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The 1998 - 2000 Eritro- Ethiopian war, that needn't have happened. Historical evidences prove that, wars are fought by soldiers but organised by governments. National defence is the prime responsibility of the government and when the nation is threatened, the governed (people) naturally rally around. The problem is, how do people regulate it, when the government itself, turns to be part of a problem? Border disputes are as old as history and are still common globally, but never settled by war. It is a postulated norm of social well-being and prosperity that, violent conflicts are a cause of poverty, under-development and ill health, which in turn stimulate personal greed, that triggers more conflicts, in looking to sooth the political and economic inequalities. So conflicts are more common in countries of low income and economic growth. On the basis of this standard, the recent Eritro-Ethiopian war cannot be defined only as a border conflict. It has to do more with their economic divorce. Hence here follows an article that attempts to navigate within the complexity of this issue and its association with the war. This assertion is based on the fact that, despite of the only solution to be a legal one: Ethiopia and Eritrea fought the war without admitting, the feasibility of solving, this arithmetic of border dispute, at a war front. Why? How? Tell me and I will forget. Show me and I will remember. Involve me and I will understand. (Chinese Proverb) One can list a lot of questions, in pondering the sequence of miscalculations that propelled, Eritrea and Ethiopia into a war, commonly termed as pointless, senseless or even foolish. By no mistake this is a provocative approach towards a proper diagnosis of the ailment rather than an exhaustive analysis. So I believe that such efforts can help in saving time, knowledge and resources, being invested in looking for a remedy to reengineer the nation building process of the new state-Eritrea. Though it is a clear fact that the initial diagnosis of the ailment was said to be a border dispute, post the end of the physical war another potentially dangerous regional pathologic disorder has infested the spectrum of Eritreanism, particularly the tendency of polarizing Akeloguzai. But this is merely a partial loss of direction and hopelessness of the hands with power, in looking to get an escape goat, to justify what had been done by the orders of their signature. Now the actual situation of Eritrea is demanding citizenship of thinking well about every one, and not just about one’s self. And it is my sincere belief that one of the most effective strategies to alleviate Eritrea’s acute problems is improving the relationship of both peoples. So I will try to touch the role of economic divorce as a cause and propose my view that “Let us think beyond the concept of an enemy towards Ethiopia. It is up to us to find a solution of the stigma associating “enemy and Ethiopia”. To begin with and say it explicitly, the peoples of both countries didn’t expect this war to have happened in such a way and as fast as it did. Because they were about to have a taste of stability and prosperity, post the three decades long war. In fact they were visualising a better utility of their endowment to cohabitate. But undeterred by good wishes or peace-prayers, or mediator attempts the sudden fracture in relationship between the two ruling parties was transformed into a sense of war-rivalry, determined to see the elimination of the loser. In line with this sudden explosion of an all-out war and to the dismay of historians, there existed a huge difference in awareness and preparedness, (be it to fight a war or to look for a peaceful alternative) among the peoples of both countries. In other words: 1. EPLF’s Eritrea and the war. a) Eritreans were immersed into this war, deprived of proper information. Right from its inception, the spectrum of the problem was obscured intentionally, by enlisting causes and causes of causes. So war had been waged by leadership view, rather than a consensus of informed public or parliamentary debate, concerning the necessity to fight in defence of a threatened national interest, if there was any. Too sad, it will be, for the generation-now, when reviewing the cost-benefit ratio of this event. b) With the dawning of the long awaited independence from Ethiopia: Eritreans, not only accredited the EPLF to be their uncompeted government, but also over trusted it, to the extent of allowing seniors from the x-fighters to:- (i) Replace the traditional and cultural value of elders in playing the role of maturity and leadership in daily life. (ii) Replace professionals from their jobs or intervene in micromanaging daily socio economic events: (i.e. almost all formal office responsibilities, trade, legal and administrative systems, of the government) were assigned to x-fighters as a reward for their role in the three decades long armed struggle, for independence. As proven hitherto, this view, was too much in the real world and has issued what the EPLF's Eritrea is now reaping. Consequently contrary to expectations it lead to:- (i) The build-up of patriarchal ruling party that behaves as if it owns the nation and its peoples. And only time will tell, the percentage of the wholistic activity of this party, in piling on, or alleviating the agony of the Eritrean peoples, relative to their historical ambitions to prosper and live a real life, post their long awaited independence. (ii) A culture of idolizing its first leader, to the extent of accrediting him as divinely anointed to lead the country, or consider him endowed with prophecy and irreplaceable leadership. Thus the fate and ambitions of the Eritrea-of-now, fell at the mercy of the office of a man, who dislikes being disliked! And would never allow access for people to know what he believes in or what he wants to do, regarding national interests. With no exaggeration it was impossible to conceptualise what he really is, till the outcomes of this war (of rivalry), which pushed public disappointment beyond the threshold limit of tolerance. It is this, of his style that is dooming not only his careers in power and politics, but also is issuing existential challenges to the Eritrea-of-now, while questioning the viability of negotiation, reconciliation and harmony of living together among Eritreans. Hence the acute, self-promoted culture of the ruling-party produced unaccountable governance that finally committed suicide by indulging into chain of wars, with Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen and finally Ethiopia. In addition to the above-mentioned cultural failure within the EPLF, the international diplomatic environment and the TPLF or Woyanes also had a huge contribution in this process of lionization. Particularly the Ethiopian side portrayed him as the most talented leader within the EPLF and relied thoroughly on his power and role in designing policies of common denominators. Needless to mention the negative impact of this, lionized personal animosity in leadership, on the failures of all the attempted mediation efforts. If there is some thing questionable here, letting public affairs to be public, (by the mediators), even now, can sooth a lot of discomforts on the way to recovery.
