In the face of a brutal suppression at the hands of a tyrannical regime, what should the people of Eritrea do?  If they give up on the regime’s ability to self-reform and decide to resist, what happens if they cannot agree on the strategies of this resistance movement?  Can there be more than one resistance movement?  Should multiplicity of organizations be encouraged or tolerated?  Is there a threshold or criteria by which an organization calls itself one?  The Pencil has attempted to answer these questions a number of times (please refer to the two most recent ‘EDA: How To Break The Stalemate’ and ‘Strengthening The EDA’) and, in light of the recent developments in the EDA, we will try to do so again.

EDA’s Second Congress

As reported by Gedab News, EDA’s Second Congress which convened between February 19 - 23 had a great deal to recommend it but it extended for another week trying to resolve the impasse over electing the chairman for its executive committee.  The biggest challenges of the EDA were (a) its uneven relationship with Ethiopia; (b) the issue of proportional representation; (c) the so-called “articles 2 and 3” of the charter which, according to their critics, affirmed the autonomous rights of religious and ethnic groups a bit too categorically; (d) the level of subordination expected by the EDA from its member organizations; (e)  the seemingly fundamental differences between the programs of some organizations that resulted in watered-down decisions that failed to generate wholehearted and enthusiastic support from the member organizations and (f) the dispersed offices of the opposition groups which make consultations and confidence-building measures less likely. 

With respect to the uneven relationship with the Ethiopian government, there had been accusations (also voiced by The Pencil in “What Is With Ethiopia’s Rulers”?): that the relationship between the Eritrean opposition groups and the Ethiopian government is not only not one between co-equals, but one where it was a mystery to determine what Ethiopia’s strategy was. As reported by Gedab News, the meeting the opposition had with Meles Zenawi and his commitment that henceforth his government would deal with the issue at the highest level removed at least one of the complications.  It is unclear if all organizations were uniformly convinced of the assurance that Ethiopia would deal with the EDA as one entity or whether, as with its past practice, it would continue to favor some over others.

The second issue was that of proportional representation. How does the EDA allocate votes to its member organizations if there is no independent means of verifying their size? Should it use depth or institutionalization; ie. Longevity of the organization, frequency of its congresses and number of branch offices? Should it use breadth: i.e., activities in diplomatic, media and military front? Should it use other factors such as the proximity of their headquarters to Eritrea (presence in Sudan and Ethiopia?)  These questions bedeviled the EDA (and those outside EDA whose opinions were solicited) and they were not satisfactorily resolved.  

The third issue, the so-called “articles 2 and 3” were inherited from the 1999 charter of the Alliance of Eritrean National Front (AENF.) Specifically, the clauses conferred rights on Muslims to govern themselves according to Sharia and to ethnic groups the right of self-determination.  Addressing these issues was supposed to be one of the most contentious but, ironically, the amendment of the charter to strike out these articles was approved by 10 of the 11 member groups, with only one organization registering its reservation.

The fourth issue deals with the relationship between the EDA and its member organizations.  Specifically, to what degree is each organization willing to subordinate its tactics and strategies to the larger goals of the EDA?  For example, will those with the military wing seek approval from the EDA before they undertake their missions?   Again, this issue was not satisfactorily resolved.

Concurrently, there were also varying levels of confidence instilled in the leaders of the member organizations by their own constituencies. 

The fifth issue dealt with attempts to reach “minimum program” consensus by organizations with wide-ranging views, and sometimes fundamental differences, on the most effective way to wage the resistance against PFDJ and what kind of Eritrea to institute following the fall of the PFDJ.

Lastly, attempts to narrow these differences were made more difficult by the fact that the member organizations (and their constituencies) are dispersed throughout the world.  In some cases, leaders of the organizations were able to meet with one another no more than once or twice a year—during the EDA semi-annual meetings.

Streamlining/Clarity

Many well-wishers have called on Awate.com to balance its reporting activities with its opposition advocacy role and to take up a historic role of mediation.

Unity is a preferred mode of progress—but only if it is a unity of peers united by their strengths.  Failing that, just as one should not expect great agility and speed from two people shackled together at the ankles, one should not expect great results from organizations who feel they are in a compulsory unity and wish to be unshackled.  Thus, our reluctance to take up an initiative.

Eritrea’s traditions, cultures and religions teach that the ideal state for adults is to be married.  But they also teach us that the only thing divorce is preferable to is a miserable marriage. And when organizations agree to divorce the less contentious and the less drawn-out it is the better for all involved.  The two blocs can do us all a favor if they spare us the confusion of pretending that they are still married or about to get together sometime soon—one of them has to drop the EDA letterhead and EDA name.   Whoever is giving up the name should not feel a big loss: EDA the name has existed for two years only and people would be hard-pressed to come up with a list of its achievement.

