Constitutions As a Door Stop Print E-mail
By Saleh Younis - Apr 21, 2007   


In honor of Dr. Bereket Habteselasse, the African & Afro-American Studies Department of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill hosted a conference entitled Islam, Politics and Law in Africa on April 12-14.  Along with Eritrean, Ethiopian, Sudanese, Somali, Kenyan and American scholars, Awate.com’s Saleh Younis was invited to present a paper.  The following is a text of the paper, of which, due to time constraints, only a small excerpt was presented for discussion at the seminar on April 13, 2007. 


Constitutions As a Door Stop
Sal Younis
Awate.com
April 13, 2007

My paper is entitled “Constitutions As A Door Stop” but a more descriptive title would be “The Eritrean Constitution Drafting Process: A Contrarian View.”  Not only is it probably contrary to the views shared by most if not all of the attendants of this conference who I would venture to say consider the process virtually flawless; what it recommends is also contrary to the recommendation of those who are critical of the process.  We are all here honoring Dr. Bereket Habteselasse for his role, among other things, in chairing the drafting process of the 1997 constitution.  And his pride is well-deserved: not many get to have a role as historic as preparing the owner’s manual of a nation.  But above all things, Dr. Bereket is an intellectual—and the highest value intellectuals place is on truth.  I thank him for the intellectual honesty he is displaying—even as he knows what I am about to say, not least because I had an extensive interview with him about the constitutional drafing process.   In the words of Keats, “truth is beauty; beauty is truth—that is all you know; that is all you need to know.” 

To place the address within the context of the conference which is billed as Islam, Politics and Law in Africa I will address “Political Islam” in general and within Eritrea specifically, as I believe the issue relates to constitutions and constitutionalism.   I would like to preface all my statements with the disclaimer that I am neither a social scientist nor a historian: consider this as the response of a consumer—a consumer who is presented products by the doctors, the salesmen and the politicians.

Islam & Islamism in Eritrea

I am sure you all know that Islam was first introduced to Eastern Africa by contemporaries of Prophet Muhammed who visited Ethiopia seeking asylum from their persecutors, the Quraish authorities of Saudi Arabia. The asylum seekers were given amnesty, then were told that persecution had ceased and returned back home, only to learn that the news was inaccurate, and returned back to Ethiopia and settled at Negash in Tigray, Ethiopia.   Did they stay there and did they give Islam its root in Ethiopia and Eritrea?  Islamic history records that the Abyssinian king who provided the amnesty, King Ashama converted to Islam, as did his followers. Ethiopian history records otherwise: the king never converted: as a matter of fact, goes the history, those who settled in Negash actually converted to Christianity.  In any event, what is likely is that Islam was not completely wiped out and some Muslims probably found their way to Eritrea during the normal migrations between present day Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Briefly speaking, the other influences that accounted for probably the majority of the spread of Islam in Eritrea were: the fall of Dahlak/Zula to Islam in the 8-9th century; the Islamization of the Beja (Hdareb, Hadendawa, Beni Amer) in the 13th century and the missionaries of the Mirqani school of thought of the 18th century.   In short, Islam is, like Christianity, deeply rooted in Eritrea. 

Of equal importance to its depth is its application.  In his essay Unhappy Masses & The Challenge of Political Islam in The Horn of Africa, Dr. Said Samatar theorized in half-jest that African juju is responsible for emergence of messianic characters in Sudan.  Dr. Samatar will be pleased to know that Eritrea does not have sufficient Juju to “spawn messianic characters.”   The Suffis who evangelized Islam were accommodating of our native culture and customs and spread Islam by conviction and not compulsion. No mahdi ever originated in Eritrea: our Islam is that of co-existence, of saints and pilgrimages, of Quranic schools, of reverence for Arabic language, of charity, of covenants and good works.  Small scale, but no less devout; modest, but firm in belief.

