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The Eritrean regime solidified its friendship with the current government of Ethiopia, in blood, in 1980, and then solidified its enmity, in blood again, in 1998. The Eritrean regime fought with the government of Sudan, severed its relations for 11 years, and then reconciled. The Eritrean regime was a charter member of the Coalition of the Willing in 2003, and then became a fierce opponent of American unilateralism in 2005. It moved from being a frontline state against the expansion of Islamism in 1994, to the biggest proponent of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia in 2006. The Sana’a axis was formed. A recent Ethio-Sudanese joint committee concluded that Ethiopia’s armed opposition groups could only have infiltrated across the border along Gaderef and Kassala in the Sudan to Ethiopia via Eritrea. And, throughout, the Eritrean opposition had nothing to say—which is to say, they had something to say: “we are not relevant.”
To be sure, there were exceptions. For example, on August 28, 2006, while the inevitability of the UIC and the destruction of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia looked like a foregone conclusion, the foreign affairs director of the ELF, Dr. Yohannes Zeremariam, firmly aligned his organization with the TFG and supported the “coordination between the democratic forces in the different countries of the Horn" which he described as "an urgent obligation.” But there was no follow-up or support from his own organization. There was also the coming together of the three organizations that formed the National Front for Eritrean Salvation. But the leadership was elected in the bad old way of “consensus”—which is to say, a deal among the leadership, irrespective of the wishes of the grassroots.
The achievements of the opposition groups were rare and modest. Every year, it feels like the opposition is making preparation to launch something the next year: here is the big meeting before the great meeting in preparation for the grand meeting. Meanwhile, the Eritrean regime continues to accelerate and intensify its oppression of the people: patriarchs were overthrown; the youth were enslaved, arrested, tortured or exiled to the four corners of the world; parents were held for ransom; hard-earned money of Eritreans in foreign lands was extorted; and the tasteless coronation of Isaias Afwerki was celebrated in the state-owned media.
Throughout, the Eritrean opposition groups allowed themselves to be distracted and led astray by the certified obstacle-builders who are experts at quackery. Oh, their arguments sound so noble and righteous. “The Eritrean people do not want a change that comes via a military clash,” they said. Really? How would the Eritrean people react to the news that an Eritrean commando unit, in the stealth of night, overpowered the guards and liberated the prisoners of Eira Eiro, Carshelli, and Track B? Would they celebrate the achievement or would they mourn it? Would the enslaved “Warsay” or “Yekaalo” raise arms to defend his enslavers? In our opinion, we do not think the Eritrean people are opposed to an armed group that confronts an unlawful government: what the Eritrean people fears is (a) multiplicity of armed groups who will (b) refuse to be subservient to the law once Eritrea becomes a nation of laws and accountable government.
Here’s another explanation to do nothing: “The Eritrean people do not want the Eritrean opposition to go to Ethiopia.” Really? The first responsibility of an opposition group is to remain an opposition group. It cannot bring about change, good or bad, if it ceases to exist and be irrelevant. And to exist and be relevant, it must be firmly rooted in reality, and not slogans. Yes, there are many Eritreans who view Ethiopia as an enemy state and the Ethiopian government as the enemy of Eritrea: but many of these are the same people who also thought that the Ethiopian government is the eternal friend of the Eritrean people only 8 years ago. This is why political organizations have cadres and media departments: to persuade and change the minds of the people.
Now the Eritrean opposition groups who are members of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) are getting ready to meet in February. The obstacle-makers will throw in their usual obstacles and try to dominate the agenda of the meeting: where did the EDA meet? Why did they meet in Addis Abeba? Which Weyane official attended the opening ceremony? Who spoke at the closing ceremony? Were the attendants speaking in Arabic or Tigrigna? And what happened to articles 3 and 4?
If the EDA is to be taken seriously and if it is to demonstrate that it has any relevance to the Eritrean reality, it has to come up with a serious plan on how it intends to bring about relief to the Eritrean people. It must elect individuals who have a clear vision and the competence to execute them:
The leadership that is elected must have: - a demonstrable record of achievement.
- the communication skills required to inspire Eritreans and to appeal Eritrea’s case to the international community.
- Experience in fundraising and diplomacy
- Passionate with a sense of urgency.
The objectives must be classified into short-term and long-term ones and they must be quantifiable. They should include:
- a list of nations that should be visited and persuaded to align themselves with Eritrea’s opposition groups;
- A list of nations that are aligned with the PFDJ that should be visited to persuade them to keep away from the volatile regime.
- a list of international media outlets that must be cultivated;
- a list of NGOs that must be approached.
The map of the opposition must include all the countries of our region and not be limited to Ethiopia and Sudan only.
As soon as the meeting is concluded, the EDA must conduct a world-tour to call a people’s meeting and to share with them, first-hand, their decisions and recommendations. The EDA must also establish its representative offices in all countries where all opposition organizations operate under it. Partisan politics should be placed on low priority in order to advance the EDA’s goals and so that the opposition can have impact.
It is important that we always remember that the oppositions doesn’t have the luxury of time. What is at stake, the security of our country and safety of our people, is being exposed to the highest risk ever.
What we want to reiterate here is that congresses and meetings are (and should be treated as) a means to a goal and it should be clear that they are not a goal in themselves. That is why congresses, and a year without splits has been treated as a victory. It is important that an honest evaluation is made regarding the activities of the opposition during 2006. The upcoming meeting is being held at a time that is opportune for reflection and thorough evaluation. We need to ask ourselves: what has changed in the ground? To what extent has the opposition grown and to what extent has the oppressive regime weakened? Is there a coherent strategy to bring about the downfall of the regime? Is there a central strategy to deal with the various armed groups and to safeguard against military pluralism and future warlordism? We have seen several communiqués from the DMLEK (Kunama) organization that carried news of three military confrontation with the PFDJ during the month of December 06 alone. We also hear of unconfirmed skirmishes that happen often between other opposition forces and the PFDJ. Where these approved by the EDA? Was EDA even aware of them? Unless the EDA is able to answer these questions and unless it can demonstrate a record of achievement, however modest the achievement may be, it cannot expect a groundswell of support for its activities and objectives. And, every year that it fails to record an accomplishment, it will continue on its path of irrelevance.
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