Compare the member groups of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance with the mass organizations of yesteryear. There are two differences: (1) whereas the mass organizations of the past were set up to serve groups sanctioned by communist ideologues--i.e., students, youth, women, workers—the member groups of the EDA are set up to serve different interest groups—groups organized on the basis of religion, ethnicity and political legacy; (2) whereas the mass organization of the revolution era were completely subservient to the parent organization, the member groups of the EDA are more powerful than, and function autonomously from, the EDA. Until the member groups of the EDA change this dynamic, the EDA will never be effective—and it will be essential to own up to the truth and declare it a worthwhile, but a doomed, initiative.
If the EDA needs a theme for its next meeting, now tentatively scheduled for March 30, it should be called, “Now or Never.” There is a limit to everything, and EDA’s “Do or Die” moment is fast approaching. We know the leadership of the EDA knows this; this is a call on them to act on this knowledge.
Lessons That Should Be Learned
The alliance of Eritrean opposition organizations was set up in March 1999. Then known as the Alliance of Eritrean National Forces (AENF), the umbrella group was comprised of 9 organizations and 1 individual. Since then, the alliance has changed its name a couple of times first to Eritrean National Alliance, then Eritrean Democratic Alliance; some of its member organizations have changed their names; new groups have been added; others have been dropped. The style of leadership has been modeled after various world bodies and it has evolved from a rotational basis, to representative election. Charters have been adopted, and charters have been modified. Criteria for membership have been stiffened and relaxed. There were walkouts and stalemates. Blocs were suggested, created and dissolved. Now, March 2008, the Alliance is, by any objective benchmark, exactly where it was 8 years ago: a dysfunctional parliament in exile.
Even a committed Eritrean political junkie cannot answer one puzzling question: why are there 13 political opposition organizations in Eritrea? By conventional standards, the only reason to create a political organization is to espouse a vision that is not espoused by existing organizations. From a political program standpoint, what is the difference between ELF, ELF-RC, Salvation, and EPM? Don’t they all advocate a liberal democratic state employing decentralized governance? What is the difference between the Federalist, Sagem, Red Sea Afar and Kunama movements? Don’t they all advocate a federal system on the basis of region or ethnicity? What is the difference between the two, soon to be three, Islamist organizations?
And herein lies the dilemma of the Alliance. The relative strength of the member groups within the Alliance is based on the perceived strength of the individual political organization. Thus, it has become in the interest of each political organization to devote all its resources to strengthening itself—and where there is a conflict between what is good for the Alliance or what is good for the member organization, the political actors choose what is in the best interest of their political organization because they see their primary role as that of providing service to their self-defined constituency. This is considered a safe bet: if the Alliance holds, it is a winning strategy because it strengthens the political organization’s hand; and if the Alliance fails, then, so what because no energy was vested towards it anyway.
The lesson that should be learned is this: political organizations cannot give formulas for governance unless they have a formula for bringing about change; a formula for bringing about change is meaningless, unless it has the support of the people; the support of the people will never be forthcoming so long as the organizations remain fragmented for reasons that are not consistent with the people’s interest.
What Will Not Do
A meeting which defines victory as having a meeting will not do. A meeting where there is no workable action plan, no strategy, to bring about change in Eritrea will not do. A meeting with yet another name change, without the accompanying structural change, will not do. A meeting where 15 political organizations describe their agreement on how to add on 15 more political organizations will not do.
Why? Because none of these proposals address the central question of: how do we bring about change in Eritrea? They only address the question of: how do we position ourselves to optimize our power in a post-change Eritrea? This is, to paraphrase an Eritrean adage, arguing about where to house the sheep, when the larger question is how to get the sheep.
What Is Needed
The member organizations of the EDA are made up of political parties and fronts. The discussion that should be going on within the opposition is not on which form of organization is preferred, but on how to have one organization. The choice is not between multiple political parties or fronts. What is needed is a formula for creating a movement.