On the other hand, Islamism as a political movement in Eritrea traces its origins only to the 1980s.  There are some Eritreans, President Isaias Afwerki included, that expounded the view that the ELF of 1961 propagated what would now be called “Jihadist” views.  Even if this claim for which there is no historical basis is accurate, it would be a stretch to say that it was any more than agitation to organize people against Ethiopia— it certainly was not to create an Islamic state in Eritrea.  That maximalist view was articulated first in the 1980s and has ran head-on to the wall of Eritrean reality.  If I were to summarize how Islam is practiced in Eritrea by its adherents, I would say that Muslims believe that Islam is the religion that guides their lives but they temper it with the recognition that it is a religion, one of two, in the state’s communal life.  

We should be skeptical of any attempt to impose a system that relies on the supremacy of divine law—whether the source cited is the Bible, the Quran or any other holy book.   Forget now, when we are living in a complex and inter-related globe.  Even in the early days of Islam, the effort to create an Islamic State was not a sterling success. Most Muslims call the first 4 Caliphs the “rightly guided” who ruled justly and with unanimous support of their followers. But as we do with all our recollections, we juxtapose our wishes for reality—much like Americans venerate the Washingtons and Jeffersons.  But it is well to remember that Islamic history records that 3 of these “rightly guided” first 4 Caliphs were murdered while they were ruling, 2 of them by fellow Muslims.   They were victims of political assassination by their contemporaries. Which leads one to ask: if Muslims who were eyewitnesses to the rule of Muhammed in Medina could not agree on how to create an Islamic State, what hope is there for those who are removed from it by time, space and language barriers? Skepticism should be the order of the day.

On the other hand, it is perfectly valid for politicians to draw on Islam and its teachings as an inspiration to creating a just system--so long as they are willing to abide by the rules of democracy and submit to the supremacy of the people’s will.

A common criticism heard, specially now in the age of the “clash of civilizations” is this: other religions, particularly Christianity, have gone beyond so-called divine laws and progressed to secular law: why can’t Muslims, including Muslims who should “know better,” do so? 

Secularism is a result of the age of enlightenment which was itself a consequence of decades-long wars between Protestants and Catholics as well as between European princes and the Catholic church of the Holy Roman Empire.  When Europe began the movement towards secularism, the criticism was directed not just at the church but at the state. Which is to say, the practioners of the divine law, whether popes or kings, were seen as corrupt and abusive.  Secularism evolved in Europe organically.

Not so with Islam. Not yet, anyway. It is entirely possible, probably even likely, that around the time the Ottoman Empire was collapsing, the Muslims would have gone through their own organic Enlightenment.  I leave it to the specialist in the field to answer the question whether,  in much the same way that colonization interrupted Africa’s organic development, it also interrupted the Islamic world from achieving its own state-mosque balance.    

It is also not unusual to hear Eritrean Christians express their astonishment at how the tolerant Islam that they know and grew up with is so different from the type they meet in the Diaspora.  And the natural inclination, the natural conclusion is: for whatever reason, Muslims have become radicalized. 

It is completely outside the scope of my limited qualification to give an informed judgment on that.  If I were to hazard a guess, I would say that this is probably due to shifting primary identities: once people no longer find hope and are alienated from one of their identities, they react by adopting and emphasizing another identity—particularly if the exponents of that view are heavily-funded and committed to their task. 

To subdue one form of identity to another, to make the set the subset, is not limited to Islam or even religions. All variations of fundamentalism tend to do this.  Years ago, I think in 1997, I wrote about “secular fundamentalism” which many then thought that I was trying to just be provocative.  But let me give an example.  I would place the government of the State of Eritrea as a practitioner of secular fundamentalism.  Meaning: it is constantly trying to elevate one form of identity (nationalism) by destroying others (religious identity, ethnic identity, regional identity.)  For example, we no longer have “deqi akele”, we have “nationals who reside in the South.”  We do not have a tribe called Jeberti; they are described as “Tigrigna speaking adherents of Islamic faith.”  We no longer have Muslims or Christians: they are “adherents of the Islamic faith” and “adherents of the Christian faith.”    We no longer have Orthodox Church calendar, we have "Geez calendar."  In this fictional world, Christians celebrate Muslim holidays and Muslims celebrate Christian holidays.  And I am not talking about the civil, considerate exchanges of “rhus lidet” and “eid se’eed” messages that our forefathers have been exchanging forever.  No, we are told that Muslims celebrate Easter and Christians celebrate Eid.  This is an effort to erase our uniqueness in exchange for bland homogeneity, a land where we all wear colorful clothes, dance to different tunes but worship the same god of secularism. 

