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For years, the excesses of the revolutionary fronts, our lack of development, the absence of progress and justice, the emergence of “revolutionary justice”, the embrace of the decaying ideology of communism, the civil wars, the power struggles, were all explained away by our “30 years of armed struggle.” A close relative used to call this the “Suez Canal Syndrome” and explained it as follows. In 1967, in one of several Arab-Israeli wars, the Suez Canal was closed and remained closed until 1975. During this period, merchants in Eritrea had a ready-made answer to explain inflation: Suez Canal indiyu teASiyu! Even a businessman who sold goods which had nothing to do with Suez Canal—Taf, onions, duba, beles—explained it by citing the Suez Canal. Intaymo ygeber ilkayo, Hmaq zemen, he would say in mock outrage as he counted his money. Just when we thought we Eritreans had begun the process of opening our Suez Canal, we have created a new “Suez Canal Syndrome.” It is Weyane. Inflation? Weyane. Arrests? Weyane. No justice? Weyane. Failure of the opposition to unify? Weyane. The war with Ethiopia and Ethiopia’s refusal to agree to prompt demarcation is now used, sometimes alternatively, sometimes simultaneously to explain all that ails Eritrea. The Arab despots have Israel to blame for everything; the Eritrean despots and despot wanna-be’s have their Weyane.
When they are not blaming Ethiopians for the problems of Eritrea, when they are not blaming demarcation, the supporters of PFDJ insult and blame Eritreans for the crimes of the government. For example, the government of Eritrea did not arrest journalists because those arrested are not journalists by the strictest definition of the word. They didn’t have journalists’ license, they didn’t have journalist’s minimal capital, they didn’t have journalists’ training. They don’t know journalistic ethics; they are, in short, hustlers. Who knows, maybe they were not even literate. BzuH zeytfelTwo alo. Of course, the journalists were displayed as journalists when they were covering the Eritrea-Ethiopia wars and their views coincided with that of the government. Well, technically speaking, the journalists were closer to journalism than the government is to governance. The same people who excuse government incompetence, after 13 years at the helm, because it is telmeden (novice) expect perfection and Edward R Murrow status from journalists who have been at their craft for 5-6 years. But no matter. For example, The G-15 were placed in “protective custody” to shield them from the unruly mob who would have killed them (by beating them with metal chairs?) for their crimes of treason. They are detained for their own protection. The families of the G-15 should thank the government for protecting their loved ones. For example, the elderly were arrested because they were unwittingly being used by the G-15. They were warned, and they didn’t listen; now in the august years of their life, they have to be taught patience, even if the schooling will kill them. Never mind that the elderly got involved at the behest of the G-15 AND the supporters of the G-1 who are now, cowards that they are, refusing to speak on their behalf. For example, the university students were sent to WiA to help them build character and learn discipline. It was for their own good. The Muslim teachers are arrested in 1994 because they were caught red-handed planting bombs west of Tessenei, while they were physically present in Asmara and Keren at all times. Well, maybe they prayed for those planting the bombs, what is the difference. The Sawa conscripts are there because…well, let’s have a product of China’s cultural revolution, a certain Gou Houdong, pick up the story (courtesy of Shaebia.org):
I visited Sawa once. The facts I saw there differed much from what I had learned from the internet. Needless to say, the natural conditions in Sawa are hostile, the training is harsh, accommodation and food are far from being desirable. But a whole generation of Eritreans from Sawa will become the backbone of the nation. A newly born country with the least-developed economy badly demands disciplined and skilled citizens. I chatted with several youngsters in the pleasant breeze at nightfall - the sunset in Sawa is breathtakingly beautiful. I heard some complaints about the boring life in the camp. I asked them if any member of their families died in the thirty-year independence war, the answers were the same “yes.” “Have you asked yourselves: what I have done for my country?” I added. My attitude might be a little bit unfriendly, but I was sincere and serious. Gradually, our talk became happy and joyful. “You guys will be proud of your days in Sawa.” I said.
Mr. Houdong could have easily contradicted what he read on the Internet and exonerated the government. He would have asked the youth if they were subject to, or knew someone who had been subjected to, “helicopter” and other means of torture; he could have asked them if they knew anyone who was summarily executed. He would have asked them whether they knew anyone who had been raped. He could have asked them if they knew young girls who were being asked to be the maids of lieutenants and generals. Then, he could have published this and discredited the Internet. But he didn’t go there to learn; he went there to teach. His behavior is consistent with that of the Chinese government and their protégé, the Eritrean government: always lecture, never listen. Lecture on patriotism, lecture on what it means to give to the State without any expectation from the State.
