In our opinion, the all-inclusive meeting that the Eritrean opposition held in Khartoum between the 18th and 22nd of January more than met expectations. The meeting, which had been billed as historic, truly was. Judging by the official statements some of the participant organizations issued, the diversity and size of the participants, the charter and name that was adopted, and the decision to have a follow-up meeting within weeks and not months, we believe the Khartoum conference was a transcendent one, a big leap towards presenting a united front.

To appreciate the accomplishment, one need only assess the diversity of the sixteen Eritrean organizations that came together. Their platforms range from Islamist to secularist; from ethnic-rights advocates to national-rights advocates; from organizations who trace their origin to 1961 to those who were formed in 2004; from organizations who see armed struggle as legitimate to those who advocate peaceful political struggle; from organizations who advocate centralized governance to those who advocate federalism; from those who are suspicious of the Ethiopian government to those who view the Ethiopian government as a strategic ally�in short, all viewpoints representing all of Eritrea�s political spectrum were represented.

We are enthusiastic supporters of the newly formed Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) �alternatively called by its Tigrigna shorthand kidan (covenant) or its Arabic acronym Tehadee (challenge)-- for the same reason that we supported the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA), the Four Plus One, the Two Plus One, etc: because they are efforts to bring voices of Eritrean opposition together and to harness the fight against PFDJ oppression. We consider the political issues of who is "ascendant", who is in "decline" who is "dominant", or who is "trailing" and who is "winning" or who is "losing" questions within the individual member organizations as distant second issues compared to the paramount eminence of the strength and effectiveness of the umbrella group as a whole.

Over the last two years, the Eritrean body politic has been saturated with accusations and counter-accusations: you are traditional; I am modern; you are too soft on PFDJ, I am tough; you are too soft on Weyane, I confront; you don�t stand up for Eritrean sovereignty and I do; you are not a democrat, I am; you are exclusionary, I am inclusive; you are hoping to get to power by riding on a Weyane tank, I am supported by the "people"; you are a Trojan horse, I belong to a "patriotic block". And this was at the level of our bigger and more experienced fronts and parties. Below the public radar, worse things were said�including accusing front leaders of being murderers, weak or squandering their time eating chat.

Some of our compatriots approach the whole by inspecting its parts. Their argument is that the whole is only as strong as its weakest link and by focusing on and diagnosing its ailing part, we can collectively reach a solution--to repair or discard it�and, by doing so, form a stronger, healthier and more effective umbrella organization.

The problems with this approach are many, chief among them being that the approach simply does not work. There are no physicians and patients, no mechanics and moving parts in our revolution: all we have are people, organizations, history and interactions among fluid parts. Many of the tools used to differentiate organizations�large vs small, mainstream vs fringe�such as polls, membership rolls, party identification, size of conventions and congresses, party�s assets�are not available to us. The tools we use are crude: the staying power of a party/organization and the size of the attendants party leaders are able to draw. Thus, as a beginning, it is fair to treat all as equals, until such time that precise measuring tools can be applied. But it is important that a criteria is devised and agreed upon by all concerned.

The PFDJ accuses all of Eritrea�s opposition forces as being supported, bankrolled and nurtured by Ethiopia. No surprise there, that is what dictatorial regimes do to hide their own illegitimacy. The surprise has been that some members of the opposition, their own fellow-travelers, actually believe this accusation. Some elements within the opposition have bought the PFDJ argument that the Islamists and the advocates of ethnic rights are creations of Sudan and Ethiopia.   Part of the confusion has to deal with the fact that Eritrea�s history has followed a parallel track with many of us, depending on our background, traveling with a historic blind spot.

No sooner had the ink on the Khartoum agreement dried than the usual suspects began looking for the next crack and found it in the usual corner: region and religion. A cursory view of Eritrea�s recent history will show that some of the oldest elements of the Eritrean opposition are Islamists and ethnic-rights advocates who have been, openly and publicly, advocating their cause for more than two decades now. Yet, they were presented as if they are presenting a new demand and spoiling the unity of the opposition with unreasonable requests.

Contrary to common perception, the Islamist and ethnic-rights organizations were not formed by the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments and their demands would exist regardless of what kind of government are in Ethiopia or Sudan. The Islamists trace their origin to 1981 (prior to the ascendancy of Bashir/Turabi and their supporters) and some of the ethnic-rights Eritrean organizations were advocating their federal formula in the early 1980s--long before the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) changed its goal from the liberation of Tigray to forming an ethnic-based Ethiopian federation.

We don�t have to agree with their platform or their viewpoints to accept that they are, for good or ill, Eritrean and that they have, by definition, earned the right to join the ideological battleground to win the hearts and minds of Eritreans. The trade-off and, in our opinion, the non-negotiable bottom line is that all opposition forces must be democratic�if they are not, what is the incentive of the Eritrean people to struggle to bring to power organizations that will not yield to the will of the people? We think that instead of scrutinizing the platform of the organizations and conducting the equivalent of primary political campaigns, we should focus all of our attention in bringing to light the commitment of each organization to principles of democracy. That is not an "internal organization affair"; it is our business.

The history of Africa is that, in politics, the person with the most guns wins. A person used to getting his way by killing more people than the other side is likely to live by the creed of "might is right" and is unlikely to subject himself to the indignities of democracy. The person of Isaias Afwerki is case in point in this African malady. There are calls from some of our compatriots that the Eritrean opposition should wage a peaceful struggle. It is one thing to say that; quite another to disarm groups who are already armed believing, as they do, that armed resistance is a legitimate tool. And for as long as some groups are armed, we believe many will feel pressured to be armed or align themselves with those who are�triggering an escalating arms race.

We believe it would be naive to expect the armed groups to disarm�especially armed groups whose history suggests to them that the only reason they were spared total liquidation is because they were armed. The most realistic approach, in our view, is to insist that the armed forces be under a unified command, structured in a manner that approval can be granted only at a Joint Command level. This will ensure that the military is used only sparingly, and only for reasons that are agreed upon as strategic goals and self-defense, and unlike the era of the Armed Struggle, there will be somebody who will eventually account to the Eritrean people for the decisions.

There is also the question of where an exiled opposition should be headquartered. The multiple-headquarters approach poses its difficulties�opposition parties do not have face-to-face meetings for long periods and, consequently, misunderstandings emerge and confidence is shattered. Some within our opposition, particularly the Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP), have expressed their reluctance in official presence in Addis Ababa, so long as the "no war, no peace" situation does not change. Moreover, the current leaders of Ethiopia had, at the behest of their then-friends, the PFDJ, arrested ELF-RC cadres in the early-1990s and allowed free rein to the PFDJ to hunt down and assassinate opposition leaders, particularly EDM.

Sudan, on the other hand, due to its long history of hosting Eritreans and extending them hospitality, has always been seen as a natural headquarter. But Sudan�s history is not as un-checkered as some think. When the ELF was driven out of the Eritrean field in 1981 and the EPLF wanted to make sure it would never pose a military threat, it sent hit squads to Sudan to assassinate its military leaders. In the early 1990s, Sudan�s Turabi had, at the request of the PFDJ, rounded up and delivered Islamist leaders to the PFDJ.   And now, with John Garang ascendant, opposition leaders should be apprehensive about how Sudan�s politics will be affected by having a vice president carrying a big IOU check to Isaias Afwerki.

We mention all of the above not to provide an answer but to inform our readers of the difficulty the opposition faces in this regard and that they should place in context and be skeptical of the bumper-sticker slogans they hear from those who seem content to play by the rules of the game as dictated by the PFDJ.

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