Islamic fundamentalism works in reverse: to destroy any devotion to country and to channel it all to a religion.  It does this by blurring lines: Islamic law categorizes acts in five classes: proscribed, recommended, permissible, disliked, and unlawful.  In essence, what a Muslim fundamentalist practices is the blurring of the lines between what is proscribed and what is recommended, what is recommended and what is permissible, what is permissible and what is disliked, what is disliked and what is unlawful.  In extreme cases--and we should always make big distinctions between Muslim fundamentalists and Muslim extremists--the extremist will blur the lines between what is unlawful and what is proscribed: he will tell you killing innocents (unlawful) is not only permissible, it is actually proscribed.  If a Christian is anxious about it, the Eritrean Muslim who comes from a traditional Muslim family is anxious and annoyed by it.  There is no sight more annoying than an arrogant self-declared devout Muslim lecturing a 70 year old Muslim Eritrean on how to practice his religion.  Which is to say: it is an ongoing debate, the so-called “fight for the soul of Islam.”

These are important concepts in any society and any faith—and subject to interpretations. It is the human mind trying to understand the Word of God. But, although they are the overwhelming majority, the moderate and tolerant Muslims are at a disadvantage: materially, and morally because they suffer from guilt by association with the brutal so-called secular and moderate Muslim states.  By what definition is Morocco, a nation which has a constitution banning criticizing royal decrees “moderate”?  Virtually all the fanatical tyrants in Moslem nations in modern times have come wearing secular garbs: The Nassers of Egypt, the Assads of Syria, the Saddams of Iraq, the Arafats were all secular.  By the time secularism came to the Muslim states, its interpreters had adopted all its decadence, all the killing efficiency of the state, without importing the corresponding check-and-balance and accountability.

To paraphrase Freud: what do mainstream Muslims want?  The word justice is mentioned 47 times in the Quran.  Just is mentioned 87 times.  Fair is mentioned 45 times.  And, relevant to our topic, constitution, the word Covenant is mentioned  61 times.  God does not destroy the children of Israel because he is all-powerful and felt like it but because they broke their covenant with him.  Create just, fair systems that respect individual and societal covenants.  In short what Muslim Eritreans want is what Christian Eritreans want.  I am not a linguist at all, but I would be curious to know if the Tigrigna words for justice (fithi) solution (fitah) and key (meftih) have the same root word.  If they are, our people were saying that justice is solution and solutions are just.

To demonstrate my point, let me state this: when the Eritrean Islamists parties were seen as demanding justice, many Muslims, including secular Muslims, were sympathetic to their call.  But when this morphed into a maximalist demand of a Muslim state in a multi-confessional country, they lost it.  Now they have scaled back their request to demanding Islamic law in Muslim-majority areas and whether there is acceptance even for this---only time will tell.

Constitutions & Constitutionalism

As you all know, constitutions are vertical agreements between the rulers and the ruled and horizontal agreements between people or, more accurately, between people who are recognized by the state to be citizens.  For example, the Magna Carta was an agreement between the king and the nobility—it didn’t have much to say about the masses.

There are generally agreed upon concepts about the process and its content—but I won’t bore you with them other than to mention how defective processes and bland contents contribute to orphaning constitutions.

Delete & Undo Buttons

Years ago, at a commencement speech, I heard a talk that was attempting to demonstrate the relatively young age of the US.    The speaker made this point: To understand how young the United States is, you can tell its entire history by the biographies of six presidents.  The year George Washington, America’s first president died, the 11th president, James Polk, was 4 years old.   And so on: from Polk to Lincoln, from Lincoln to Teddy Roosevelt, from Teddy to Franklin Roosevelt, and from there to Ronald Reagan.   That’s it.   Whereas the speaker was trying to make the point that the US is a relatively young country, I was more struck by the continuity of the system: in 218 years of life as a republic, the US had 43 presidents and only 27 amendments, including the first 10 Bill of Rights.   