The important thing now is not trying to figure out the impossible project of how to unscramble the egg, but what, going forward, will the Block of 3 and Block of 7 do?   Will they use opportunity to create strong intra and inter-block relationships?  Will they be sniping at each other for weeks and months?  How will the rank and file of the opposition avoid the rollercoaster rides of the splits and mergers of the organizations? What are the intra and inter block pull and push factors and how will the organizations and blocs overcome them? 

The Intra and Inter-Block Pull Push Factors

Block 1 is composed of the Eritrean Liberation Front – Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC), the Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP) and the Eritrean National Salvation Front (ENSF.)  The pull factors are the shared values: programmatically, the groups have fairly interchangeable programs.  This begs the question: what is the reason d’etre for these organizations? What is their justification for existing? What is the one principle, the one belief, the one unique attribute they have that is not shared with the others?

This takes us to the push factors:

1.  ELF-RC is in the process of setting the criteria to convert itself into a party.  This project is something that will require committing the limited resources of the organization in the transformative goal. 

2.  The leadership of ELF-RC and the ELF-NC (now part of ENSF) had a falling out in 2002.  Has this rift been entirely overcome or is there a residue of bitterness that makes unity difficult?

3.     When ENSF’s leadership was elected by “consensus” it created some acrimony among its combined leadership.

4.     The role of Sedeg’e (now a member of ENSF) to enter Eritrea following the Ethiopian advances into Eritrea in 2000, was quite controversial, including among some opposition groups, and specifically within EDP.

5.    EDP (and, to some degree, the EPM, which is a member of ENSF) are at variance with their block members on the issue of the 1995 flag, the 1997 Eritrean constitution, and interpretation of the history of Eritrea’s armed struggle.

Block 2 is composed of 7 organizations:  two Islamist organizations (Islah and Alkalas), two organizations fighting for the rights of specific ethnic groups (DMLEK and Red Sea Afar), an organization calling for regional federation (EFDM) and two organizations that originated from the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF and Sagem.)

The pull factors of Bloc 2 is a broad agreement that Eritrea should be organized along largely autonomous and traditional power centers (religion, ethnicity, region.)   They either have armed groups or are strong advocates of having armed groups to supplement and protect their political agendas.   

The push factors:

1.  Although the long-time chairman of ELF, Mr. Abdella Idris, has been sick, his organization chose to elect him as its chairman, leaving the day-to-day running of the affairs of the organization to two vice-chairman: Hussein Khelifa and Hassen Assad.

2.  The two Islamist organizations follow different schools of Islamic governance and are very unlikely to dissolve their organizations and merge into one;

3.    Sagem was one of the organizations that was created following the dissolution of the Eritrean Liberation Front in 1981 and was historically at odds with the decisions of ELF’s military command (Abdella Idris/ELF) to replace the “civilian” administration of ELF;

4.    Not much is known about DMLEK and Red Sea Afar outside their respective ethnic groups, the Kunama and Denkel of Eritrea.  These two organizations were part of the 4+1 alliance that was formed in Kassel in 2002.  During their merger discussions, the two organizations indicated that they were not willing to “freeze” their maximalist demands.  From the 4+1 alliance came three organization: ENSF (now part of Bloc 1) and  DMLEK and Red Sea (now part of Bloc 2.)

5.    The EFDM is fairly new organization and, despite its ambitious name, has not been able to expand its membership beyond the founding members and is, thus, not taken seriously by the other organizations.

Outside these two blocs is Nahda, an even newer organizations of which little is known outside its immediate circle of recruits.  Nahda decided to freeze its membership in the EDA to protest the developments.

Once the restructuring process gets started, there will, no doubt, be solicitations from or to those organizations which were not attending EDA’s Second Congress.  These include:

• EPM, which is headed by Adhanom Gebremariam.  Adhanom was a founding member of EDP when he parted at its first congress; formed EPM with Abdella Adem and then the two went their separate ways after the EPM congress. 
  
• Eritrean Congress Party, which is headed by Herui Tedla Bairu, who was the Secretary General of the predecessor to the EDA, the ENA. The Congress party was a short-lived union of five small groups led by Dr. Herui Bairu,  Adem Mejawray, Idris Qaysem, Dr. Osman Abubaker, Ismael Nada and Yacob Indrias.

What Next?

Given the bad blood, bitterness, and mistrust that continues to surface every now and then, the most realistic expectation and goal should be for the blocs to refrain from using inflammatory language against each other and to concentrate on strengthening the cohesion within their own blocs.  What we had until now were 11 organizations that functioned as 11 organizations for 11 months a year and then attempted to be a bloc for 1 month a year (during the Alliance congresses.)  If we can replace them by two blocs that can function as two blocks for 12 months a year, it is not a bad bargain. Maybe the EDA can be an umbrella for the two blocks.

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References:

EDA: How To Break The Stalemate
http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4274/2/

Strengthening The EDA
http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4223/2/

What Is With Ethiopia’s Rulers?
http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4213/2/

Eritrean Political Organizations: 1961-2007
http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4485/9/