2. The management of same situation by the TPLF's Ethiopia. The Ethiopian peoples were better informed by their government, which also took the advantage of allowing public debate about this contagious national issue. Several seminars and consultations, involving scholars, elderly and religious leaders, were conducted and released accordingly, in their national TV and radio stations. This arose public awareness about a threat in national interest. Plus a historical fact, the Ethiopian government did, was an official invitation of all Eritreans and Eritro-Ethiopians who were living in that nation, to discuss the issue. Comparatively the Eritrean government never allowed such type of a discussion throughout the process of the war and its related consequences. Though most Eritreans wouldn’t believe or accept it, here follows a brief account of my experience about this particular event. Just few weeks after the explosion of the war, May 1998: all Kebeles in the capital Addis Ababa, distributed a short script to almost all Eritreans and Eritro-Ethiopians living in their vicinity, inviting the individual mentioned by name, to participate in public discussion concerning the current dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The letter, which looks like a simple card of invitation to a wedding ceremony, (as is common in Eritrea and Ethiopia), attracted the deserved response. The number of participants, reminded me the day of referendum, to see such a big number of Eritreans gathered for a single meeting, in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Any way it happened!! And the meeting was started by a brief introductory explanation from the coordinator, which was followed by questions and answers. To cite some points of his speech, the coordinator said the followings in a manner very palatable to the ears of the audience: Dear Eritreans it is clear for all of us our relationship with Shaebia is being eroded by the recent conflict, said to be a border dispute. As you are fully aware: It started on a border guard-site near the small town of Badme. It happened when few Eritrean soldiers and military officers arrived to cross an Ethiopian border-control site, with their arms.They were confronted by the Ethiopian guards, disallowing them to enter, while armed. Need it be they were told to enter, leaving their guns at the site, so that they can collect it on their way back home. Unfortunately they refused. And this refusal, resulted in a fire exchange, with a number of deaths from both sides. This was the first phase of the war. In a couple of days time, the second phase of the war, that involved thousands of Eritrean infantry, tanks and artillery devastated, many Ethiopian villages and small towns in the vicinity. Worse now the Eritrean army is refusing to return back to its original site. And we are demanding for the return of our local authorities to their original place, in order to continue our sovereign-right of administration and reinstate the disrupted living conditions there. Hence the Eritrean army should leave the town of Badme and its surroundings to Ethiopia. As explained by the Eritrean government, the first phase of the war, took the lives of Eritrean officers and others. Yes they are right, and we feel deep sorrow, as your sorrow is our sorrow too. (hazenkum hazena slezkone). Worse the second phase of the war, incurred huge number of loses in Ethiopian life and property. And still we believe in the truth that, this, our sorrow, is also your sorrow. (hazena hazenkum slezkone). That is why we are saying no need to rush for a revenge of a fight. But the question now is, we are asking them to respect Ethiopian right to administer the town, and just start a legal case, if they ever feel to have a claim over the land. But so far the response seems a reflection of a contrary assessment. And if this situation persists long, consequences will be too bad for all of us: as there can not be peace in Addis Ababa, if there is no peace in Badme as well as any other place of Ethiopia. Hopefully, mediators from the OAU and other friendly governments are trying to help us in getting a peaceful solution, but we feel obliged to inform and consult you about the issue, which is the aim of our presence here, today. Specifically we need your voice against the illegality of measures being undertaken by Shaebia. Public response was more of fear and stunned silence. But there were some, men and women who dared to condemn, the style of propaganda campaign, concerning the war by the Ethiopian mass media. There were also some participants, openly instructing the people not to ask questions or not to comment on the issue. But what strikes my memory is, the comment of a gentleman on his late seventies and who had lived in Ethiopia for ages, prospered and raised his children there. He said, " we are Ethiopians as well as Eritreans, through out the seven years of independence we have been following the instructions of both governments equally. In fact our ambition was to see both of you rewarded the peace Nobel Prize like the Farengis (whites). To the utter death of our hopes, you are now showing us an incredible failure. We feel ashamed of both of you, as we cry for our fate and the futurity of our nations. How can you come to us, to the uninformed people with such a failure only within seven years of governance? I do not hesitate that, you need a reminder that seven years, in the age of nations is a glimpse of the eyes. Etiw keybelas quak abela!! He used this tigrigna proverb, to conclude his speech saying, ...more is expected from both of you, please. But he stressed and said, we ask the one who is claiming a land that does not belong to him, to respect the