In Africa, we don’t amend constitutions; we just replace them.  When we don’t like something, we just press the delete and undo buttons.  I was reminded about this in a completely unrelated incident.  Remember the story of the yellow cake and Niger to justify the war in Iraq.  One way they were able to show that it was fake was that the so-called smoking gun, the evidence the Italians presented that was allegedly an intercepted letter, was making a reference to an article in a constitution that did not exit.  The poor forgerer did not know that Niger had come up with a spanking new constitution in 1999—the constitution of the “Fifth Republic” no less.

Arbitrary Changes   

It is not that they are replaced; it is that they are done at the whim of whoever is in charge.  When Chiluba became president, his first amendment was to have his country be molded in his image.  He is a Pentecostal Christian, so Zambia’s constitution had to be amended to say, “We declare the Republic a Christian nation.”  This is an outrageous statement.  The outrage is not that Zambia dares declare itself a Christian nation, but that it pretends to be a Republic.  In any event, the next thing that Chiluba did was to disqualify the biggest challenge to his career by adding new citizenship requirement to the constitution.  There was only one problem: the candidate he was disqualifying was Kaunda, who holds the inconvenient title of being Zambia’s “father of the nation.”  Chiluba was going to disqualify Kaunda simply because his father happens to be from Malawi.  Those who enjoy delicious ironies were happy to know that Chiluba’s own citizenship was questioned—because his lineage is from Zaire.

Tinkering With People’s Symbols

In the US, every school child learns how the US flag was commissioned, who sowed the flag, etc.  In Africa, flags are substitutes for ruling party emblems: the winner takes it all.  Ethiopia’s 1994 constitution, a classic top-down imposition, had this to say about the flag:  

(Article 3): (1) The Ethiopian flag shall consist of green at the top, yellow in the middle and red at the bottom, and shall have a national emblem at the center. The three colors shall be set horizontally in equal dimension. (2) The national emblem on the flag shall reflect the hope of the Nations, Nationalities, Peoples as well as religious communities.   

The national emblem (the star with spikes) was the hope of the nations, nationalities, people as well as religious communities?  Or was it just a replacement for the imperial Lion of Judah--in other words, expressing the hopes of the ruling party?  The result is that there are two flags in Ethiopia, one with and one without the star and spikes.

Similarly, does anybody know how the Eritrean flag came about—other than that it bears a striking resemblance to the EPLF flag?  That work was so arbitrary that merely days before Eritrea’s flag was to be flown at the UN pole, Eritreans were still submitting one wrong version of the flag after another.

Generic Language

If we look at India’s constitution, we would immediately know we are reading India’s constitution when we get to the article dealing with the Untouchables.  Look at Namibia’s 1990 constitution, and the detail that went into describing its territories including the very disputed “enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay”, would show us what nation we are talking about.  And when you are reading the constitution of Iran, it is very, very clear that you are reading the constitution of Iran.  For good or bad, it is authentic: it reads exactly the way Ahmedinejad talks.  If we removed the preamble and the word "Eritrea" from the constitution, would we able to know that it is Eritrea’s constitution?  Then, by what sense would the people develop a sense of ownership? 

Eritrean Constitutions: Case Studies

The true test of the worth of a constitution was summarized by Benjamin Franklin after the drafting of the US Constitution.   When asked if the drafters had come up with a monarchy or a republic, he responded, “a republic if you can keep it.”   Implicit in the answer is that republics require the informed assent of the ruler and the ruled.  And, when nobody fights for a constitution, it means they had never truly understood or adopted it to begin with.  And they become door steps.   And here is where my first contrarian view comes in: the Eritrean constitution has been orphaned not just because Isaias Afwerki is a dictator, but because there was something seriously flawed in the process that resulted in a built-in rejection of the constitution from the get-go.