Political parties and fronts are good at many things: advocating the principles of their membership; providing the public alternative visions; positioning themselves for power. This is all well and good—but premature. What is needed now is a movement: a movement can speak with one voice and it can focus like a laser beam on the one thing movements are good for: bringing about change.
Clarifying The Ethiopian Factor:
The joke in some quarters of the opposition is that 14 Eritrean political opposition groups will meet—13 of them are Eritrean; the 14th is the representative of the Ethiopian government. Ethiopian political agents have been courting, grooming whichever organization happens to be the flavor of the month.
In a previous editorial we stated (Be The Alternative You Seek, June 1, 2007) that “…given the current balance of power, the Eritrean opposition does not have the leverage to insist on equal status in establishing a tactical alliance with the Ethiopian government. However, we believe that the relationship, whatever its nature, must always be provisional and always the kind that can be freely debated and ratified by the legitimate power of the Eritrean people. A political entity that comes to power primarily due to Ethiopian military force will always owe its allegiance to those who placed it in power—and will see no need to campaign for popular legitimacy.”
We feared then, and we fear now, that the fragmentation and balkanization of Eritrea’s politics is encouraging Ethiopian “Bremerism.” Just like Iraq’s fragmentation allowed Bremer to run post-war Iraq; Eritrea’s fragmentation is inviting emboldened Ethiopian officials to dictate terms of “peace and stability.” (See also our editorial What Is With Ethiopia’s Rulers, 4/4/2006) We understand that respect is earned and not demanded; but an alliance for the benefit of the two countries should not be based on the fact that the opposition organizations are weak and that, therefore, an official can boss them around taking advantage of their weakness. This is bad politics and will hinder further cooperation and understanding. A fragmented opposition is a weak opposition—and a weak opposition is always prey to predators. By insisting on remaining small and fragmented, the Eritrean opposition organizations have presented an opportunity to the Ethiopian government’s agents to attempt to influence them—a fact that is often noted by whichever Eritrean political organization happens to be out of favor at any given time.
Creating A Movement
An honest assessment of the organizations, by the organizations themselves, would begin with this question: “why does my organization exist?” If they cannot explain it without reference to its leader, or to the leadership of a rival organization, then this is a clear admission that the whole reason for the existence of the organization is based on personalities and mistrust.
Thus, the question that should be asked is not, “why should I dissolve my organization?’ but, “why should my organization exist?”
The second question that should be asked is: “is my organization contributing to bringing about change in Eritrea or is it merely positioning itself for post-change Eritrean politics?” There will be plenty of time for posturing after change comes about; the important thing is to be a catalyst for change now. Regretfully, some organizations are so focused in the post-change Eritrea that they don’t even seem to care how, and by whom, change is brought about.
What we mean by this is that those organizations who are not actively involved in bringing about a change are not just unhelpful, but they are a detriment because they facilitate the diffusion of Eritrean political power and encourage foreigners to set the agenda or unduly interfere in Eritrean matters.
The only plausible means by which the opposition can bring about change is by soliciting and gaining the support of the Eritrean people. It hasn’t done this, and it is not likely to do this, so long as it insists on staying focused to the ambitions of the political organizations and their leadership and to the detriment of the opposition at large. To repeat it, the people are ready to join a movement—and the movement can only be created by tearing down the little huts of opposition that litter the Eritrean political landscape.
The only item on the EDA’s agenda should be: How To Transform Our Organization To A Movement. If it takes the courage to do so, we promise that it will receive the embrace and overwhelming support of Eritreans—inside and outside Eritrea. But until such time that the Eritrean Democratic Alliance is serious about transforming itself into a movement within a short period of time, and so long as it continues on its path of irrelevance and fragmentation, it will continue to invite the yawn of Eritreans, the scorn of the PFDJ, and the unsolicited intrusion from Ethiopia. It is do or die time.
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