Years ago, never mind how many years ago, there was a radio play in Asmara. I dont know what it was called but I know it was a comedy. One of the characters had a one-word response to everything: arbaAa. Forty. I dont know what the context was or why this was considered hilariously funny but I do know that for about a month arbaAa was a household name.
Fast forward to 2002. Call it inflation; call it cost of living adjustment, call it what you will but arbaAa (40) has now been replaced by 1500. How many Eritreans attended the pro GoE rally in Washington, DC? 1500. How many Eritreans attended the pro-GoE rally in London, England? 1500. Ok, there is a difference. The one in DC was approximately 1500 and the one in London was about 1500. So, there.
Take a number. Take any number. Divide it by three.
I have a theory. I think a pre-condition to being a good politician is that you have to be a sports fan. What? Let me explain.
See, if you are a sports fan, you accept defeat as part of the game. Sometimes you win; sometimes you lose; sometimes you break even. Win, lose, draw. When you lose, it does not change your essence or your identity: it just means you were bested by your opponent. For example, Tiger Woods, the best golf player in the world, recently lost in London (in front of about 1500 observersJ Does that mean he woke up one day and forgot how to play golf? Does his loss change anything about him? No and no.
Accepting loss or defeat also makes victory that much sweeter. Your life has a range: your emotions, like natures seasons, vary and you accept them.
No Sports Zone
If you are not a sports fan, this perspective is entirely missing. A politician and a politicized entity just cannot accept defeat. They begin with the conclusion of the story (We won!) and then fill in the body and the introduction of the story. If it is a demonstrable loss, then a politician changes the definition of what is a win and what is a loss. The politician changes the expectations by increasing and decreasing the threshold.
Talk to an ELF veteran and he will never utter the d-word about what happened to his front in 1980-81. A vibrant political organization with a twenty-year history was chased out of the Eritrean field. That is not defeat. Nobody, at least nobody in leadership has said, We failed our front and its membership. We were ill prepared. We had poor intelligence; we were grossly negligent. Facing the reality would have taken the ELF leadership to the next step: appeal to the membership: we have failed you in the past. We would like a second chance to redeem ourselves. If we have lost your confidence, we understand, we will move on. However, we think the principles of our front are worth preserving and we would like a new generation to take leadership. Instead, what we get is the other d-word: deny. It is victimization; it is a conspiracy (at minimum between EPLF & TPLF; sometimes it gets grander involving many other agents including Sudan, Libya, the Soviet Bloc, Israel and the United States.) Twenty years later, the same leadership with the same vision heads the same organizations leading friend and foe to conclude: you keep doing what you had been doing, why shouldnt we think you will keep on getting what you had been getting?
This doesnt make the ELF leadership bad people; it just makes them standard politicians. It isnt that much different within EPLF or even with the TPLF. Heres why:
Between 1998 to 2000, Ethiopia waged four (not three) offensives. For reasons not known to me, both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments say there were three offensives but, as a matter of fact, there were four.
The First Ethiopian Offensive was waged in June 1998at least according to Ethiopias Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin. Its objective was to recapture Badme and environs. The offensive expanded to the central zone (Zalambesa) and the Eastern Front (Bure.) Ethiopia failed. What is the measure? Not only did it not capture Badme, it lost Zalambesa and made no headway in Bure. In frustration, it bombed Asmara. Ethiopia (in the person of its Foreign Minister) declared that its counter-offensive was victorious.
The Second Offensive was waged in February 1999. This offensive, the so-called Operation Sunset had a defined objective: to re-capture Badme and environs as well as Zalambesa and environs. Ethiopia managed to capture Badme; it failed in capturing Zalambesa. In other words, it was a draw. Nonetheless, Ethiopia declared victory and Eritrea, with its governments panicky response to the UN, acted as if it had lost.
The Third Offensive was waged in April 1999. The offensives stated mission was to recapture Zalambesa and environs and the offensive was launched in the central zone. Ethiopia failed. That, unlike Operation Sunset this operation is still nameless is a good indication that the mission failed.
Ethiopias Fourth Offensive was waged on May 12, 2000. Within days, Ethiopia had infiltrated deep into Western Eritrea, followed by capturing Zalambessa, followed by Eritreas withdrawal from Bada and Burie, followed by fierce fighting in the Asab front, where Ethiopia made no headway. When the dust had settled and ceasefire agreement was signed, Ethiopia was in possession of every disputed territory and Eritrea had agreed to terms that allowed UN presence in a 25-km buffer zone, all of which was inside Eritrea.
Ethiopia, and the world, declared victory. The Eritrean government declared victory as well. To do so, it had to redefine the meaning of victory: Eritrea was still standing, the whole of Eritrea was not occupied, the government was still in place, our military is still intact, things could have been far worse. Also, to compound the Ethiopian advantage (in terms of population, in terms of diplomacy), Eritrea was hampered by having to deal with enemies from within, some of whom were conspiring against its government with the enemy.
Because the alternative explanation would be: we did not take the Ethiopian threat as seriously as we should have. We were grossly negligent when it came to intelligence. Our commander in chief was mocking Ethiopias catalog-shopping of armaments. Our defense minister described an attack long advertised as a surprise attack. Our military leaders were not even in the frontlines; they were too busy partying in Asmara. We are not good politician; we are not good administrators: the only luster we have is our military prowess and we dont want to give up that portfolio. So we won. Anyone who says we lost is not only mistaken but is deliberately trying to weaken the indomitable Eritrean spirit. And our unity. And our diversity.
Nasserism
What Eritrea has now is leadership vacuum. The educated class always goes to the same source to find explanations: history books. They point each other to maps and directions. Did you read 1984? The similaries with Eritrea are eerie? Did you read the biography of Kamal Ataturk? Man, it is eerie? Oh, did you read Rise To Rebellion? Just change the names and you are talking about Eritrea now!
In other words, we dont know. We are all fishing for the answers. So, heres another one. Egypt is celebrating the 50th anniversary of its revolution: the coup detat that overthrew a monarch and gave the world Gemal Abdel Nasser. Within a few years, as the Economist reports, many states that were mesmerized by this golden boy sprang up, some even going to the extent of adopting the flag of Egypt. After defeating the superpowers of France and Great Britain, Gemal was canonized by the Arab world encouraging his ego to go on a wild trip and nurturing his bad habits of monopolizing the economy and jumping into un-winnable wars (Yemen, Israel.)
Fifty years later, many Egyptians look back to the royal period with nostalgia as a time of cultural renaissance, vibrant economy and political pluralism. Nasser is remembered for the disastrous 1967 war with Israel and for institutionalizing one-man and one-party rule not only in Egypt but the Arab world. To this day, his defenders have only one response: at least he wasnt corrupt. Meaning, he wasnt financially corrupt: he didnt amass wealth as evidenced by the modest lifestyle of his children. But he was politically corrupt and a power freak.
Fifty years from now, what will we say about the Eritrean revolution? I dont know. But I know Isaias Afwerki is not a sports fan which means, everything the government does will always be a victory. MeAt Awetat iyu. arbaAa!