Mr. Houdong will be back to his native country and participate in rationalizing brutality against Eritreans. Why? We “badly demand” discipline, according to Mr. Houdong. Mr. Houdong’s message fits right in with Isaias Afwerki’s address to Sawa conscripts several months ago when he told them that they were spoilt. “America was built by the whip,” he admonished, “all the things the West brags about were built by forced labor.” The argument being: America’s industrialization was made possible by the slave labor of Africans and the indentured work of immigrants. If one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, Mr. Houdong should be very understanding of America’s use of the Chinese to build the railroads in the United States of the 19th century. Maybe the Chinese “badly needed discipline”?
Mr. Houdong does not realize that to Eritreans he is just one more in a series of foreigners who were smitten by their ideal and who allowed themselves to romanticize reality, to fall in love with ugliness even when all their senses warned them against it. By the time they came to their senses, the ugly bride had already started flirting with another foreigner…and so goes the cycle of PFDJ, because there is no shortage of people who want to be duped.
Flawed Model of Nation Building
In undeveloped nations, one of the obligations of the learned class, I believe, is to provide various models of development. They have an obligation to compare various systems, compare their compatibility to the history, culture and resources of their nations and then put forth a set of recommendation. And, regularly, one of the things critical minds are supposed to ask is: what if I am wrong?
The model put forth by the PFDJ intellectuals is the Eastern (Asian) model. From this model (Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea) the following are extracted as desirable values until such time that a “solid middle class” emerges: · A strong central government imprinted in the nation’s political, economic
and social life · A one party state, · Re-engineering of the nation’s culture, · Prioritizing “communal” rights over individual rights, · Nationalizing and/or severely limiting free expression (media, assembly)
All of the above, and more, are supposed to be “temporary” sacrifices the people have to make to speed up the process of development. I’ve tried to quantify “temporary” from the private correspondence I get from the PFDJ supporters: it ranges from “at least ten years” to “the foreseeable future” to “not in your lifetime, you expletive deleted.” Not coincidentally, the people who justify the calls of "sacrifice" are the ones who are sacrificing the least and, in some cases, benefiting from it: well-paid and well-traveled government officials with perks and privileges; foreign-nation-dwelling Eritreans who visit Eritrea on vacation; foreign nationals receiving bid-free contracts (Chinese, Koreans.) You will never hear from those on the receiving end of the “sacrifice”—the conscripted soldiers, the students whose studies are interrupted, the farmers who can’t farm, the traders who can’t trade, the parents grieving the loss of a precious child—expressing understanding for this sacrifice that falls lopsidedly on them.
Those of us who present the Western model are told that we can’t impose Western ideals on Eritrea because they are different cultures. The “different cultures” excuse is applied selectively. Assume there are five hypothetical Eritrean researchers. One writes a book about Guatemala, another about Guinea New Papau, another about Japan, another about China and still another about the United States. My guess is that the more obscure and the more distant the country of reference, the more seriously their work would be taken. Not totally recovered from the politics of the 1970s, the culture they respect is not for its closeness to Eritrea, but for its distance from the United States. Using this logic, the researcher who reported his findings about the US would be dismissed as a hamburger-loving, unrealistic, imperialist pig and the one who reported his findings about, say, Vietnam would be hailed as a serious researcher. If the US is so different from Eritrea that its experiences are irrelevant to Eritrea, what, precisely do the Chinese, Korean, Singaporese, Taiwanese have in common with Eritreans? Is it their religion? Their language? Their history? Really, are there cultures more alien to Eritreans than the Southeast Asian ones?
Those of us who present the Western model are challenged to present one single case in sub-Saharan Africa of a nation which has have followed the Western model—political pluralism, individual rights, free enterprise—and been successful with it. I will concede there are none if those who are advocating the Eastern model—political monopoly, no individual freedoms, no civil liberties, regulated economy—will also concede that there is no African country which has used their model and succeeded. In sub-Saharan Africa, there are countries which are very poor AND totalitarian and then there are countries which are very poor AND at least less totalitarian.
