Origin of conflict, contributing factors, and mediation efforts. Updated: 06.24.08

RECENT HISTORY

Djibouti and Eritrea began the relationship of equals in 1993, when Eritrea formalized its statehood. Djibouti’s president, Hassen Gouled Aptidon, attended the ceremonies to commemorate Eritrea’s declaration of independence in April 1993. Mr. Abdella Adem (now the leader of the opposition group Eritrean Salvation Front) was appointed Eritrea’s first ambassador to Djibouti and he served from 1993 to 1996.

The first dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti occurred in April 1996 when Djibouti accused Eritrea of shelling Ras Doumeira and circulating an invalid map which incorporated Djibouti territories. Djibouti’s claims came four months into the Eritrea-Yemen war of December 1995. In all likelihood, the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti was about the usual disagreements of frontier people, dealing with access to land and water. In any event, the conflict was short-lived because at the time, Eritrea was in a state of war with Yemen (over Hanish Islands) and Sudan (having declared that Sudan’s regime change was Eritrea’s foreign policy.) It could not have a conflict with another neighbor, not yet anyway. 

In late 1998, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki accused Djibouti of being a conduit for Ethiopia’s war efforts and, to add insult to injury, Isaias snubbed Djibouti’s then-president, Hassen Gouled Aptidon, at an OAU function. President Hassen Gouled Aptidon took great offense at the snub and African diplomats who observed Isaias’s behavior were appalled because Hassen was then 82 years old. Djibouti broke off its relationship with Eritrea in November 1998, and subsequently dismissed Eritrea’s ambassador to Djibouti, General Ramadan Awliyay (less than a month into his service.)  

Isaias Afwerki immediately began doing what he does when he breaks off relationships with governments: he armed their opposition, in this case the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD.) 

The relationship between the two governments was repaired in 2001. By then, Aptidon had retired and Ismael Omar Guelleh had been elected president with, ironically, the support of FRUD. The heads of states exchanged visits—and it was relatively cordial through 2006, when Isaias Afwerki attended a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) meeting in Djibouti. 

ORIGIN OF CONFLICT 

The 2008 dispute is a top-down dispute: there were no issues percolating at the ground level that required governmental intervention. Unlike the 1996 dispute, this one is centered at the eastern terminus: in the coast of the Red Sea.  It appears to stem from Eritrea’s decision to have a military presence in the Eritrea-Djibouti border.     

In January 2008, Isaias had two meetings at Assab with local Djibouti officials where he gave them a courtesy briefing of where the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) will be re-positioned. It is unclear whether they understood the dual role of EDF (national development/national defense), whether they gave their consent or, if they did, whether they communicated it to their superiors. 

“The Eritreans asked in January if they could cross the border to get some sand to build a road. Instead, they occupied a hilltop and started digging trenches,” according to Djibouti officials who were interviewed by the New York Times.

By April, the presence of Eritrean troops had activated a reaction: Djibouti armed forces were within inches of the EDF, occupying the same hill. 

By May, Djibouti had already complained to the UN Security Council. It was only a matter of time before a break out of hostilities, which occurred on June 10 and 11^th.

POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS  

Border Dispute 

Thanks to the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, the Western terminus of the Eritrea-Djibouti border is fixed at 12 28.3’ N (latitude) and 42 24.1’ E (longitude.)  There isn’t such degree of detail for the eastern terminus or the line connecting the two.  

The Eritrea-Djibouti border is a result of a series of treaties between Ethiopia and France, and between England and Ethiopia. It is well defined, but not demarcated. 

One of the lessons of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute is that treaties that are reputedly indisputable, and landmarks presumed to be clear, never are.   

The eastern terminus is understood to be at Ras Doumeira.  Doumeira is the name of a hill, a hill range, an island, and a small village.  

Conventionally, the northern slopes of Ras Dumeira (the hill) are part of Eritrea and the southern slopes belong to Djibouti.  

About 10 kilometers south of Ras Dumeira, close to the coast, are the ‘Seven-Islands’ where the USA has a base. 