Eritrea has had two constitutions drafted: the 1952 Federal Act (which died in 1962 shortly before Ethiopia annexed Eritrea) and the 1997 Eritrean Constitution which, depending on one’s biases, was either stillborn, aborted, or is in an extended sabbatical. 

Regarding the Federal Act, there are two versions.   The conventional wisdom, aggressively advanced by some Eritrean intellectuals and historians is this:  the UN funded it, hired its chief drafter, Matienzo, who negotiated with Emperor Haile Selasse who, along with his advisers, allegedly outsmarted him and brought forth a constitution so lopsidedly in favor of Ethiopia, that it was doomed to fail.   The Eritreans of the era are spoken of as completely out of their element—outmaneuvered by the Brits, the Italians, the Americans, the Ethiopians and the UN who, legend has it, even selected their flag for them.  This negative view greatly influenced Eritrean intellectuals—particularly those who were sympathetic to the EPLF.

Here is a contrarian view. A segment of Eritrea’s population wanted independence; another segment unconditional union with Ethiopia.  The federation, though disliked by both segments (for different reasons: for the Independence Bloc, because it was disregarding the views of 70% to appease Haile Selasse; for the Unity Bloc, because it was denying them their call for unconditional unity), was a compromise and a-not-unreasonable proposal.  By the time the UN was drafting the constitution, it had a fairly comprehensive understanding and documentation of the two sides—their size, their needs, and their leaders.  This is because it had sent two commissions who toured Eritrea on what would now be called a “listening tour.” When it came time to drafting the Federal Act, the UN consulted with party leaders who actually and genuinely represented the wishes and aspirations of their constituencies.  And once the Federal Act was ratified and passed as law by Emperor Haile Selasse, those who favored unity with Ethiopia did everything—most of it legal—to bring about their wish. 

My view of those who ask us to believe that the Eritrean politicians of the 1940s who negotiated the Federal Act were dupes who were outsmarted by all is the same view I have about absolutists individuals who want to teach Eritrean Muslims how to really practice Islam: how dare you?   How clever was the Emperor exactly?  Consider how Deng Xioping handled the “one country, two systems” dilemma with the Emperor’s mishandling of his “one country, two systems” dilemma.  According to a well-documented book on the subject, Zewde Reta’sYe Ertra Guday”, Aklilu Habtewold came up with a novel idea that was rejected: instead of destroying Eritrea’s federalism, just convert your relationship with the other 12 provinces to a Federal agreement.   In any event, the constitution was chipped away and Eritrea became a province, but that is a different subject.

Now here’s the Benjamin Franklin test: what happened when the constitution was violated?  When Eritrea’s flag was lowered, when its official languages were discarded?  It gave the intellectual impetus and the moral high ground for action: a revolution.  Just as the US Declaration of Independence listed all the offenses of the “present king of Great Britain”, our first revolutionaries were listing their grievances against the “present king of Ethiopia.”  That constitution may have died; but it was never orphaned. Is is hardly a coincidence that the armed struggle started in 1961, just a year before Eritrea was completely annexed.

Let’s now compare these developments with those of the 1997 Constitution.  First the process: the transitional government of Eritrea (EPLF/PFDJ) issued three proclamations: 37/1993, 52/ 1994 and 55/1994.  The same ruling party, this time through the National Assembly which it entirely dominated, created the Constitutional Commission and nominated the 50 members (with 47 sitting) that made the commission, with instructions to prepare a draft with the participation of the people.  The commission had two advisory committees—one Western and one made up of elders.  The process began in April 1994 and ended with its ratification in May 1997.  

There is much to recommend in the constitution, at least from my standpoint.  But an individual is only one of 4 million—so my views of it are irrelevant.  The important thing is again the Benjamin Franklin test: what happened after the constituent assembly ratified the constitution? Nothing happened.  And in reaction to the nothing, an ever louder nothing happened.  Why?  Why was the Eritrean constitution orphaned?

