Despite overwhelming evidence, some Eritreans refuse to believe that Isaias Afwerki is a dictator or that Eritrea is a dictatorship. Their denial seems to be based on the premise of (1) Tegadalay Isaias can never be Dictator Isaias and (2) Even if Isaias wanted to be a dictator, the people wouldn�t let him become one, because they have a history of resisting dictatorships.  These are all flattering and nice�but false.  Alnahda argues that both premises are wrong and the only way to end tyranny in Eritrea is to change the culture that produced it.  

I.  Can a Tegadalay Become A Dictator?  

The premise is this: Isaias was a Tegadalay (freedom fighter); by definition, a Tegadalay is a selfless brave, patriotic combatant whereas dictators are self-centered, greedy and cowardly; therefore, Isaias is not a dictator. To disprove this claim, we don�t have to go browsing through the entire African catalog of guerilla-leader-turned-tyrant trago-comedies which are so voluminous you can create an entire Dictatorship for Dummies series. All we have to do is have a chat with Isaias Afwerki who, between giving agricultural advice to a farmer (Hrshawi mkhri leggisulla), reviewing a work plan, touring regions, and authoring working papers, sometimes finds the time to be interviewed.   Whenever he is asked questions about the Armed Struggle, he will say that not all combatants were equal.  Just because somebody is a tegadalay does not mean he wasn�t a coward, he will say.  In 2002, when AIDS and corruption (remember the short-lived �Before It Takes Root�--�keysaErere�--campaign?) were the distractions of the year, he said some of those arrested were Tegadelti and �just because someone calls himself Tegadalay does not mean he is not corrupt.�  [Asmarino is running an audio clip of that interview.  Probably the only time in history when a commander-in-chief disses those he commands with impunity.] 

If you rely on Isaias Afwerki to validate truth for you, there you have it:  Just because somebody is a tegadalai does not mean he wasn�t a coward, greedy and didn�t always harbor dictatorial tendencies.    

Those who find our claim that Isaias Afwerki is a dictator an insult can easily disprove our �slander.�  After all, the word �dictator� is one of the most clearly defined words: all they have to do is point to evidence that there are limits to his power; that he is constrained by law; that he is elected; that he permits opposing views in the media he controls.  They can�t do that.  So they tell us that he works hard, that he is a visionary and that he is handsome--as if they are setting up a blind date. In other words, they are saying he is a dictator, but as far as dictators go, he is no ogre.   

II. Can The Eritrean People Tolerate Dictatorship?  

By the Eritrean people, I mean the general population and the combatants of the EPLF.  So even if Isaias wanted to be a dictator, would the people allow him or tolerate it? Hell yes! But how and why? Slowly and with a lid firmly in place.  

Every consultant�s favorite lesson about the undetectable nature of gradual change is the frog story:  throw a frog to boiling water and he will jump out; place it in cold water and bring it to boil, and you�ve got frog soup.  It is a good story�but an urban legend.   It turns out that there is a second element to the slow change�at some point, the frog will try to jump out, no matter how subtle the change. Unless, you constraint it�which gives us a completely different lesson altogether:   change, no matter how gradual, is still detectable; it will be resisted�and it requires somebody (in our case, a dictator and his agents) to create frog soup by placing a lid.   

The turning of the stove goes back to the 1970s�September 29, 1976, according to Aklilu Zere.  Incremental steps took us to:  
1.      December 5, 1994 in Keren
2.      June 18, 1997 at Kushet,
3.      September 18, 2001 in Asmara;
4.      Gedem in 2002
5.      November 4, 2004 at Adi Abeito
6.      Muder in Gelalo of 2002-2004  and 
7.      Disappearance at Dahlak in 2002-2004 ; and 
8.      Massacre at WIA on June 10, 2005 .    

It has yet to stop. Which is to say that one thing September 18^th was NOT is a turning point�there have been far worse things committed against Eritrea before and since.  Still September 18^th is notable.  It is notable for its brazenness: unlike other cases of disappearances and cold-blooded murders, mourned only by loved ones, in this case an entire nation was a witness to the disappearance of journalists and government officials. It was no longer possible to deny that the disappeared had disappeared. September 18^th is also notable for the fact that the tyrants� victims spoke and wrote before they were led to their caves.    

Still, how did we get here? And how and why could this happen in Eritrea? How and Why did Isaias get the power to make the gradual changes and place the lid to boil the frog?   