rule of law. Otherwise we as people can do nothing except comply with government orders. We are not able to say specifically this land belongs to you or to the other side. (ente eti zeynatu zdeli zelo gin higi kekbir nilimno). I believe this was the appropriate reply, to verify the wonders of what, the Ethiopian side expected from the people attending the meeting. By no mistake, most of us went there to hear better news rather than diagnose, discuss and decide a strategy of reconciliation for such a contagious issue. Definitely we lacked an experience of the expected conclusion and never understood why it was happening like that, still we believed on the possibility of its quick reversal to normality. Unfortunately the outcome of this event for Eritreans living in Ethiopia was, a negative assessment of their view or silence in the meeting. Hence it was politically exploited, as a factor, to justify all the in/actions during the management of our fate, by deportation, deprivation and many other historical guilties. Incredibly we were condemned as supporters of the war and Shaebia, merely for not condemning it. On the other hand, it is also a strong belief of most Eritreans that, even condemning Shabia according to the agenda of the meeting, wouldn't had reversed this historical event, which is claimed to be a pre-planed act of the new hands in Ethiopian power. Any way I do not have a dream of reversing the irreversible. My view is Shaebia cannot manage this public issue, it is we the people!! Who can manage and solve it.
The failed mediation efforts. A second miracle in this conflict is, the failure of the mediation efforts. Fore heavens sake!! Why did all the mediation efforts, for a peaceful alternative failed completely, precipitating this historically fatal war? Yes!! A war that stooped finally to the rule of law, after being soaked with too much but avoidable blood of innocent Eritreans ad Ethiopians. Worse! Unnecessarily polluted with countless crimes and social evils, and finally rendering incompatible "isms", to grease the steep slope on the way to recovery. There are many Eritreans and Ethiopians who accuse the opposite side for its pre-planned ambition in this war. Commonsense assures that, there cannot be a single analysis that can satisfy both diverging points of view. Unquestionably, the physical aspect of this war was initiated as a single and simple border skirmish that provoked vicious escalations with a mood that turned fast too wild. And now history needs to record: If there can be any reasonable justification for the inevitability of this war. What was the aim of the war, on the basis of common or conflicting national interests? What is the reason behind the Gerusalemisation of Badme after the war, and worse post the verdict of the international Tribunal on mid-April 2002? So if war or law could not solve the problem, it indicates that there is a misdiagnosis of the ailment. And we need to do more than what we have been doing to save our selves and our people in order to minimise irreversible damages on our ambition in nation building. Subsequent events have already vindicated that, some of its long-term effects, specifically in Eritrea, will be: (i) a measurable shift and ambiguity in the futurity of its politics, and in shaping the value of its post independence aspirations in Eritreanism. (ii) Poverty and dependency on foreign aid for several years. ((iii) Above all, it has exhausted the credibility of Shaebiaism within and outside the nation, and has opened the eyes of most Eritreans, to visualize a new Eritrea minus the monopolization of Shaebia. Though, Eritrea-of-now will still need a dynamic, evolving and competitive Shaebia. In pondering the radical turning point towards a cease-fire in this war: it was a war-result, better palatably said, a managed retreat that softened the sting of defeat. Otherwise what was asked or mediated prior to war was too little relative to what had been accepted after the war. The governing decree of the cease-fire became a non-negotiated Ethiopian proposal. This phenomenon closed the chapter of mediations, leading the case to the International Tribunal of The Hague Netherlands, needless to mention the inevitable impacts of the war and its results on the verdict. I believe the futurity of a healthy Eritro-Ethiopian neighbourhood, a must! Needs deeper diagnosis into the cause of the war. Given the historical, cultural and religious common values, plus their socio-economic need for one another. A post-war renovation of their relationship needs more pragmatic interventions by us the people. However, mediator roles of the many senior politicians like Mr. Herman Cohen, President Kagame, President Museveni, President Hassan Gullet, Mr. Mohamed Sahnun, President Abdulaziz Butafelika, Mr. Antony lake, Signor Rino Sieri, Mr. Robert Cook..,The EU delegation, showed only, change of faces, at different times, for the same purpose but without bringing any transforming new energy. These gentlemen should have something hidden to tell us concerning their expensive tours to Asmara and Addis Ababa, at least for the cultivation of sustainable peace. But their inhibition is, mainly due to the nature of global politics and diplomacy, swaying in favour of benefiting the actors with power rather than the disadvantaged people, thus justice vanishes. Otherwise if they were to react openly by expressing their assessment of every visit to Asmara and Addis Ababa, of course on the basis of international standards pertaining the issue, huge number of deaths could have been avoided plus a lot of wasted resources could have been saved. Such a pragmatic approach, particularly in Eritrea, could have stimulated awareness among its information-deprived population. Because the ruling party monopolizes all the resources of propaganda, and applies it to divert information in a way it wishes. This rendered the Eritrean people ill informed about the actual status of the situation or the scope of the in-coming war. In fact the time given to differentiate causes and effects of the war was, too short, that people are still confused in identifying which is which, even at the end of the physical war. It was due to this influence that, the ruling party was successful, in its application of the expired propaganda, considering Ethiopia as an invader, colonizer or as a land-locked country always looking to annex the port of Assab, in defining and justifying its own asserted reason behind the war. The significance of the economic divorce