The easiest explanation is that President Isaias Afwerki wanted nothing that would constrain him in the exercise of his power.  He didn’t want noisy judges, nosy journalists and annoying parliamentarians questioning his every step.  This is hardly unique in Africa, nor surprising for Independence parties which have a bad track record of transitioning from what Lenin called “revolutionary morality”—if it is good for the revolution, then it is morally right—to the constraints of a constitutional republic—the people have the right to be wrong.

Why didn’t the people rise up?   I submit that despite all the seminars and conferences, there was no sense of ownership—nothing to cling to, nothing to miss.  There was no difference between the baby or the bath water.

This takes us to the process. Muna Ndulo, a professor at Cornell University and the director of its Institute for African Development had this to say about the commission approach to constitution drafting: 

After independence, the practice in many African countries has been to adopt new constitutions through the use of commissions. The commissions typically tour the country, soliciting views relating to possible constitutional arrangements from the public and recommend a draft constitution for adoption by the national Parliament. This approach seems to fail to produce durable constitutions for many of the countries that have used it…. the use of commissions to recommend a constitution is susceptible to manipulation by the government in power and often results in the imposition of its preferred constitution model. [Emphasis mine]

The Eritrean case clearly shows that this is the case.  This is not to impugn the motives or the hard work of the Commissioners—only to criticize the process that was designed by somebody else. The Commissioners fully trusted the President’s avowed commitment to constitutionalism.  And why wouldn’t they?  Hadn’t the EPLF declared in 1987 that it is committed to liberal democracy?  Hadn’t the Eritrean revolutionaries pledged that they would avoid the experiences of African governance—single, corrupt parties; president’s for life, coups and counter coups?

Much is said about the diversity of the Commissioners—that the gender, age, religious diversity reflected Eritrea’s cross-section.  That is true.  The one diversity that was not accommodated was ideological diversity.  The people that were short-listed passed a litmus test imposed by the one-party one-ideology National Assembly.  If a city is trying to pass an ordinance banning smoking, it cannot exclude smokers on the basis that smoking is bad for you.  Nor can it include ex-smokers and claim, “Everybody was invited.”

It is not just that the Commissioners were entirely picked by one party—it is that they were experts and technocrats with no popular following at all.    All academics and scholars can do when constitutions are violated is to pass resolutions and pleas. On the other hand, politicians speak a different language: uprising, disobedience, revolution. 

The alternative was to use a negotiated rule-making approach. For example, around the same time Eritrea was issuing its constitutional proclamation, South Africa was beginning its post-apartheid constitution.  27 political parties participated in the drafting process of a constitution that eventually became the supreme law of the land in 1997.  Sure, it was messy; sure it felt like the differences were irreconcilable.  But, in the end, they brought about a constitution that, were it to be violated, were it to be orphaned, they would not be issuing resolutions: there would be disobedience, uprising and even revolution.  

Conclusion

I still do not know what the Eritrean government’s attitude is towards the ratified constitution.   I used to think that its position is, “we will implement the constitution when we are good and ready” but I am not so sure.   I was speaking to a senior official about 5 years ago and he told me something stunning: “just because we didn’t have ribbon-cutting ceremonies, don’t assume we are not using the constitution.” In fact, whenever the government is accused of violating the religious rights of its citizens, it refers to the same ratified constitution as a defense that it is not violating their rights!   This is like telling a police officer that you can’t possibly be drunk driving because you have a valid drivers license.

Eritrea does have a population that is conducive to democratic rule.  I expect Dr. Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis to enlighten us on its Customary (Traditional) Laws but from my knowledge of Eritreans, I would say that their demands are minimalist: justice.  What Eritreans want is justice—  popular participation that assures them that there is fairness and co-equal status, a just justice system (due process), a just economic system which begins with a just land policy. Remember Frantz Fannon’s lessons and his railing against the post-colonial African leaders who were subverting the people's cause: to the people, only land is supreme.   For what does it mean to an illiterate person when you tell him you have freedom of press if you tell him that the land belongs to the State?  And since justice also includes honoring a covenant, a just system will also look seriously at a covenant that included a specific flag and co-equal status for Arabic and Tigrigna.

