1. Do Nothing (Superstitious version)

As a political entity, Eritrea has existed since 1890 when the Italians made it their colony and defined its borders.  The chain of rule has been as follows:     
                     

In other words, since our formation as a nation-state 117 years ago, we have not had the opportunity to hold un-coerced, free and fair elections, and our rulers have never had our full consent to govern us. Consequently, some Eritreans have taken a fatalistic approach to enduring oppression: just wait it out. "Like his predecessors," they say, "Isaias Afwerki will rule for a number of years, a number which is pre-ordained by God, then he will follow them and a new king will rule us."  Iziwin Kihalef iyu.

This mindset used to be expressed by the superstitious and the devout.  But now, especially when there is news that Isaias Afwerki registered some alleged "diplomatic breakthrough" or some other fantastic claim is made, even people whose resume suggests they ought to know better are articulating this view.

That is a defeatist view and wrong for a number of reasons.  First, since we can't know what is pre-ordained, the fatalism package includes de-facto acceptance that the relatively young Isaias can be in power for another 30 years, with each year taking Eritrea closer and closer to the precipice, and doing damage that will be virtually irreversible. Second, the "Do Nothing" formula encourages all future dictators to be emboldened to sit on the throne for their "pre-ordained" number of years. Third, it would be a betrayal of the cause that thousands of Eritreans, generations of them, paid life and limb for.

If it is pre-ordained for Isaias to rule Eritrea, it is also pre-ordained for the people to resist his illegal and illegitimate rule.

2. Do Nothing (Delusional Version)

Some Eritreans hold the view that "this is not the right time for elections and democracy. We first need to secure our nation and improve the living standards of our people. What the people need is clean water, education, healthcare, and jobs. Once we do that, once we stabilize our country, then we can worry about elections and political parties."  One can argue that it is impossible to have stability or economic progress unless a nation has a government that has the consent of the people.  But let's take their arguments at face value; let's assume that there must be economic progress and political stability before one can deal with issues like human rights and elections. Has the Isaias regime brought about economic progress?  Has it brought about stability? Has the average Eritrean seen his life improve over the last 16 years?  Economically? Socially? Culturally?

Let's talk about facts and figures. A veteran fighter ("yeka'alo") who has made it to the rank of colonel, or a director at a ministerial office gets about 1,900 nakfa (after taxes.) A general makes around 3,000 nakfa, before taxes (excluding income from their widespread contraband and illicit trade). A teacher with a BA gets around 1,600 Nkfa. And these are the "elite," the ones with the good jobs. Let's now look at the average income for an Eritrean who has a 12^th grade-level education and works for the government. A teacher with a teachers' certificate is paid about a 1,000 Nkfa per month; a low-level civil servant earns 650 Nkfa. 650 Nkfa a month is also the salary of a policeman and the enlisted soldier.

These are the "lucky" ones—those who are employed.  

We challenge those who are constantly telling us that Eritrea is making progress under the PFDJ to prepare the budget for the average Eritrean household (husband, wife and four children) with a monthly income of 650-1000 Nakfa and the following expenses:  

          1,000 Nakfa  for a modest two bedroom apartment

          250 - 350 Nakfa for ½  quintal of meshela (forget Taf, which is beyond reach)

          0.35 – 0.50 Nakfa per piece of bread

          16 – 25 Nakfa for a kilo of lentils and legumes

          30 - 60 Nakfa for a kilo of cooking oil

          11 - 27 Nakfa for a kilo of sugar

          70 – 110 Nakfa for a kilo of coffee

          12 – 16 Nakfa for a bar of soap and 200 gm detergent

          100 Nakfa for electricity

          10   Nakfa for bus fare

The numbers just don't add up. It cannot be done, even with the supposedly subsidized prices of government-run co-ops. It cannot be done without subsidies from the Diaspora, without people resorting to begging, and without corruption (financial and moral.) Although it has been repeatedly and conclusively demonstrated that command economies do not work, the PFDJ insists on running the same experiment that has failed everywhere else it has been tried.    

As for stability, it is only those who have blinded themselves to the recent past and the PFDJ's trigger-happy diplomacy who can credit PFDJ for bringing stability to Eritrea. For the last 16 years, Eritrea under PFDJ has jumped from one crisis to another—with its innocent children shedding the blood for the folly of their government. It requires a special skill of self-delusion to blame Ethiopia for all the problems Eritrea has gone through. Ethiopia had nothing to do with PFDJ's row with Sudan; it had nothing to do with its row with Yemen; and it doesn't bear full responsibility for the so-called border war.

The conclusions are inescapable: the Isaias Afwerki regime has not only taken political decisions that have resorted to inciting and mismanaging war and alienating its own citizens, but it has also pursued economic policies that have bankrupted the state,  criminalized free enterprises, destroyed the business community and fulfilled the prophesies of ill-wishers who have long maintained that Eritrea could never be a viable state.