in the war. Rewinding the cassette of my memories of May, June and July 1998, reminds me the following event. During the eruption of this war, unlike the Ethiopian side there was no information dissemination from the Eritrean side. But after considerable number of days, ambassador Girma Asmerom called a press conference at the Eritrean embassy office in Addis Ababa. His Excellency opted to deliver his speech in Amharic. And within a few minutes to the meeting, a reporter asked the following question. Reporter: “Kibur ambassador yihch Badma Yeman nat?” Dear Ambassador to whom does this Badme belong? Ambassador: “Badme…eh! Yegna nat Yenesum nat.” Badme is ours and theirs! This answer was followed by an immediate and violent disruption of the meeting. And it proved that his Excellency didn’t know to whom the disputed land Badme belongs even after the first war. So I believe that, the commonly asserted reason behind this war, i.e., a border dispute, is not appropriate enough to verify or cover the reason behind or justify the goal for the inevitability of this war. By no mistake it is mainly a failure in managing the introduction of economic-divorce, attempted 7 years later, after the most admired, but incomplete, political-divorce that had been accompanied by a strategic policy of relationship, polluted with politics of friendship. Eritrea’s ruling party managed such public or national affairs without the slightest consultation of people. It grieves me to have to say it, but it has only itself to blame. Incredibly it is still is falling prey in the hands of its leadership, that lacks skill to adapt to changes, and courage to admit a mistakes. To show that all members in the leadership, are family of believers, no body threatened to resign formally or no one was sacked for a disagreement on principles of managing the issue till the end of the war rivalry. This is too bad for the Eritrean people trusting such leaders ignorant or negligent to the responsibility of their power. And still after the war, the venue of a peaceful recovery is too far, in the Eritrea-of-now, with no change of hand in power for new thinking. A point of surprise here is the advisory role of the old professors, perhaps Marxists, but definitely earning a fat salary of the UN-institutes, for their role of expertise in the making of a modern Eritrean government. Just to remind them, experts see things in much more differentiated form, that’s what makes them experts. And “the wrong view of the future might be worse than no view at all”. I wonder what money is worth for them, to serve in such a governing structure, with no visible professional hand for job satisfaction. In such a situation, where a nation is destroying its people they could not suggest the principal difference between the people and the mountains said to be threatened. Freedom came to the Eritrean People and the mountains are there to the benefit of the people but not the reverse. Oh my God!! silence is a historical crime, when telling the truth to power as well as to the public, could have prevented further complication of the peace-route. Otherwise intellectual dedication, to power and benefits and condemning to despair the ambitions of the generation-now is taking us to decline and perhaps to the disintegration of that nation. “ The more we know, the more clearly we realize what we don’t know, and this probably explains why we find so few scientists and scholars among politicians, unlike them.” Perhaps the presence of their families in Europe and the USA is enough to lose their sensitivity to what is going on in the unlucky Eritrea.
The role of power in the emerging economic divorce. To begin with, Ethiopia and the new state Eritrea followed diverging economic policies under a single currency, till 1998, despite their political-divorce, in 1991. Details of their economic integration and the spectrum of divergence in their policies are beyond the scope of this article. But I feel safe to say, contrary to the complexity of the issue, all official processes done by that time reflected, too much tolerance and flexibility of the Ethiopian side, paralleled by an immeasurable sensation of lionization of the Eritrean side. More particularly, Mr. Isaias Afeworki, the so expected to be, George Washington of the new state, Eritrea, or one of those said to be young democratic leaders in the transformation of Africa. At the beginning many analysts dared to give him the credit of engineering the qualitatively new, Ethio-Eritrean relationship, post the school of independence-war. To mention an example, of this type of view, I would like to repeat what Mr. Meles Zenawi said by the time, when his life was seriously threatened by malaria attack, of the plasmodium Falciparum type. Thanks to the Americans who rushed to send a military plane, that took him to Israel, which was said to have the nearest and best, know-how of medical facilities, able to treat such an acutely dangerous infection. Anyway, few days after this incident, news about Ethiopia's readiness to send a plane to carry Mr. Isaias to the treatment centre, circulated along with the unexpected and feared probable outcomes of the illness. Keeping this in mind, a reporter interviewing him, asked: whether Ethiopia were to send a plane for the above mentioned purpose. In his reply to this question, Mr. Meles Zenawi said, it was only the immediate arrival of the Americans; that cancelled the flight of our plane to Asmara. Need it be, he said, Ethiopia was ready to send its plane in reply to the request of an airplane for emergency-aid, from the new state Eritrea to save the life of its first president. Because his existence and his role is decisive to the sustainability of the qualitatively new but sensitive strategic-relationship, initiated among our countries. In fact another very delicate issue, I remember from that particular time is: the chairmanship of a meeting of the ruling party, EPLF, in the absence of Mr. Isaias, held at Dongolo was shared by two, i.e., Mr. Haile Woldetinsae Mr. Alamin Mohamed Said. Definitely this incident verifies the traditional ambiguity of a second person in the political hierarchy of the EPLF. In fact it magnifies the culture of power-dominance and the concentration of decision-making, within this very closed and secretive organisation. Surprisingly he ventured his sick-leave trip to Israel, with a policy about succession, "Don't worry, I am not going to die." This event critically questions, the ability of the ruling party, in transforming