Now that we have gotten your attention, the alternative mechanism we are referring to is not the one advanced by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (to substitute for the ruling of the Boundary Commission) but the one pushed by President George W Bush (to get around the reach of the International Criminal Court.) Eritrea, reports the US State Department, has signed on to Article 98.  Some background:

Article 98 is a section of the so-called Rome Statue, which lay the framework for the creation of the International Criminal Court.  According to the US State Department, the United States had envisioned the ICC to be overseen by the UN Security Council.  When that didn�t happen, it decided to nullify its signature.  The US is now having bilateral agreements with various nations (Eritrea was, according the press release, the 92^nd nation) indemnifying its soldiers from ICC jurisdiction.   This bilateral agreement is an �alternative mechanism� to the ICC.

Before we get to drawing parallels between the �alternative mechanism� advanced by Zenawi and Bush, it is worth mentioning that the way the government of Eritrea went about signing the bilateral agreement with the United States is entirely illustrative of the way it has been governing the nation for thirteen years now.   Two patterns of behavior are worth point out:

      (1)    Delaying The Inevitable:  The government of Eritrea does not seem to have heard of the local Tigrigna proverb zeihalfeka gasha aTbiqka seAamo (if a guest visit is unavoidable, you might as well make your kiss a robust one.)  Example: There was no difference between the OAU Framework Agreement that was in the hands of the Eritrean government in January 1999 and the one it had in March 1999.   It was procrastinating arrogantly on the former and telegraphing its meek acceptance via desperate midnight faxes to the UN on the latter.   The only difference was Ethiopia�s military offensive of February 1999 that resulted in the death and maiming of tens of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians.  Similarly, there was no difference between the early drafts of the Algiers Agreement of April 2000 and the eventual Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that were signed in June 2000.  The only difference was the Ethiopian military�s offensive of May 2000 and its penetration of Eritrea.  

Given the government�s habitual and costly delaying tactic, it is not surprising that Eritrea would sign Article 98 days after the United States had announced that it was withdrawing its seven personnel stationed at UNMEE because Eritrea had not signed Artile 98.   The government seems to have absolutely no understanding of �opportunity costs��it squanders every goodwill and accepts inevitable deals only belatedly.

(2) Secrecy:   Awate.com, and other Eritrean websites, published this information, and, consequently, Eritrean readers know about this bilateral agreement because of the press release that the US State Department sent us.   You will not find this announcement anywhere in the government-owned or controlled websites.   Whenever there is news that runs contrary to the myth the government would like to promote (that it is self-reliant, stands for its principles, etc), the government pretends that the event that contradicts its myth does not exist.  Another example of this secrecy is  the government�s decision to join (with an "observer" status) the Arab League.   Actually, the government�s decision to join the Arab League is also another example of �Delaying the Inevitable�: it was being begged to join for years; then it had to wait and beg to join.

The ninety-two nations that have signed Article 98 with the United States could have said �no� and insisted on maintaining the purity of international agreements.  But each one, for its own reasons, chose not to.  Looking at the roster of the nations, it is not hard to guess their motivations: some are banana republics, states in names only (eg: �Democratic Republic of Congo�); some are staunch allies of the United States (eg. Israel) and some were probably just bullied into signing the deals.   Undeniably, one of the reasons for some of the nations has to be this: consideration.  

A considerate nation with mature leadership may think as follows: �In real terms, this means nothing to me because it is a virtual certainty that I will never be in a situation that requires my taking a US soldier to the Hague for war crimes.   On the other hand, this issue apparently means a lot to the US (the rights of States vs the supremacy of international institutions.) Therefore, I will be considerate and give in to my partner because by doing so, I lose nothing and, in fact, I earn some goodwill.�

The Parallels With Ethiopia�s Proposal

Ethiopia is not a superpower like the United States.  But in many ways what goes on in Ethiopia has far more significance to Eritreans than what happens in the US.  Just as the US asked for an "alternative mechanism" to the ICC, Ethiopia is asking for �alternative mechanism� to the EBCC.

An Eritrean may interpret Ethiopia�s calls for dialogue through a prism of cynicism or hope.  A cynic will see it as nothing but a government trying to bully its way through: a nation trying to exercise its muscles; a bigger nation behaving like an empire.   A hopeful interpretation is that what Ethiopians are calling for is consideration, using this argument: �In some cases, where the proposed borderline crosses is of minor consequence to Eritreans but of major consequence to Ethiopians; conversely, in some cases where the proposed border is going to cross is of minor consequence to Ethiopians but of major consequence to Eritreans.  Let's make a deal.�

To be sure, one can glean from the published reports of what the Ethiopian leaders have said reasons to be concerned that they are trying to bully their way through.  But, if one is being objective, one will also conclude that those are the exceptions.  In nearly every case, the Ethiopian leaders are asking for consideration and implying that what they want to discuss are small but politically volatile lands.

The Eritrean government is saying no�without explaining how saying no advances the interests of Eritreans, or what Eritreans would lose by entering into a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia.  Surely, it cannot be because the government is �principled� or because it has great affinity to �international law� or "rule of law."  There is a mountain of evidence that the government does not care one iota about any of the above.  On the contrary, many of its utterances seem to indicate that the primary reason for insisting on a rigid enforcement of �final and binding� is not because it is in the interest of Eritreans but precisely because it believes its implementation will destabilize the Ethiopian government and maybe the nation.

That is the government.  Now let�s consider the views of some of our compatriots who have chosen to make �final and binding� as their own litmus test, their own "Alamo."  Which direction one stands on this line is supposed to test one�s loyalty to rule of law, one�s integrity and even patriotism.   Furthermore, this litmus test is supposed to be used to determine who is a loyal opposition and who is a mercenary. 

Leaving aside all the name-calling and the questioning of people�s motives and the empty jingoism, we find it curious that those who push for a rigid application of �final and binding� never do so from the standpoint of Eritreans (the people, particularly those who live in the border areas) or even Eritrea (the land), but from their theoretical abstraction of Eritrea (the State.)   This is why they are unable to demonstrate what Eritreans and Eritrea will lose if Eritrea and Ethiopia were to show mutual consideration and enter into a bilateral agreement that will finally demarcate their border in a way that neither side feels vanquished or diminished.

What we have now is neither the "final & binding" nor an "alternative mechanism."  What we have is status quo: that period where the government delays the inevitable until it enters into secret and belated negotiations, after it had squandered whatever moral highground it had.   How long is long enough before this formula is considered a failure and scrapped?  And why would members of the opposition want to adopt a failed approach to nation-building? And what will it take for it to change�another wasteful war? 

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