one hand or compromise with their Eritrean Moslem brothers on the other hand. It was a difficult choice. The other segment was also haunted by its own fears and mistrust. The fear of been dominated and squeezed by intolerant Abyssinian Christian culture in greater Ethiopia, of been marginalized as the Ethiopian Moslems and the fear of been detached from Arab and Islamic world for which they have had economic interests, linguistic, cultural social and religious affinity. A national Covenant embodying how to live together was impossible to attain. However, the emergence of the independence block was a sample of a healthy unity in diversity the Eritrean people badly needed. The Conference of Bet Gerges in which national consensus had been sought signalled polarisation of society, wars, destruction and humiliation for fifty years to come. No one was saved. Those who set fire on the houses of their neighbours found their houses burned at the end of the day.

The Federal Constitution:

(Compromises - unity in diversity)

It was not home-produced, it was less than the required commodity, nobody wanted it, and Federation with Ethiopia became a fact because external forces redeemed it suitable for the diversified Eritrean society. In my opinion federation was a win-win solution for the two parties. The UN had to arrange the Eritrean house before the British finish their mandate. Neither the wisdom of the two competing Eritrean parties nor the wisdom of Haile Sellasie but thanks to the wisdom of the international community relatively win-win democratic constitution that required a considerable amount of conciliation, reconciliation and mutual compromises was reached. It was a National Covenant for peace and coexistence. Had the unionists and The Ethiopian government respected it, it would have provided peace if not democracy and prosperity. It defined the relation among the Eritrean peoples as well as between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Arabic and Tigrenga side by side were symbols of compromise between partners, equal partners. The Arabic language issue was/is not a matter of using a language as a media of communication only, it had been politically charged and been promoted as a symbol, a measurement and litmus of either partnership or exclusion. It became a symbol of been accepted or rejected. By trying to deny this language, PFDJ have denied one of the principles of the National Covenant on which coexistence and partnership was based.

1^st Semblia:

(Victim of intimidation and bribery)

The Eritrean Parliament was supposed to be the custodian and guardian of this Covenant of the principles of how to live together, but unfortunately it suffered two main weaknesses. The first, been that Ethiopia and its local Agents of national distraction and disunity, the unionist troubled souls like Qashi Demtros, were not convinced by the compromises reached in the federal arrangements and consistently sabotaged it. The second was the arrangements of representation through which this parliament was elected. After Bet Gergis the society was divided into two camps, Abyssinian nationalists represented by the Unionist Party and Eritrean nationalists represented by the independence block. Eritrean Moslems united in the Moslem league consisted the nucleus and the largest social base of the independent block. This unity around the league had emanated among other interests from common religious sentiments and common Islamic cultural and social affinity. The unforgivable mistake committed by Shiekh Ibrahim Sultan and his league (after the martyrdom of Mwelana Mujahd Al kaber, Shiekh Abdulkadir kabire) was complying with the modernisation invectives of Trevaskis and others and accepting the arrangements of Addi/Add as the bases for election to the federation parliament (1^st Semblia). The League had used the Islamic sentiments positively to promote Eritrean national aspirations. However, the Addi/Add elections divided this strong united social base the league had enjoyed and diverted its constituency from the former Islamic ideological unity to promote higher national interests, to a subjective personal, parochial and primordial interests in the bases of Addi/Add (clans). The Addi/Add elections brought the collapse of the league and hence the collapse of the independence block and ultimately weakened the national cause.

The Jabarta felt abandoned, the Saho felt isolated, the Affars felt sabotaged, the Shemagele felt threatened, and the emancipated Tigre lost in rediscovering their roots begging Kantebay and Diglel to tell them to which clan do one of them belong. I am not spreading a secret, talking about how leaders like Shiekh Hamid Farej (the good hearted brave), Shiekh Idris Mohamed Adem (the roaring lion), Shum Ibrahim Shum (the refined intellectual), Ali Radai (the visionary), Omer Akitou (the desert hawk) etc� who heroically fought side by side in the League to promote the same ideals of national unity and national independence stood on opposite camps and fallen prey to the manipulations of the wicked Haile Sellasie through Qeshe Diablos (or was it Demitros) and the Sell-out Asfaha W/Michael in the clan elected Semblia. It should not be a secret how they played the self-centred clan Nazirs (chiefs) against each other and how an ugly phenomenon like that of Omer Nashif and his likes replaced the benevolent Islamic sentiments for national unity and national aspirations, in the Semblya. The Add/Addi aborted the legitimate, positive and progressive role of Islam as the unifying factor of Eritrean Moslems for Eritrean National Salvation. The Add/Addi clan politics was a destructive manipulation reactionary machine to divide and destroy the Islamic League and the independence block and no doubt this concept would play no better role in the future.

By these weaknesses, Eritreans showed immaturity and by no means were match to the diplomatically experienced and politically matured Ethiopian state machine. This Eritrean Standing National Congress (the Semblia 1) was bribed, cheated, intimidated and used to lose its custody to the internal and external enemies of peace, democracy, tolerance and coexistence. It handed Eritrea and its people to the reign of terror.

To be continued in Part two�

Next

Eritrea In Search of National Consensus

Part II

ELM�s Asmara Conference:

Cairo Students &Executive Committee:

Supreme Council and the five regions
Adoubha and Awate Conferences: 
Amman and Sduha Eyla Conferences:

ELF 1st National Congress: 
ELF 2nd National Congress:
EPLF 1st Organisational Congress: 
PFDJ�s Constitution and 2nd Semblia (H3L):

Followed by�

Eritrea In Search of National Consensus

Part III

Lessons from our history of searching Consensus
Implications to the road ahead (identifying myth from realities)
Our present reality and future dreams
The anticipated National Reconciliation Conference:

• Definition (What to Reconcile)? 

• Representation (Whom to Reconcile)?

• Technicalities (who would do it, when, where and how)

• Outcome � destiny (The Holy National Principles)

Do we afford another Bet Gergis?  
The wisdom of Bet BeHalyai?