itself into a benchmarked government. Any way lucky they were, he was saved, simply enabling the continuation of their tradition, without any sign of a visible effort towards reversing this trend. Alas!! to Eritrea and Eritreanism, this ruling party, had never shown any sign of efforts in speculating governance without him till the emergence of the chapter of economic divorce from Ethiopia. And the complexity of this issue of conflicting interests demanded inevitably flexibility, new skills and above all new faces, i.e., experts. Yes! I mean experts, not of the type of scientists of American globalisation nor of the type of seniority in the struggle for independence (mkur-tegadalay)!!! But experts of the type who know the Ethiopian neighbourhood to Eritrea. Worse, a change of hand in power of the Ethiopian side, proved to be different in managing the more complex economic divorce. And it verified to be: a) Relatively less compromising, regardless to the emerging fragility of relationship among the ruling parties. b) More pragmatic towards establishing a benchmarked relationship signalling the maturity of time to apply the full definition of the less than decade old Eritrean independence. d) Apply an economic muscle in twisting the arm of a rival, given the previous economic marriage at its hand. On the contrary the Eritrean side: a) Relied on the hard power of its asserted possession of a military might or thirty years of experience, plus the myth of leadership talency in the ruling party. In fact a letter that circulated in Asmara, during the eruption of the war, throughout the ruling party structure, assured a 100% VICTORY in the war. With no time, the first and the biggest issue, became this said to be imminent victory, which confused and diluted reasoning about the incoming war. And denied a place for public disappointment in the management of the conflict. Specifically it eclipsed the opportunity of questioning the need to fight the war, in order to find a solution for a border dispute. The attention of the un-informed Eritrean peoples was thwarted by this ill information that lead to a progressive loss in sensing and measuring the reality. Hence no Eritrean, be it some one from within the state, or from the renowned scholars in the Diaspora, dared to propose an alternative strategy or mind the Eritrean public of the potential dangers of this war. Otherwise there was no reason to anticipate victory from a full-scale war, in a nation about which its citizens were deprived of the proper information. Worse it is an irresponsible act of betrial to the national interests, to declare "war-victory" prior to informing the public about the core of the problem and the reason to fight. In fact it was conducted to acquire prestige in a game of regional rivalry: as it had been clearly stated by the leader of the ruling party, "Menyu goblel naizi zoba nimflay zigber qunat'yu". b) Plus the EPLF adhered to the aged inherited belief, of the type of an expired propaganda of the past Ethiopian regimes: that "Eritrean port services are essential for the existence of Ethiopia", or in their absence, Ethiopia will risk famine, poverty, decline and disintegration. That is why Eritrean propaganda focused too much on the so called agenda of Ethiopia's claim to take the port of Assab, though Mr. Meles Zenawi used to state this, clearly that "Assab is out of question" in this war. And described the Assab-of-now, as a port that cannot serve, the owner Eritrea or any other neighbouring country. He said, even in the future, Assab should prove to be competitive for its services, in order to attract the renewal of Ethiopian interests, relative to Djibouti. To surprise the mood of some Eritreans regarding the role of Assab port services to the Ethiopian economy, he stressed on the strategy of improving the capacity of Ethiopian economy, as a strength to enjoy competitive outcomes of nearby ports, including Assab in order to sell their services to the land locked Ethiopian market of 60 million peoples. c) Perhaps the designer of the wave of triumphalism, took fore granted that, the existence of a TPLF dominated government in Ethiopia, as it is still now, will not play a trade-off with the supporting hand of the EPLF military muscle. In summary the post-political divorce (1991-1998) history of these countries had seen many evolving phases. 1.Initially the Ethiopians (TPLF) complied with many demands of the EPLF, perhaps: (i) They prioritised, focusing on the stabilisation of the remaining parts of Ethiopia. (ii) They wanted to see Eritreans do their own homework, to satisfy their demand in the determined fight till independence. 2. They admitted openly the need of time to rehabilitate Ethiopianism. To cite an example, Mr. Meles Zenawi was saying repetitively, during his early hours in power: "Ethiopiawinet kibir hono megegnet mechal alebet", meaning: let to be an Ethiopian be able sign of dignity!! "Ethiopiawinet tefelagi hono mekreb mechal alebet", meaning: let to be an Ethiopian be a desirable issue!! 3. Plus they reflected a clear vision that, the actual Eritrean situation, demands nothing less than, responding to their asserted causation for such a long war, in order to achieve a sustainable peace in Ethiopia. They were deadly convinced that the actual Eritrean status can not be satisfied through a compromise of an affordable alternative route, other than an appropriate response to their demand. Hence they accepted Eritrean independence, in whatever way it comes, either in response to a colonial question or even by secession, if they disliked Ethiopianism. Luckily this was supported by the fact that, it was an already proven historical fact that, other options applied to solve the Eritrean case by previous Ethiopian governments were prohibitively expensive or worth only failures. 