Early this year, I discussed a very important issue in an online forum. The issue was raised by A/Rahman Sayed (Bohashem), himself inspired by a certain academic article which appeared in the Journal of Democracy - “Pathways from Authoritarianism.” Authored by Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, the article describes the major types of autocratic governments and provides a scientific forecast of their “tenures.” By forwarding the article to the online forum, Bohashem invited comments. After reading my comments and that of others, he asked me to re-draft the comments in a post-able format for the benefit of the wider public. I agreed but was soon immersed in a daunting task which has utterly absorbed my time and energy until recently. A few days ago, I read a posting by a moKsi, who insinuated some sense of magic with the number “seventeen.” This reminded me of my promise to Bohashem.

Indeed, there is some magic with that number. But it is not only magic, coincidence or luck; scientifically, the kind of authoritarian regime we have in Eritrea lasts for about seventeen years. To grasp the whole idea, one needs to read the article by Hadenius and Teorell. What I will do on my part is provide a general overview of the kind of authoritarian regime we have back in home, compare the basic features of the regime with the points of reference identified by the authors of “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” and assess the prospect of regime change in Eritrea – if not “forecast” exactly. I am sure there is a great need for such ideas, as I was reassured by Bohashem.

According to Hadenius and Teorell, there are different types of autocratic regimes and their tenure is accordingly determined by their type. It is argued that the effect of regime type on tenure is crucial. The PFDJ is characteristically an amalgam/hybrid of personalist, military, and single-party regimes – although Eritrea never had even a single party election in the strictest sense. There are some similarities between personalism and sultanism, as indicated by the authors. Although Isias is not a sultanist, he is a personalist in the literal sense of the term in that he enjoys excessive and absolute concentration of power. In this sense, I am also using personalim to imply the cult of personality Isaias and his cohorts have constructed in the last 30 to 40 years. An interesting observation of the authors is that personalism alone may not be taken as a form of regime; it can only be taken as a supplementary feature of a regime. This is elaborated as follows: “The frequency with which the head of government is replaced serves as [an] indicator of the degree of personalism characterising a regime. In personalist systems, leadership changes are rare, for the logic of the system requires a personal persistence in power … the longer each chief executive stays in power, the more power will be concentrated in his or her hands.”

We have never seen any replacement of a head of government in Eritrea since 1991 and this is a typical trait of personalism in the nature of the PFDJ regime. According to the study, military regimes (one of the traits of PFDJ) are the most fragile and their life expectancy is the briefest. If you have an amalgam of a military, personalist and single-party regime, the regime is most vulnerable in terms of fragility and life expectancy. This is good news as far as PFDJ’s Emri is concerned. However, “the demise of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily signify the commencement of democratisation, as one authoritarian regime may simply give way to another.” I will come back to this point later.

Among the three modes of maintaining political power, the Eritrean regime continues to hold power via “the actual or threatened use of military force.” Using the terminology of Hadenius and Teorell “the [commanders of the] armed forces [in Eritrea] … exercise political power either directly or indirectly by controlling civilian leaders.” Accordingly, the PFDJ portrays a dominant trait of a military regime. But it is also a personalist and single-party regime, as I have already stated. At the same time, the terminology the authors use to describe the type of government in the DRC also fits correctly into the characteristic features of the PFDJ. Most of the time, the PFDJ pretends as a transformed rebel regime but in reality the major problem with this regime is that it has never transformed itself meaningfully into a modern democratic government. It still operates as a rebel regime with the name of a government.

The average lifespan of one-party regimes is 17.80 years (here comes the magic number!) and that of military regimes is 11.10. The study does not provide an average lifespan of a hybrid regime, like the one we have in Eritrea. Thus, neither the 11.10 nor the 17.80 would be properly apportioned to the PFDJ as the most fitting average lifespan. However, the average lifespan of a one-party regime, that is 17.80, can be taken as the closet estimation in the tenure of the PFDJ. I say this because the regime is already now in its 17th year of power (as “government”) and many of the indicative features of failure have already materialised incontrovertibly. At the risk of falling into a purely prophetic realm, I think 17.80 years is too long for a kind of ruthless hybrid regime such as the PFDJ. The regime has already spent 17 years since its coming to power in 1991, as the provisional and later on as the transitional government of Eritrea. Taking the above scientific extrapolation (17.80 years) as the closet average, what is left is an average of 0.80 year; it sounds too soon, ne! At this point, we can compare the PFDJ with the Derg. The latter was by far stronger than the former in terms of military might but it only lasted for 17 years. If the PFDJ lasts for more than 17.80 years, then I personally will have to make other plans … God forbid!

Let’s agree that this is merely a semi-academic or a “wishful” political discourse; what happens at last will only be seen with time. However, Hadenius and Teorell strikingly warn that in terms of the “correlation between years of executive tenure and the lifespan of authoritarian regimes,” personalist regimes can last longer. In the case of Eritrea, this risk is mitigated by the fact that the regime is not a purely personalist, rather a hybrid one.

Military/one-party regime, which scores the lowest rate of democracy, that is 1.1, is the most fitting type of hybrid regime in close resemblance with the PFDJ. According to the authors, this is the most repressive form government, “no surprise.” This is attributed to the fact that “these regimes combine two highly repressive forms of government.” This is exactly what the PFDJ does currently. Another interesting finding of the research is that “military dictatorships are more short-lived than one-party regimes.” Rebel regimes also have shorter life spans. All of these traits, at one or another time, accurately describe the nature of the PFDJ.

On the other hand, the authors also note: “The most durable regimes are either highly authoritarian or strongly democratic; it is the semiauthoritarian and semidemocratic regimes that are the most fragile.” The PFDJ may be described as a highly authoritarian. Does this mean that it is still most durable? This durability should not be interpreted to exceed the average lifespan of military regimes, as extrapolated by the authors (17.80 years). The most important point is the following, which I have indicated earlier: “The breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily signal the onset of democratic transformation.” The pioneering writers on transitions from authoritarianism, Guillermo O’Donnell et al, have also reached the same conclusion in 1986. This is the biggest challenge of Eritrean political forces at this time. There is a frightening figure in this regard revealed by Hadenius and Teorell: “In fact, from 1972 to 2003, 77 percent of transitions from authoritarian government resulted in another authoritarian regime.” This is what happened in Eritrea in 1991. It can again happen after the demise of the PFDJ, because as the authors rightly note “getting to democracy is much more difficult from a regime that has no tradition of political competition.” They conclude that “transitions from a dominant-party system or a pure one-party state to a democracy [are] far less common.” The authors then predict “for one-party countries that do not directly transition to democracy, a shift to nondominant limited multiparty government will raise the prospects for democratisation.” Although valid observation, this concern may also give rise to PFDJ scaremonger-ism, as put by Bohashem. But he then reaffirms that this “should not put us off from addressing the issue of “post tyranny scenarios.’”

Who knows, the current Eritrea-Djibouti crisis might be the last disaster to be fomented by the PFDJ. Are we ready for a post-PFDJ transition?