Things Are Not Perfect, But... 

The state of denial some of our compatriots, particularly our intellectuals, are living in is breathtaking.  I’ve just began to read Andrew Robert’s update of Winston Churchill’s History of English Speaking Peoples and it reminded me of our intellectuals. 

In the part that deals with England’s rule of Uganda, the author states that a few British administrators were able to rule over a 96,000 square mile land and a population of 5 million with only one incident for decades; thus, he argues, this must mean that the Ugandans accepted the just rule of the Brits.   This conclusion conveniently glosses over the fact that only one side was armed—I could easily be impressed that the 1 million prisoners in America don’t have daily uprisings against their prison wardens.  In my state, California, they are trying to export prisoners to other states because whatever the magical prisoners-to-guard ratio is required  has been crossed and there are prison wardens getting killed now.

Similarly, some Eritreans equate the absence of daily uprisings in Eritrea with an endorsement of the regime there.  They practice the art of understatement: "Things are not perfect, but..." 

Eritrea is facing now a mortal danger to its very survival and this is where my second contrarian view comes in: when the men of arms speak in their language of bullets, we must be prepared to offer a way out. This means, to me, adopting the orphaned constitution, the same one whose process I was and am criticizing. Yes, the criticism about the constitutional-drafting process which allowed one political party to exclude others is valid.  Yes, the criticism that the process ensured bringing about a winner-takes-all constitution is valid.   But nations need a sense of history and continuity and there should be a healthy respect for Stare decisis.  We cannot continuously tear down and re-build when we have an opportunity to modify and remodel. 

What I say in 2007 about the 1997 constitution is exactly what I said in 1995 to the Constitutional Commission about the 1952 constitution: respect the effort of the people, even when you believe the people were duped or their participation was a hoax.  Adopt the orphans.  Take the best of 1952: the spirit of negotiation and compromise among politicians who truly represent the aspirations of their constituencies, and apply it to the 1997 constitution (which can boast, among other things, the credit that it was the first one drafted in an independent Eritrea without the disturbances of the Brits, Italians, Ethiopians) and adopt two orphans.

If you see a contradiction between my diagnosis and my recommendation, I share with you this parable:  it is called The Doctor & The Salesman:

The Doctor & The Salesman

A man suffers from excruciating cluster headaches.   That is the first clue: unless you remember that his headaches are excruciating and debilitating the parable will make no sense.  After trying every medicine, he goes to a specialist.  The doctor tells him that he has some good news and bad news: he can cure his headache but it will cost him a lot.  “I will do anything,” says the patient, “what is it?”   The doctor responds, “You see, your spinal cord is so twisted it is applying severe pressure on your genitals.  I can make the headache go away, but I have to castrate you.”  The patient is stunned, says I will think about it, goes home, and has the worst headache he has ever had.  He comes back the next day and the deed is done.  But now the patient is depressed.  He tells himself, “my wife always goes shopping when she is depressed, so let me try that.”  He goes to clothing store and he is immediately greeted by a salesman.

It is quickly apparent that the salesman knows his stuff.  “Let me see, your coat size is 41 long?”  Right.  “And you will want a shirt; you are 15 ½ neck size and 36 sleeves?” Right again.  “Shoes, I’d say 9 ½ wide.”  He gets everything right and our castrated subject is impressed.   The salesman figures out the guys taste in neckties, socks, watch, everything.  Finally, he asks him if he’d like to buy underwears.  Why not, says the man.  The salesman eyes him and says, “I’d say you wear a medium, size 36.”  Guy says, “You had to be wrong and you are.  I wear size 31 and have been that size since high school.”  “Oh, no,” says the salesman, “that can’t be right.  That would be too small for you, so small that it would twist your spinal cord and give you the most excruciating headaches…”

Sometimes, the “no pain, no gain” prescription is not the right one.  Sometimes, the painless solutions are the correction solutions. 

Thank you.

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Last Updated ( Apr 30, 2007 )
 
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