4. They understood the dissociation of Eritreans from the reality of Ethiopia. Because the three decades old war for independence is enough to cultivate an Eritrean-mind with no good news about Ethiopia. So concluded that, it is worthless investing hard power to win or convince the reversal of such a reality. Hence thanks to, Mr. Meles Zenawi's wise assertion and courage to challenge the long standing, belief of, "a land locked-Ethiopia without Eritrea will be paralsed or dead." And he has successfully converted this assumption in to a business game stating: "Let us see which one of us can exist in the absence of the other, need it be!!" And this is a big assignment to Eritreans. On the other hand the new state Eritrea was welcomed locally and globally with cheer and bright expectations, for its probable potency to become a model of success story to modern Africa. This was an exhilarating assumption, accompanied by speculations about its economic success, to the extent of expecting an out-performing potency to be the Taiwan or the Singapore of Africa. The global conclusion was, a vision of a sustainable peace and the rule of law, in the war-ravaged horn of Africa. Because out of the above mentioned trend the following forecasts seemed to be feasible: a) Ethiopia will have a reliable access to the sea. b) Eritrea will enjoy the Ethiopian market for its services, natural and industrial produces. But the impacts of their success stories, over a common enemy, issued different results in both countries. Particularly the evolution of both parties happened to be different. The EPLF proved to be: a) Careless to the power of culture and excluded the people. It fostered a culture of not questioning official statements and views of officials about internal affairs of the nation, and forbids citizens to discuss about it. This negligence of the culture of people is seen by the incredible venture in Sawwa: a sort of social engineering in the name of military training, with no single benefit in the cultivation of sustainable peace, civil society reconstruction and development. Anyway when this caused public expectations to overturn, people resorted to what amounted to be an undeclared passive protest: loss of initiation and creativity. And it fostered sense of negligence or passivity, commonly expressed as: "let them do what they want to do and let us wait and see". This has killed the creative brilliance of the generation-now, in education, business and other forces that drive growth: badly needed for that impoverished land. Fore sure that is why Eritreans, of course those who can afford, are voting on foot. It is now part of daily news that Eritreans are flowing to Italy, via Sudan and Libia. By no mistake, Sudanese refugee camps are hosting the highest number of Eritrean boys and girls of the most active working age, in their history of kind accommodation to Eritrean refugees. Given the actual trend in Eritrea, I wonder what a miracle could have been seen if Ethiopia were to opt to host Eritrean refugees. To sum up the EPLF has excluded the people, till the exhaustion of patience of its worshipers. b) Monopolistic:- in power, national resources and information. It followed a rigid and centralised economic policy that monopolised every sector of the economy. Worse it applied an economic-might, run in the name of its elite members killing the creativity and business ambitions of trade oriented Eritreans and shattered the smallest open market that existed even during the communist regime of the Dergue. Needless to remind that, given the proper attention to neighbourhood, the strongest economic pillar of the new nation stems from its endowment that, large number of its population, not only know but also are able to play active roles in the profitable neighbouring markets of the Sudan and Ethiopia. Unfortunately the indulgence in this war has paralysed such an opportunity, thwarting the ambitions of Eritrean business people. c) Phobic to:- 1. Evaluations and benchmarking standards: No open recruitment exams, merit appraisals, and performance checks. 2.Critisim, transparency and accountability 3.Choice, competition and Higher education. 6.Diversity:- instead it adhered to slogans like: "hade lbi hade hzbi", meaning: One people one heart!! "hzbi Eritrea kem hade sidra", meaning: The Eritrean peoples are, same as one family! Worse a common response to a reaction, of a different view, that might not admire the EPLF, appeared to be: "Emberdo Eritrawi Eyu". i.e. Is he really an Eritrean? d) addicted to: 1. Unpaid forced labour: throughout the decade old period of independence all Eritrean youngsters, have gone to serve in the army or unpaid labour services in agricultural fields, road construction sites, despite the fact that no country has developed in such a way. And human development is substituted by such a fruitless endeavour. Worse all projects are lead by military officers where professionals of diverse qualification are seen to serve under their directory. The longer the time of this imposed mandatory service, the more the person gives up hope in life. e) unable to: 1. Think small or plan a measurable one, within the boundaries of the capacity of the nation. Instead its ever, overestimation of its capacity, dares to deliver over promising propaganda of its ability to challenge even the global master plan designers. 2. Modernize by accepting the inevitable demand to design policies in the right direction, in line with new world's demand for new thinking. Instead it enjoyed a communist like bureaucracy, unmatched even by the misdeeds of the Mengistu regime. 3. Negotiate and reconcile for an agreement to disagree more politely, in case a need arises, like the wars with Yemen over the Ziqur Hanish archipelago, or the so called border dispute with Ethiopia, 5. Leave its old habits of the bush life, though thirty years of entrenched behaviour can not simply be banished with the wave of a hand, the lack of commitment to improve or the lack of readiness to embrace change, in order to end its self-estrangement and join the concert of developing, democratic countries or facilitate the integration of its members to civilian community and culture of the Eritrean peoples. 6. Learn from history, whatever future awaits, the past will be no guide, and time moves only in one direction, which is the future. Nothing was done to shake the party out of its complacency. It lacked the right lessons from the bloody war for independence to save this poor country from getting poorer. On the other hand the TPLF appeared to be quick in adapting a relatively dynamic culture of governance relying on diversity and unity. In fact it is not a mystery but a historical tangibility that it cultivated a new interest of Eritreans towards Ethiopia and Ethiopianism. These were some Eritreans: a) From within the new-Eritrea and those already established in Ethiopia. b) From Eritreans in the Diaspora, c) And above all from many x-combatants of the 30-years war for independence. d) Needless to mention the extraordinary development in Ethiopianism among Ethiopians of Eritrean origin, who used to pretend to be Eritreans during the period of struggle for independence, because of their attachment to an Eritrean background. The TPLF initially handled the new nationality- Eritreanism, by disseminating openhearted information about Ethio-Eritrean fraternity and practicing an open-minded policy, of healing the wound and welcomed new Eritreans who would like to settle in Ethiopia. This strategic approach won the hearts of many Eritreans, including me. Particularly many of those dismayed by the negative reply to their proposal of new ideas and their insistence to carry them out, in Eritrea, decided to make Ethiopia another home. And we are waiting our Ethiopian brothers to tell us the legal explanation of the sudden deprivation of our Ethiopian citizenship. Unfortunately our choice to be Ethiopians as well as Eritreans was short lived. And has opened the awful chapter of deportation, accompanied by too many social evils, Needless to mention its intentional deprivation of rights and impoverishment. 