In the absence of success stories, I think we should compare the failure stories to see which option is worse. I know there will be some who will say that there is a “third way” and Eritrea is coming up with its own “organic democracy” but, in reality, there are only two options: the one party state and the multi-party state. So, let’s compare the nightmares:
(1) Option One: Eritrea enters a stage of political pluralism, free press, and economic liberalization. But things go horribly wrong. The nation enters an era of instability, which is inherent in any democracy: with every election, it charts a new path, tries it for a while and the next election brings a different path. Political parties get organized along ethnic, regional, religious lines. The media is run by press barons who peddle scandals and libel. The economy is run by an elite group, well connected to the powerful. Vast areas of rural Eritrea are ignored. New religions proliferate. The gap between the haves and have-nots increases: corruption reigns. Sense of disempowerment breeds discontent and strikes. (2) Option Two: Eritrea continues on the path of a dominant mono-party. But things go horribly wrong. The one-party state stifles freedom of expression; it builds more and more prisons to house the dissidents. Its elections are neither free nor fair—they bring predictability and stability but those out of power (and the constituencies they represent) remain out for decades, thereby creating first-class (Fallujah) and second class (Kurd) citizens. The economy is dominated by the State, the media is owned by the state. Those deemed enemies of the party are equated with being enemies of the state. There is no gap between the haves and have-nots because there are no haves. There is corruption. There is sense of powerlessness and discontent, but no way to express it and the people become dispirited. Obviously, nobody would wish either one on the people. But given a choice between two risky endeavors, which of the two options one chooses is really driven by one question: do you trust the people? If one believes that the Eritrean people are capable of self-government, that they are able to place safeguards to minimize the nightmare scenarios outlined, that their history suggests political maturity and self-government, then one chooses, reluctantly, Option One. If one believes that the people are ignorant, uneducated folks that can be easily exploited by mischievous politicians, hucksters and hustlers, then one would choose the PFDJ-model because the people are like children who need the strong, sure hands of Papa Isaias and, after him, whomever Papa Isaias hand-picks as his successor. (see also, Syria’s Hafez Al Asad, Libya’s Kaddaffi, China’s Mao Ze-Dong.) For the absolute worst scenario in this—of what Eritrea could look like 30 years from now-- see an HBO-produced documentary of Oliver Stone’s interview with Fidel Castro where Fidel: · Calls the 80 people he recently arrested “spies”; · Describes the journalists he arrested “mercenaries” of foreign powers; · Dismisses Amnesty International as a western Trojan Horse; · Dismisses the opposition as sympathizers of Batista; · Strolls the city to demonstrate how much “the people” (his Hafash wdbat) love him (they chant their version of “we will go to the mountains of Sahel if we have to protect the Comrade”); · Dismisses the power vacuum that will be created in a One-Man State after the One Man dies. And in a language almost identical to what Isaias has said often, Comrade Fedel says that he would resign his position tomorrow if that is the wish of “the people”, if he felt that he is a liability to Cuba. Irrespective of what one thinks of successive US government’s policy of maintaining a suffocating embargo against Cuba, it is undeniable that the embargo exists only because Fidel is in power. It is clear to everybody in the world, except to Fidel, that Fidel = embargo = bad for Cuba and therefore Fidel = bad for Cuba. But he, and his “supporters” cannot see it and the nation suffers for a generation. And they cannot see it because of their own “Suez Canal”: the US tried to overthrow Fidel and so to “punish” the US, Cuba will have Fidel as its El Presidente…even if Fidel is undisputedly bad for Cuba. Going back to the “what if I am wrong” self-evaluation, the biggest problem with the Fidels and Higdefs and Mugabes of the world is that they are incapable of asking that question, much less answering it. The reason I believe the risks of the one-party state are far greater than the risk of multi-party state is that one-party states create a dispirited people—fearful, suffocated and skilled at only one thing: mastering the art of survival. And if survival in a terrorizing state requires lying, snitching, and developing two personas—one private, one public—the people will do it. Forget about Eritreans in Eritrea, who have much to fear, I have witnessed the two-personas (one private, one public) of Eritreans in Diaspora who do so for fear of isolation from their small circle of public opinion. Like They develop all the symptoms of powerlessness: hopelessness, susceptibility to conspiracy theories, and, worst of all, loss of spirit and sense of patriotism. This life of a lie, deception and fear has, as any people who have survived totalitarian states will tell you, far-reaching and nearly permanent scars that are almost impossible to reverse. We could choose to acknowledge it, face it, arrest it before it develops or hide behind ever-new “Suez Canals Is Closed” stories.
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