The further south the Eritrean forces go, the closer they get to Bab El-Mendeb, a location of such strategic importance that it is home to both France and the United States.  

Political 

For over two years, the government of Isaias Afwerki has been supporting and defending (and arming, according to UN Fact Finding missions) Somalia’s Union of Islamic Courts. After Ethiopia pushed them out of Somalia in December 2006, they slowly trekked to Asmara, eventually coalescing into the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007.  

The ARS was getting stronger, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was getting weaker and Ethiopia was getting stuck deeper and deeper into the Somali quagmire—such was the view of the Asmara government. The keys to Somalia were in Eritrea and Ethiopia—the Ethiopian version had been tried and failed, it was only a matter of time before the Eritrean version would be tried. Or so hope the Asmara government. 

Then, a new actor: Djibouti offered to mediate the TFG and the ARS. In Djibouti, a faction of the ARS signed a peace agreement with the TFG. The peace agreement is supported by Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations.  

Financial

Both Djibouti and Eritrea are small countries whose macro economic plans depend on generating significant revenues from providing their ports. 

Under normal circumstances, they would be competing for the same business—port services to Ethiopia and others in the shipping business; leisure to tourists, particularly those from the Gulf States; and military bases to rich countries, particularly the United States.   

The Eritrea-Ethiopia war of 1998-2000, and the subsequent non-implementation of the Algiers peace agreement, has worked to the great benefit of Djibouti and the great disadvantage of Eritrea on all fronts. Ethiopia is not using Eritrea’s ports; it is using Djibouti’s, whose management has been turned over to Dubai. The ports of Massawa and Asab stand idle despite massive investments to improve the infrastructure—whereas the port of Djibouti continues to operate at capacity.   

Finally, the United States, after flirting with the idea of establishing a base in Eritrea—and after intense lobbying by Eritrea, abandoned the project and chose, in 2002, to establish a presence at Camp Le Monier in Djibouti.  

Djibouti, which finds itself being courted by wealthy businessmen from the Gulf states, Europe and the United States, is also in the process of developing Al Noor, located 30 kilometers south of Asab, Eritrea. The Djiboutis have practically given Alnoor to investors including the Bin Laden family who have proposed building a suspension bridge that connects the Djibouti coast to Yemen.   

MEDIATION 

In our previous issue, we reported that the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the European Union (EU) and the United States have all called on Djibouti and Eritrea to resolve their dispute peacefully—either through direct negotiations or through the use of a mediators.  

Fact finding teams dispatched by the Arab League and the African Union to Djibouti and Eritrea were received in Djibouti—but not Eritrea. 

 The latest to make the call is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), an alliance of 19 African states, including Eritrea and Djibouti. 

COMESA has appointed a Council of Heads of States, chaired by Libya’s Colonel Muammer Ghadaffi, to meet with Isaias Afwerki and Ismail Omar Guelleh  in Cairo—a letter was already sent to the two leaders to that effect.   

Meanwhile, IGAD will also try to mediate between the two countries. Eritrea withdrew from IGAD and has not paid its membership dues since 2006. But in its last meeting, IGAD, which heard a closed-door report from Djibouti, passed a resolution mandating itself to have Eritrea re-join the organization. 

Other heads of states and senior officials are also approaching Isaias Afwerki offering their mediation services, but to no avail.   

One leader of an Arab country (whose identity will, for now, remain anonymous) was told by Isaias Afwerki: “This country”, referring to Djibouti, “doesn’t have the foundations of a state: it is made of Somali, Ethiopian, Yemeni and Eritrean refugees.” 

When Mustafa Osman, Sudan’s former foreign minister, offered to mediate between the two countries because he has good relations with Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Isaias turned down the offer and advised: “don’t get involved in this non-issue; we do not have a problem with Djibouti.” 

The United Nations Security Council has called on both Eritrea and Djibouti to diffuse the tension and directed both nations to re-deploy to their pre-tension positions. Djibouti has redeployed 5 kilometers; Eritrea has not. The UNSC, whose emergency meeting was convened at the request of Djibouti, also directed the Secretary General to send a fact-finding team to the area.