This is a modest attempt to "engage in the past" as called for by
Woldeyessus Ammar, in his column Spotlight at Awate.com.The ogre residing in Asmera has been very methodical in dealing with the various opposition groups within his camp and the meda Eritrea in general. He had not only physically liquidated the dissenters, but often, he has also attempted to manipulate history. "Nehnan Elamanan" and "Aenawi Menqesqas 73" are the notable ones written by him. Yet the "Kagnew Connection" has remained a riddle.
All the alleged participants of the "plot" have chosen to stay mum about it. Isaias opted this time to kill indispensable witnesses of the "project", Habteselassie Ghebremedhin and Tesfamichael Giorgo, and remain silent about it. Successive Ethiopian Governments, including the "Anti-Imperialist" Derg, did not divulge anything- and likewise, the Americans.
For over two decades now, the little information, or "propaganda", available was mostly from Jebha and its spin-offs. Researchers and serious intellectuals appear to be shunning it. In the mid 70s, the ELF had Wedi Giorgo in its custody and reputedly, it had a taped confession from him about the "Kagnew Connection". In the propaganda war of the mid 70s, the "scoop" helped Jebha among its sympathizers.
In the absence of any documents about this "scandal", the political context of those times, the death/disappearance of Isaias' confidantes, and some conversations heard in the Meda would be helpful. Onlt then would the plausibility of the "plot" make sense.
After the Adobha meeting in the late 60s, the Hizbawi Hayletat factions, Selfi Nasnet, Obeliyeen, and the Sabbe group linked off to various destinations. Jebha was to them a divisive and repressive organization. Among many of The ELFs weaknesses the formation of the Zonal Commands or Wilaya in Arabic, was considered the cause of the splits. On hindsight, the Jebha leadership's intent seemed to accommodate the thin line between regionalist sentiments, and the nationalist cause (keep in mind PFDJ's all-out attempt to obliterate the Adi). Jebha's fears and sensitivities towards ethnic and regional issues were not unfounded.
Upon dispersal from the parent organization Jebha, each factions headed towards its ethnic enclave. The Obeliyeen marched to the Roras of the Sahel. Isaias and his few followers went to the Kebessa. And with the help of the indefatigable Sabbe, the last group crossed to the Sudan from where it was airlifted to South-Yemen. It was soon sea-borne, and beached in the Southern part of the Denkalia shores. They had no plans to stay there for long; Semhar was the destination in their radar.
These disparate groups had not a lot in common. The Obeliyeen and the Sabbe groups resented the "tribal dictatorship" of the alleged Beni-Amir in Jebha. Power grievances aside, the urbanized and well educated of the Sabbe group did not harbor any hostility towards Arab affiliation.
In contrast the Selfi Nasnet's position was very radical, and uncompromising to the parent organization. It vehemently condemned Jebha as pro Arab and anti-Christian. It accused Jebha for massacres of Christian fighters and farmers. It considered itself the only panacea and dismissed the other politico-military entities and tendencies within and outside Jebha. Its mobilization campaign concentrated on the Christian highlanders. And circulated the document "Nehanan Elamanan" for this purpose in 1971.
Notwithstanding the proximity of the guerrilla abode it chose, Sefli Nasnet's anti Jebha propaganda resembled the Imperial Ethiopian Governments propaganda. Governor Asrate Kassa was relentlessly trying to exploit the divide along highland/lowland and along religious grounds. The increasing number of former disaffected Christian combatants from all ranks was also utilized. Radio and newspaper coverage was intense. It soon resulted in the formation of the Israeli trained commandos and peasant militias in the Kebessa region. Did this common platform lead to some rapprochement between Isaias and Asrate Kassa? Nobody is certain.
Selfi Nasnet's armed contingent stayed briefly in Ala and then moved to Bahri-Bara. Isolated from Jebha, mistrustful of the other factions, and the Imperial Army on its back, what was this group brooding and plotting? What vision could it dream under these dire circumstance?
Primary sources are not available. The tidbits of information are what the writer later heard as a recruit in the Bahri-Bara area. Some of the veterans occasionally gossiped about Wedi Giorgo. About how he used to supply them with watches, and medicine from his contacts: the Imperial government and the Americans at Kagnew Station in Asmera. They also used to accuse him of trying to dupe the lure them into some shady trap. It appeared that something turned sour after their brief liaison.
If there had been some "plot" hosted by the Ethiopian government, and the Americans in Kagnew, it may have been aborted or scrapped. The burden of the proof should rest with future historians and researchers. An attempt should also be made to obtain information from the American side through the Freedom of Information Act.
A brief look into the formation of Hizbawi Hayletat is necessary. Is it not confounding to understand the formation or the coalition of these groups? How did these armed groups, particularly Selfi Nasnet and the Sabbe group, tolerate each other to the extent that they merged? Did the Sabbe factions elite had an access to Isaias's publication, "Nehnan ELamanan", and his possible subterfuges at Ala? They were probably not aware of it.
Isaias sudden decision to descend the Bahri-Bara escarpment and join the groups he used to despise was simply for mercenary reasons. The Sabbe group in Semhar had foreign contacts and access to scarce resources from the enterprising Sabbe. The Obeliyeen had their hostile and impregnable mountain fastness in the Sahel and access to the Marsas close by: Marsa Tekalay, Gulbub etc.
For decades, slowly but deliberately Isaias donned the facade of leading a coalition front, co-opted the other groups into becoming his appendages, and become the most powerful person in the EPLF.
A brief note on his close confidantes
1- Habteselassie Ghebremedhin went to Bede Mariam student in Addis Ababa prior to college. He was one of the few fellow guerrillas who joined Isaias and was close to him. Habteselassie was captured by the Commandos at Ala around 1970 and was put in prison. When released, Habte joined the Selfi Nasnet, and was instrumental in the publication of Fitwerari (vanguard), a publication and an organ of the organization. For some suspicious reasons, Isaias arrested Habteselassie with the "menkae" group and he shared their same fate in 1976.
2- Wedi Giorgo joined the ELF in the early 70s and stayed until 1978. He then crossed into the Sudan and later appeared in Addis Ababa. After Addis fell to the EPRDF in 1991, he was gunned down with a silencer-gun, allegedly by EPLF hit men.