3. Do Anything

The tyranny of the Isaias Afwerki regime is so intolerable that some Eritreans believe that any and all actions that may directly or indirectly lead to its downfall are worth pursuing. At the two extremes of the "do anything" continuum, one is a call for direct negotiation with the PFDJ. The other is to be an Eritrean face for a foreign force. In our view, both are unworkable formulas.

Those who call for direct negotiation with the PFDJ carry a heavy burden of proof: the party they want to negotiate with has no history of negotiating in good faith with any Eritrean entity. It may accept individuals—but not their ideas or their affiliation. Whether it was Toteel and Zemehret in the 1980s, or other prominent politicians in the 1990s (including Herui T Bairou, Mohammed Berhan Blata, Saleh Iyay, Mohammed Nur Ahmed and many others) the EPLF/PFDJ offer is always the same: accommodation of individuals, but not their ideas—unless the ideas are identical with those espoused by the EPLF/PFDJ (as was the case with Zemehret Yohannes.)

The EPLF/PFDJ has never used the word "negotiation" or "discussion" in any context other than a stalling ploy. Every year or so, it will leak information through its intermediaries, flattering one unnamed group or individuals and duping them into thinking that they are the kind of Eritreans it can negotiate with. The flattered individuals or groups will then await indefinitely for the invitation that never comes—in the meantime, they had lost whatever momentum, whatever legitimacy and whatever credibility they had. Mission accomplished, on to the next victim.

Similarly, those who would go to the extent of advocating giving foreign forces like Ethiopia the vanguard role in bringing change to Eritrea have an equally heavy burden: the TPLF, too, has a history: it has never been comfortable with any partnership unless it has a dominant role in the partnership.  Its decades-long bosom-buddy status with the EPLF was always infused with mistrust and suspicion because both shared the view that their party must have a dominant role in any partnership. The TPLF-EPLF agreement was: for TPLF to recognize Eritrea as an Ethiopian colony entitled to self-determination; and for EPLF to look the other way as the TPLF displaced the ELF from bonafide Eritrean territories now known as "Badme and its environs" and to allow them to administer and settle them, which they did from the mid-70s to the late-90s. The TPLF is good at creating satellite organizations in its image—but these satellites (whether they are Oromo, Gurage, Amhara or Somali) are always seen as stooges by the constituencies they claim to represent. The question facing the "strategic relationship" advocates is this: why would the TPLF agree to be in a supporting role in our case? What is to safeguard a post-PFDJ Eritrea if its interests happen to be at odds with those of Ethiopia?

It should be noted here that Awate.com sees nothing wrong in the opposition's decision to establish relationship with the Ethiopian government: we see it as a necessary move to establish a transparent, enduring and peaceful relationship with a neighborly people. Physical presence in Ethiopia is necessary because the Eritrean regime has made it clear that the Eritrean field will not accommodate more than one political party, namely PFDJ, and it has succeeded in convincing the Sudanese regime to make the opposition less-than-welcome in the Sudan. The presence of the Eritrean opposition in neighboring countries is temporary because it is only a matter of time before the opposition establishes a base in Eritrea.   

We also recognize that given the current balance of power, the Eritrean opposition does not have the leverage to insist on equal status in establishing a tactical alliance with the Ethiopian government. However, we believe that the relationship, whatever its nature, must always be provisional and always the kind that can be freely debated and ratified by the legitimate power of the Eritrean people. A political entity that comes to power primarily due to Ethiopian military force will always owe its allegiance to those who placed it in power—and will see no need to campaign for popular legitimacy.

4. Do Something – But Do It Right    

Much of the cause for the calls to do nothing or to do anything is the frustration with Eritrea's opposition groups. If we had an opposition group that was able to articulate Eritreans' grievance against the ruling regime; one that advances a coherent and credible strategy; one that is able to mobilize the people to wage a campaign to bring about meaningful change in Eritrea, there would be fewer calls to do nothing or do anything.

Those of us who have concluded—reluctantly or eagerly—that the opposition is not equipped to be the agent of change have a responsibility to go beyond criticizing them, beyond using our criticism as an excuse to do nothing. We still have a responsibility to actually do our part to bring relief to the Eritrean people. We say Eritrea has a fertile womb, and if we mean what we say, we must stop waiting and hoping and begin acting. 

Information is power; an informed citizen is an empowered citizen. This is why we have set information gathering and dissemination as our primary objective. We will continue to bring out hidden news and to challenge falsehoods. But beyond news and information, our objective is to embolden and inspire you by publicizing the work of ordinary Eritreans who are doing their part; by creating a community for those the PFDJ seeks to ostracize; by lobbying human rights groups and civil societies to publicize the plight of Eritreans; by harmonizing and, when possible, facilitating the work of independent, task- and action-oriented groups.