In the heat of the year 2000 Ethio-Eritrean, a senior government cadre (I fail to remember now) was attentively watching the war footage in a newsreels report. The Eritrean Army was in full retreat, and the cadre was expecting to see his former comrades, I surmise, dead or captured. His hope was in vain.

Although many observers described the recent war as trench warfare of the First World War type, the proportion of casualties between the various ranks does show it. True, the data on the fallen obtained by Awate.com has not been crunched for the various disciplines to study. This paper has no pretensions. It is simply a layman's point of view.

It is not an exaggeration to claim that the vast majority of the dead were foot soldiers, while the officer corps of the Liberation Era were safe and secure. Those who depicted Eritrea as Sparta of ancient history were right, if it meant the perpetual mobilization of Eritrea for war. But they were wrong in one aspect. Their senior army officers did not accompany the soldiers who were storming the Ethiopian army positions. A glance into the database mostly reveals the slaughter of the youth in Eritrea. The occasional platoon soldiers, medics, and other low-rank grunts were exclusively recruits from the post Independence era. Most appear to be born in the 70s.

In the early years of the EPLF, up until the late 70s, it was not uncommon for Merah Hayletat, and battalion commanders to be wounded or killed in action. Outsiders visiting the meda, the field, in the gedli era, the era of struggle, and the fronts in the post Independence era were often impressed by the "causal" and "egalitarian" nature of the army. The dire shortage of resources coupled with the Left ideology espoused then were the reasons behind it.

In this war however, the senior officer class is conspicuously absent. The proportion of those killed reminds one of the wars of a colonial army. Negligible white officers would get killed for thousands of the native army. The fate of Askeris deployed by the Italian colonial administration in the infamous wars with Ethiopia, Libya, and Somalia is a notable example.

The vast majority of the officer class of the Liberation period was safely ensconced in the rear areas. When they die, it is mostly of diabetes and others unrelated to the war. A lot of them were busy pulling the strings of the government bureaucracy to get a visa and medical treatment abroad. Some with the hidden intention to flee the regime. Others, like their civilian counterparts, were undergoing middle-age crisis. Many were busy dropping their old family units, and opting for new ones.

Despite having a better access to resources, than what they call the gebar sector, the commoner, in the country, they were also in a frenzy to accumulate property. The property of former Ethiopians in Asmera, who were deported, were actively sought and competed for. Land procured allegedly for business (tekal) purposes would often be sold after building a few row houses for (servicio) at a huge profit. The less ambitious were often preoccupied looking for gas and spare parts for their used cars imported tax-free.

The only senior officers, who finally faced a bad fate, were those that were summarily arrested and incarcerated, after their peaceful attempts of protest when the political rupture within the ruling regime ensued. What the Ethiopian army failed to score was instead performed by the regime in Asmera when it made several scores of people disappear. The witch-hunt for dissenters among the lower ranking officers has continued to date.

Contrary to what Awate.com stated once, veterans and particularly high-ranking officers were not the first to witness the horrors of this war. Rather the thousands who witnessed it are dead and cold as ice.

In the end, Awate.com's sole "blame" would be the opening of the data on the victims of the war for everyone to see. Awate.com should unabashedly feel proud for sharing the data with the public, and wear the label "grave digger" thrown at them, as a badge of honor.