I can think of at least 5 contributing factors: three dealing with the PFDJ Culture (Secrecy, Prioritization, and Organizational Chart) and two dealing with human nature (guilt and power.)  

1. A Culture of Secrecy  

We used words like Resistance, Armed Struggle, Revolution, or Front, but the generic description for the EPLF (or ELF, for that matter) is a military organization. The military cannot function without a culture of secrecy.  Or, in the words of General Sebhat Ephrem who would later lament its alleged loss, the culture was characterized by: �Did you see anything? I didn�t!  Did you hear anything?  I didn�t!�  

Unlike a citizen, a soldier is duty-bound to mind his own business.  Directives are to be followed, missions to be accomplished, yes, sir; no, sir.  In leftist organizations, revolutionary warriors were free to discuss the abstract and the philosophical�whether Soviet communism was imperial or revolutionary, for example�but they couldn�t ask, �whatever happened to so-and-so� or �when is the next congress going to be held.�   

This ensured that only a few people knew what was going on in the EPLF.  

2.  Shuffling The Organizational Chart  

Those few people who were in a position to challenge his authority�the very few who knew what was going on--always found themselves being rotated. The purported reason was perfectly plausible: cross-training. Much later, in an interview, Isaias would claim that there was nothing new with the much-hyped management theory of TQM (Total Quality Management) because the EPLF had perfected it for years.     

But the consequence of the rotation was that there was nobody in a position long enough to know where all the skeletons were hidden in the Revolutionary closet.    

Meanwhile, this affinity for TQM conveniently excluded Isaias Afwerki: in the nearly 34 years that he has been with the EPLF/PFDJ, he has occupied only two positions in the organizational chart: the deputy (72-87) and the boss (87-present.)  In fact, when one considers the fact that his tenure as deputy was entirely cosmetic (don't laugh but Ramadan Mohammed Nur, who was thawed from the deep freeze, is still "drafting" the already drafted party-formation law for the last 4 years!) and he held the reins of the Revolution even as deputy, we can limit his role to one: boss.    

Still, even with the shuffling and freezing, it is not possible that Isaias�s transgression were kept a secret from everyone.  In fact, one of the most bitter criticisms against EPLF leaders�including the G-15�was that they not only knew, but they actually supported Isaias Afwerki as he took one step after another to turn Eritrea to a police state.  Why would they do this?  

3. Prioritization:  Mogogo/Anchiwa  

A common expression used by many EPLF veterans is: mi�inti mogogo tiHlef anchwa.  It refers to a tigrigna proverb: one must avoid the impulse to kill/entrap a mouse, if the mouse happens to be close to a clay oven.  Don�t destroy the clay oven. Let the mouse pass.  Know your priorities�achieving victory for Lady Revolution.  

Meanwhile, Lady Revolution had a voracious appetite.  She kept swallowing up people� a disappearance here, liquidation there.  She had long arms and she was praised for her ability to reach out.  She had body guards called Revolutionary Guards (halewa sewra) who monitored what people said, whom they said it to and what they were doing when they said it.   

When we were done with Lady Revolution in 1991, series of new mogogos were constructed: national reconstruction, referendum, constitution, border war, demarcation, corruption, microdams, regional stability.  Lady Revolution may have been a marionette for Isaias�but, for many, the movements were subtle and the strings were nearly invisible.  Now we are waking up to the fact that the new mogogos are just hand puppets for Isaias because he no longer sees a reason to be subtle�he�s got his hands under the skirt and he doesn�t care who is watching.  There is always an enemy that the people have to be mobilized for.    

Now here is where it gets tricky: how do you sustain this focus on the enemy?  By creating new enemies, of course! Fear is a grand motivator. There is an amazing story in Michelle Wrong�s I Didn�t Do It For You about an Eritrean university student who was sent to the Eritrean field by the North American student association of the 1970s (E.NA.SA.E).  He was on a fact-finding mission to report on the practices of the EPLF.  The facts that he found were very disturbing�yet, he filed a whitewash exonerating the Front.  Why?  Because E.NA.SA.E was the enemy!  

The combatants and the people thought that all the lying and deception had a built-in expiration date of Independence Day.  But Isaias and his supporters see no reason why this behavior should be discontinued.  They find their logic self-seductive: the culture that worked for us to get independence is good enough for reconstruction, demarcation, prosperity and, in due time, organic democracy.  

