Lately, every time I read an Eritrean article, I have been thinking about �Bonfire of the Vanities.� The author, Tom Wolfe, is considered one of America�s greatest contemporary novelist not just for his ability to coin phrases, but his narration and his talent in creating characters, dialogues, thoughts that are real and universally recognizable.  In the story, the protagonist, a WASPY and successful investment banker who is about to be accidentally (literally) jolted out of his choreographed life into the chaos of New York�s ethno-politics, overhears his maid say something derogative about Jews and�.he is thrilled.  Thrilled because he doesn�t have to be guarded with her�he doesn�t have to be careful.  He is thrilled because she shares his prejudice.  An empty thrill, as he would come to know.  I keep thinking about the book because the litmus test for nationalism now is not �Love Whom I Love� but �Hate Whom I Hate.�

Not just �hate whom I hate� but �hate them with the same intensity I do.�  Because if you don�t, I have doubts about you.   We all do it and I think we all should stop and attempt to see things from the other side.

Take the supporters of the PFDJ, for example and their treatment of Eritreans. Whereas I see an amputation and am aghast at the cruelty of the perpetrator and its witnesses, they see a necessary surgery and recoil at what they consider my sadism in broadcasting this surgery in slow motion, over and over.   I still believe they are very, very wrong; I still hate what the PFDJ is doing and I still believe the silence and unconditional support of its enablers endangers the nation, but I have no reason to doubt their patriotism or humanity and should not make their denunciation of PFDJ as a litmus test of both.  I should try to win them over by showing an alternative not by trying to bully them to hate what I hate.

We are invited to hate the Weyane with the same intensity that passes a certain litmus test.  This invitation comes from the PFDJ and some members of the opposition.  The opposition (particularly the EDP and the ELF-RC) wants us to denounce Ethiopia�s rejection of the EBBC.  The PFDJ wants us to renounce them for a whole lot of things beginning with their refusal to abide by the ruling of the Boundary Commission and ending with their treatment of the Oromo.  They believe, and I choose not to doubt the authenticity of their belief, that the weyane pose an imminent threat to the sovereignty of Eritrea.  They mean sovereignty in both senses: the people would not be sovereign because Eritreans would not have the final say on matters pertaining to their governance; the land would not be sovereign because it would be ruled by outsiders. 

I understand the sentiment because I spent 2 years hating the Weyane and asking everyone to do so.  (After nearly 2000 articles, I don't think I ever got a single correspondece from an Ethiopian telling me, "aha, now I see it" but I got plenty from the already-convinced to "give them hell.")  I don�t think I made distinction between the actors and the act, in that regard.  I hated that they prematurely declared an all-out war through their Council of Ministers; I hated that they deported Eritreans and I hated that they desecrated its land. I hated that they couldn�t bring themselves to having a face-to-face dialogue with Eritrea. I hated that they demanded unilateral withdrawal even as they knew that Eritrea could not withdraw without simultaneously admitting that it had committed aggression.  I hated trivializing war for purposes of �teaching them a lesson.�  I hated that they had to bleed Eritrea just to make a point to one man.  In short, I hated their escalation of a minor, solvable conflict into a complex, insoluble war where old grudges, animosities and the inevitable crimes of war are all stewed together making any future reconciliation difficult.

Now I see the escalation coming from our side.  So, let�s �begin with the ending in mind,� as another writer put it: How do we ascertain that Eritrea�s sovereignty (people and land) is not violated?  How do we spare our people war? 

Sovereignty is a loaded and powerful word. I don�t know about you, but I never felt that Eritrea�s sovereignty was violated between 1991-1998 when Ethiopia administered land which has now been ruled Eritrean.  Is it because I didn�t know?  And had I known, would I have demanded that Eritrea accelerate the situation and declare war?  Was the life of the average Eritrean in Eritrea better in 1991-98 when, in principle, his sovereignty was violated or in 1998-2000, when he had asserted his sovereignty? 

In 1998, when Ethiopians felt that their sovereignty was violated, they said that they would not negotiate with Eritrea until the �aggression was reversed.�   Are the lives of Ethiopians in Badme, Zalambesa, Alitena better now than in 1991-98?  Better than in 98-2000?  If so, what was the cost for this marginal improvement? 

How does Eritrea regain is sovereignty?   I see only a few alternatives here: to convince the international community to take punitive diplomatic measures to compel Ethiopia to withdraw from lands ruled Eritrean; to declare war and get back what has been taken from you; to engage Ethiopia in a way that restores your sovereignty.

International Pressure

The first approach, prevailing on the international community to compel Ethiopia, is an impossible task unless things change in Ethiopia and Eritrea.  For the world�s favorable view of Ethiopia to change, and for Ethiopia to fall out of grace, its government must do something on a par with what Zimbabwe, Sudan or Sebia did: sufficiently outrageous and vile, reducing it to a pariah state.   Conversely, for the international community�s unfavorable view of Isaias Afwerki to change, he must do something that would be considered a tangible reform and, thus, a government worth defending.  I don�t think either one of those scenarios are likely.

International Pressure on Ethiopia will only be applied if the international community believes that there is a real alternative to the Eritrean government: a united, moderate, secular force that represents the entire political spectrum of Eritreans and one that is going to be a force of stability and good neighborliness in the Horn. 

War

I do not think either side believes that a full-fledged war would change the outcome other than devastating the people and earning the wrath of the world.  War, then, would be triggered not to gain territories but political mileage.