3. The effects of Sawwa in the coming Eritrea. Sawwa is a vast plane of land turned to be a military training camp of the independent Eritrea. Our nation has invested an incredible amount of its scarce resources in building this military training centre, which is completely irrelevant in the modernization process. In fact it showed nothing more than the weakness of its designers, verifying their inability to plan beyond the spectrum of physical war and couldn't visualize the discrete role and meaning of the people and mountains in nation building. There is a common assertion that military training is essential for defence purposes. But Sawwa has ventured beyond that by shaking the stability of the nucleus of the nation: the family. It has rendered the image of the nation to be hostile and militaristic. Rather than contributing in the defence of national interests, it has become an element that frightens the security of others. Fore the Eritreans of the generation-now and the futurity of their state, history will testify, what this fertile land Sawwa has done in degenerating the generation-now and stooping the power of now to the prescription of a power ambitious ruling structure. Fore sure Sawwa was built mainly to foster a generation, loyal to the ruling structure, which in fact has ruined the country. The produces of Sawa can be summarised as follows: 1. Pollution:- the average mind in Eritrea does not know or is not yet informed to accept that, the country is not only one of the poorest but also one of the most polluted states in the globe, unfortunately not an industrial pollution to do economic evaluations. It is pollution from water insoluble and poisonous metallic remaining of fired ammunitions, cans of military-food or bullet containers, destroyed tanks and other military vehicles. To give an example, I dare to assume that 250,000 Eritreans have passed through Sawwa, up to now. Let a newly recruited soldier fire minimum 100 bullets during a course that averages 2-3 months, and if he throws a can of container a day in his consumption. It will simply mean that Sawwa contains:- a) Fired bullets:- "250,000*100=2,500,0000" b) Used cans:- 1*30*3*250000=22,500,000" c) Add to this the contribution of the number??? of foreign soldiers like the Ethiopian Oromos and the Sudanese SPLA, who pass through that training centre. Only time will tell the degree of the incurred toxicity and environmental damage in Sawwa. d) Add to this the accumulation of similar materials in the Sahel region during the 30 years of independence war. e) Add to this the accumulation of similar materials during the war of 1998-2000, which covered the most densely populated part of the nation. So one can safely deduce that a government that cheers the quality of the colonial architecture of its capital Asmara, and mobilizes the residents once a year to collect waste materials like plastic bags (festal!), cigarette boxes or others, is hiding the degree of pollution that country is incurring due to its militaristic policy. 2. AIDS dissemination: all Eritreans of the age group 18 to upper 40ies are serving in the army. Males married and unmarried, from rural and urban areas, some of them up to the age of 50 are serving in the army, which includes unmarried females up to their 40ies. Unquestionably this situation has lead to the dissemination of different Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS throughout the nation. The health status of many Eritreans serving in the army is also being challenged by chronic infections like malaria and tuberculosis. And only time will tell its impacts on the economy and family structure of the nation. 3.Desrtification, decade old trees have been fetched by the army to build world war-1 type trenches and to make fire for cooking. Plus the wealth of wild and domestic animals has fallen to its minimum level in history. 4. Cultural dissolution: rather than integrating its members into the traditions of the people the EPLF ventured in a sort of social engineering to transform the Eritrean youth into its ambitious but un benchmarked dreams. 5. Impoverishment: never in their history, Eritreans have experienced such a level of poverty. It is now common to see Iranian onions or Yemeni potatoes in the Eritrean market. Worse EPLF's Eritrean market is hosting even imported table salt, which is the most easily available natural product of the nation, Needless to mention the absence of meat, eggs, milk and citrus fruits from the house of an Eritrean family with a monthly income of a professional level. Nowadays disease of malnutrition are not rare even in Asmara.
The emergence of the new Eritrean currency. Post their political divorce, 1991, both countries started to utilize the inherited, currency, "Ethiopian Birr", in an impoverished single market. At the beginning a minimum allowance or consideration was given, to the inception of their separation, inevitably leading to competition and conflict of interests. So both parties could agree and trust each other at ease in many of their common denominators, which can be summarised as follows:- EPLF’s ERITREA. (a) Both enjoyed a victory against a common enemy, the Mengistu regime, which was hated very much by the then available parameters in both countries, while possessing relatively the same sized-pocket, with no income difference, or no measurable income on either side, that can trigger any conflict of interests. Above all the spirit of comradeship or friendship was based on the dislike of the dictator and became the basis of their agreement to enjoy the Ethiopian market together. The famous word