4.  Guilt  

This endless call and mobilization doesn�t just require an ever expanding list of enemies, it needs to feed off a pool of guilt. The cause? For fighting-age Eritreans, there were as many doors to join the Eritrean fronts, as there were to avoid them.  Avoidance was a choice, one that increases your mortality rate.  But it comes with a price: guilt. Moreover, of those that participated in combat, the odds of surviving were so low, to be alive was to be guilty.  And since we are always at war with one country or another, and since, even for the most militarized nation on Earth you cannot get more that 10% of the population to be armed, the entire population is wallowing in guilt�one that is constantly exploited.    

Eritrea is not a nation of stakeholders but IOU-holders who are constantly reminded what price was paid to make Eritrea independent, what price was paid to �guarantee our sovereignty�, what price is being paid to develop it and if we haven�t done our share, the least we can do is shut the hell up.   

In this coarse culture, to lie, to deceive, to have dual personalities and to even be victimized by lies and deception and to strangle the truth is considered the highest form of altruism, a patriotic self-denial.  One must overcompensate for the sense of guilt: to ask for justice, reconciliation, democracy, constitutionalism is to engage in self-indulgence.   

5. Power  

One of the things Eritreans find very hard to believe is that Eritreans would commit horrendous crimes against their own people�Qushet massacre, Adi Abeito massacre, Wia, Gedem, Gelalo, Dahlak, containers, helicopters.  It is one thing for foreigners to do this�but Eritreans?  Impossible!  So they dismiss it as wild exaggerations.  Ironically, the sheer volume is not proof that Isaias is a wicked tyrant; it is proof that Eritrea is surrounded by enemies who are pathological liars.  

Unfortunately, to seek reassurance in �Eritreans would never do this to other Eritreans� is just an empty boast--science answered that question too decades ago in two famous experiments, the Milgram Experiment (1961) and the Stanford Prison Experiment (1971.)   

In the Milgram experiment, university students were told they had the power to electrocute their fellow university students�in progressively powerful shocks. They kept doing it (at least they thought they were doing it) even when they heard the agonizing screams of their schoolmates.  People�s desire to follow orders trumps even their humanity.   In the Stanford Prison Experiment, university students were divided into prisoners and guards. The guards were given the authority to communicate that they control the life of their prisoners.  The conclusions were shocking: not only did the �guards� allow this authority to get into their heads and started abusing it, but the prisoners really internalized their roles and started behaving like prisoners.  

What dictators know is that money motivates people�but if you don�t have that, power is an even better substitute.  This, unfortunately, is human nature�and there is no reason to doubt that Eritreans don�t have the same frailties that all human beings have.  

III. Reclaiming A Culture  

Have you ever written a letter on behalf of an uneducated Eritrean elder? I used to hate them�but I miss them now.  �How are you? We, praise God, are doing really fine.  The only discomfort we have is that we miss you terribly.  Please do not worry about us, we are doing very well, praise be to God�� Now read it back to me. �How are you? We, praise God�.�   

I am nostalgic for those letters because they remind me of a time when people lied for honor. People said they were full when they were hungry. People lied for a cause: they pretended to support Abyot to protect their Sewra.     

Now people lie just to survive�and are shamed and dishonored by it.  Others contort themselves to avoid cognitive dissonance: �I am not saying that those arrested do not deserve a day in court, still, national security hasusat temberkekti chifra weyane janda agame demarcation hade lbi hade hzbi�.�   

But it is right and just to resist this tyranny.  Reject secrecy, reject the mogogo/anchiwa justifications, reject men kebdey regiSuni, reject a culture of "duties-now, rights-later"; reject the burden of guilt and reject exercising power over your own people.  

Time will tell whether resistance against Isaias Afwerki will succeed or fail.   Time will tell whether the frog will jump out, or Eritrea will be frog soup. Time will tell whether the end to Isaias� rule will come peacefully or violently.  African history suggests that although Eritreans want peaceful and swift change, the odds are that change will come violently.  But that doesn�t take into account our odds Against All Odds.   

When the apologists for tyranny tell us how few we are, how disorganized we are, it is meant to demoralize us�but I always take pride in it.  The same pride felt by the group of �bandits� that could be �counted in one hand��as Ethiopia used to call Eritrean freedom fighters�when their organization became the voice of the majority.   No matter: winning is no vindication for being right; losing is not proof of being wrong.  What matters is that we stand resolutely for what is right.          

This email address is being protected from spam bots, you need Javascript enabled to view it

PS: In the litany of abuses against the citizens of Eritrea, we always tend to forget the assault against Jehovah's Witnesses who, according to Dimisi Hafash, lost their citizenship rights in 1994.