For Eritrea, the motivation for the war would be to reactivate the almost-forgotten EEBC ruling.  For sure, in the event of a war, the international community would pick up where it left off and call for immediate cease-fire and the immediate and unconditional acceptance of the ruling of the Boundary Commission by both parties.  But�even then, the international community would not enforce its resolutions, as long as it believes doing so endangers the stability of the Ethiopian government and thus the stability of Ethiopia.

For Ethiopia, the motivation would be two-fold.  One, for domestic reasons: every time the Ethiopian government declares war on Eritrea, its popularity goes up.  This would pre-empt any political attack by its opponents who feel it is too soft on Eritrea.  Second, and this is, given the psychology of Ethopia�s leader, no trivial issue: to teach Isaias a lesson.   Whatever the pretext is�destroying the training ground of OLF, chasing the Ogaden Front, fighting terrorism, or just a pre-emptive strike�its sole objective may be to �teach Shabbiyah a lesson.�  As for an all-out offensive to overthrow the government, I do not see it.  People have given a special significance and interpretation to Meles Zenawi as saying that he doesn�t know when the next war will stop, without exploring the most obvious intent: a message to Isaias to not initiate a war. 

Engagement

And who should engage Ethiopia?  It should be a strong organization that is taken seriously as a formidable force.  It should be an organization that can be taken seriously by the international community.  It should have the authority to enter into agreements and the power to enforce them.  My first choice is someone who has, on the subject of dealing with the Weyane, the longest experience, the most knowledge of the principals, the most intimate know-how of the inner workings of Weyane.  In other words, the PFDJ.    But both governments--PFDJ and Weyane-- have come to the conclusion that the elimination of the other is the only way they can get their countries peace and stability and will not change until their political life depends on it.

My second choice is a strong opposition that has a deep and wide support of the Eritrean people, the respect of the international community and the air of inevitability.

For many reasons, including the fact that the last time the Eritrean people trusted a �strong opposition� it morphed into the monstrosity of PFDJ, we have no such organization.  But we have a collection of patriotic, nationalistic, persistent, committed opposition groups who have the potential to represent a plurality of Eritreans and be taken seriously by the international community if only they could overcome their suspicion and distaste for one another.  The mistrust is based on one side suspecting that the other is a Trojan horse for Meles Zenawi (and thus will forever compromise Eritrean sovereignty) and the other suspecting the other of being an exclusionary, secretive group which is not fully committed to dismantling the PFDJ.

Trust, Partnership, Unity

Unity is based on partnership; partnership is based on trust.  And trust is earned slowly and destroyed quickly.  Loyalty, on the other hand, is long-lasting.  Patriotism is loyalty to country; activism is loyalty to a cause.    Eritrea is a nation of patriots and activist: loyal to their country, loyal to their leaders.   The attempt to describe an increasingly large number of leaders as unpatriotic because they don�t agree with you is futile because of Eritreans loyal nature: the followers are not going to say, �ah, now I understand� and stop following.  They will just declare war on the other leader.   Ultimately, all these leaders will work with one another, and they should just stop making their jobs difficult.   Consider:

• In 2001, Mesfin Hagos showed his trepidation about working with those who are in Addis Abeba.  Then he started making distinctions.  Now, he has entered into an agreement with ELF-RC and ELF, whose chairman is the chairman of the Addis-based Alliance;
• In 2002-03, when the ELF-RC was splitting, the ELF-RC leadership accused the ELF-NC of refusing to be bound by organizational law, much like, they reminded us, Abdella Idris did in 1982.   Now, ELF-RC has reached an agreement with Abdella Idris.
• In 1999, the leader of the ELF-RC and the Alliance was Ibrahim Mohammed Ali.  Based in Addis, he gave interviews with Ethiopian media (including Walta), while Eritrea was in the middle of war with Ethiopia, where he blamed the Eritrean government for the war.  Now the ELF-RC is warning us against groups who are too attached to Ethiopia;
• In 2000-02, Abdella Adem was the Eritrean Ambassador to Sudan and he was giving Sudanese media interviews renouncing the Alliance and the �so-called opposition.�  Now, he is a member of the opposition.
• In 2002, Ahmed Nasser co-engineered the walkout of ELF-RC from the Alliance because, we were told, of the election of Herui, and two articles of the Charter.  Herui is still in charge of the Alliance, the articles are still there, but ELF-NC is back to the Alliance.
• In 2000, I have no quotes to prove this, but I am sure Adhanom felt that the leaders of the ethnic-based organizations were ethnic agitators.  Now he is partnering with them.
• In 2001, Herui gave interviews and addresses describing the Alliance as a spent force.    A year later, he was its Secretary General.   Herui is also famous for joining the EPLF in 1990 and, as recently as 2001, calling for participation in the 2001 election.  Now, he is accusing anyone who recommends rapprochement with PFDJ as a likely candidate for �wedo-geba.�
• In January 2004, the Secretary General of Alkhalas insisted in an interview with Saleh Gadi that his organization has a right to call for Sharia; seven months later his organization dropped that call.

I could go on and on.  This does not lead me to believe, as it does some people, that the leaders of the opposition should not be counted upon.  On the contrary, I consider all of them patriotic and committed Eritreans who exercised their right to change their mind, in the face of new facts. 

My point is that they should refrain from saying or doing things that will make partnering in the future difficult.   It is enough that we all love the same thing�Eritrea.  We shouldn�t have a litmus test to hate the same thing.  Yes, to some, loving Eritrea means the same as hating its enemies, but we should be cautious about labeling people, specially people with proven track of patriotism, enemies of Eritrea. 

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