of most Eritrean authorities, TRUST, can be the produce of this phenomenon. But contrary to the asserted Eritrean ambitions to integrate both economies under dual currency, the new Eritrean currency was named "Nacfa" in memory of the historical town during the war of independence. This town though a blessed historical site, in the history of Eritrean struggle for independence, it is also a place where most Ethiopian soldiers of the Dergue regime died fighting in the war. So the nomenclature didn’t consider the interests of the Ethiopian customer, given the Eritrean proposal of integrating both markets and both currencies. (b) EPLF's anticipated ambition to rely on the Ethiopian market was initially welcomed with a torch of green light, by the TPLF. A situation depicted by allowing free access to the luxurious Ethiopian market in consuming Eritrea's natural product, "table salt", and some industrial products like "Asmara Beer, shoes.....And of course, port services continued their tradition of serving Ethiopia. Not to mention the strategic exploitation of the Assab refinery. Some people say that, Ethiopia used to buy crude oil and then paid, in kind to Eritrea, i.e., 20% of the refined product as rent costs for its ownership of the entity. A lion’s share, that enabled Eritrea even export some refined petroleum products. But the timing period of issuing the currency didn't consider the change in hand in power within the TPLF. Specifically all matters concerning Eritro-Ethiopian relationships were completely taken away not only from the hands of Mr. Meles Zenawi but also from the hands of the central government. i.e. The government of Kilil-1 was becoming strongly autonomous in managing most of the affairs with neighbouring Eritrea. (c) Shaebia had a strong belief that Eritrean port services are irreplaceable to the newly rendered-landlocked, country, Ethiopia. To explain the grievances on this assertion, let me give one example of my experience. According to a monthly Gazeta of the Ethiopian chamber of commerce, "Nigdna limat", February 1998 G.C. or Yekatit 1989 E.C., a meeting between Eritrean port authorities from Assab and Masawa, with Ethiopian business community, was held under the auspices of the Ethiopian national chamber of commerce, in the capital Addis Ababa. Its aim was to find a solution to the mounting grievances of the business community regarding the port services. Unfortunately the outcome was disarray, where the Eritrean port authorities rejected or negated questions pertaining, loss of articles, delays, high store-rent costs, office hours and working languages, particularly the use of Arabic language instead of Amharic in posting notices from service delivering offices. Few days after this event, Ethiopian Maritime authority ordered its local clients to shift their services to the port of Djibouti. Though it proved to be too late, Eristas- Eritrea introduced a new decree of port-laws that goes beyond the fulfilment of the previous demands of Ethiopian business community. To add an insult to a wound, Maritime-Ethiopia and Eristas-Eritrea started accusing each other for breaching the agreement about port utility signed by both governments. Any way, whether it is a curse or a blessing, the Ethiopians discovered an alternative opportunity via Djibouti. Let me conclude this particular issue by the following statement, of an Eritrean man in his sixties, who worked as a truck driver for not less than thirty years. He told me "forget about the Ethiopians, it is a big loss for the Eritrean government, even me to know the way to Djibouti." ETHIOPIA. (a) Regardless to the traditional norm of considering Eritrea, not only as an Ethiopian region, but also an invaluable organ for the life of Ethiopia, TPLF's priority list of activity focused on shaping the futurity of the new Ethiopia without Eritrea. (b) TPLF's stand of solving the Eritrean question, by leaving the affairs to be done by the Eritreans was successful. Mr. Meles Zenawi was very pragmatic in his repetitive media-exposure to explain, the Eritrean question, to be out of the new-Ethiopian heart. A group within the TPLF leadership supported by some other members of the coalition, EPRDF, developed a new sensitivity and lack of tolerance towards many of their common economic denominators, by stressing mainly on the, said to be abused sector (by the EPLF). To mention some: variation in convention rate, utility of port services and the Assab refinery. This group was composed of TPLF leaders then ruling Tigray and lead by competitors of Mr. Meles. In fact they quickly implemented an, un-negotiated economic policy, towards any commercial item coming from Eritea or going to Eritrea from Ethiopia. The government of Kilil-1 (Tigray), imposed its own regulatory measures and levied tax without notifying the central government. This fact showed the emergence of a new power opposing the policy of Mr. Meles Zenawi in managing Ethiopian politics regarding its relationship with the new state Eritrea. Though this situation, of rejecting and disobeying the rules of the central government, was very clear and dangerous even to the average observer, Mr. Meles Zenawi missed the opportunity of cooperation from his old friend of the Eritrean side. On the one hand, the TPLF, established an organic organizational culture full of well-controlled ups and downs. And introduced a new constitution, with freedom of speech, writing and expression of ideas, never experienced in the history of the nation or else not tolerated by most African standards. This policy enabled it to acquire immunity, to live with opponents and their severe criticism. The success of its free market economic policy attracted the attention of many investors and foreign capital, including significant number of, Eritreans from in side and those in the Diaspora. On the other hand, the EPLF, came to be rigid and uncompromising. Internally, it excluded participation of local private capital and ventured to monopolise every aspect of business, with no feasibility study prior to intervention. Externally, its system of handling the common economic policy seemed to be smart to suggest better options or even criticise the governing Ethiopian policy of valuation and exchange rate economics. To general astonishment, it used to prescribe new standards with a free hand. However this smartness was not allowed to operate at home, in regulating and promoting activities of the new Eritrean currency, Nacfa. Another new economic strategy that emerged at th |