Awda lazm Awda [in Arabic] and Sagem gdn Sagem [in Tigrigna] were the rallying cries that gave the front Tewelde leads, Sagem, its name.  It is the cry of an exiled people who said, “Return, Certainly, return!” [in English] when their front was chased out of the Eritrean field and they were exploring options on what to do next..   They ended up returning to Eritrea. This is a story of their journey since 1981: the splinters, his assessment of the principals, on the challenges facing the Alliances, the accusations of their role during the Eritrea-Ethiopia War and much, much more.. 

When choosing a title, given the history of Sagem we briefly considered a word play on Sagem and its leader:  “The Return of the Prodigal Son.”   However, according to Tewelde Gebreselassie, “The kernel, repeat, the kernel, repeat again, the kerenel of Eritrean politics is chauvinism: this is what the intellectuals have not tackled.”   We haven’t tackled it but we don’t want to contribute to it.  So, given the grilling nature of the interview, we have opted for:  

Tewelde Gebreselassie: On The Hot Seat
Interviewed by Saleh Gadi : Crystal City, USA, July 30, 2002

1. “Awda lazm Awda: Sagem gdn Sagem” 

1.1 You are the leader of an organization named SAGEM, and you are currently holding the rotating leadership of the Eritrean national opposition forces known in short as the Alliance. Tell me what does SAGEM mean? 

SAGEM is our nickname.  We were known by that nickname after the ELF was assaulted by internal and external forces and was pushed to the Sudan [1981-82]. We were one of the three parts that formed the ELF before its disintegration. [The other two were ELF, led by Abdella Idris and ELF-RC, led by Ahmed Nasser.]   We held our organizational congress in Karakon/ Tahdai [Sudan] and we named our organization the ELF-Central Leadership. We then decided to get the Eritrean Liberation Army (ELA) back to Eritrea in order to play its patriotic role in the armed struggle for the liberation of Eritrea. The congress had called for the return of the liberation army and thus we sent one unit to Eritrea.  

But later, after almost two years of exile in Kerakon/Tahdai, the return of the bulk of the army that was pushed outside Eritrea was decided under the slogan of ‘Awda lazm Awda’ & ‘Sagem gdn Sagem’ [Return, certainly, Return]. This, in the Eritrean context, is familiar since our nomads’ travel and return to their original place is known as ‘sebeK sagem’.  

With the exception of some who gave up [on the struggle], the main composition of the organization returned to Eritrea in 1983 with all its properties. This was the first mechanism.  The second mechanism was to start a dialogue with the EPLF. This is why we were called SAGEM but, officially, the name of our organization was the ELF-Central Leadership. 

1.2 What arrangement did you have with the EPLF when you returned to Eritrea? 

We told the EPLF that we had to return.  The EPLF was in a bad situation; we had to return to the Eritrean field to fight the enemy. This was at the time of the Red Star Offensive [by Ethiopia’s Dergue].  The enemy occupied places like Kerkebet and the battles were then waged in the Sahel.   There was heavy fighting in places like the mountains of Halhale.  

The return of the liberation army gave the revolution a huge morale boost. Our decision to go back and fight helped the general confidence of the people because we had many arms and equipments: we had all the resources owned by the former ELF. For example, we had big radio equipment that enabled us to communicate with the outside world. We had many assets; we had many types of medical equipments. In short, we had heavy equipment that we could utilize jointly.  

We had talked with the EPLF within this framework: that we would enter into Eritrea and continue our armed struggle against the occupation.    As a precaution against confrontation by EPLF forces, we had stated our purposes for entering were to hold our congress. They [EPLF] accepted our choice to enter and to continue our operations in the military and expand our own politics and propaganda. There was mutual support: they supported us with arms and supplies (we had some shortage there); and we supported them by providing bulldozers.   Likewise with other things.  There was a strong mutual support based on mutual interest…  

1.3 Here… 

…we entered; but our understanding proved to be different. Our understanding was that it [EPLF] was not a democratic organization but a nationalistic one. Based on this, we decided, in a conference, that we would deal with them as a nationalist organization… 

1.4 But please wait. You are skipping an important event. The ELF was pushed to the Sudan in a joint EPLF/TPLF assault. When you returned to the field, were the issues of the assault resolved or talked about? 

There was a difference of opinion about the causes.   This [Resolution] should be done when we enter a dialogue. At first, we didn’t enter into a full dialogue. We started a full dialogue in 1984.   After our return in 1983, we held an organizational congress. After that congress, we formed a dialogue committee and we started a dialogue.  

When we formed a five-member dialogue committee, they formed a standing committee: a standing committee whose members were Isaias [Afwerki], Ramadan [Mohammed Nur],  [Ibrahim] Afa [martyred] and [Haile] Drue. [now in jail.]   This was a standing committee of the politburo.  

We started to dialogue, we… discussed those issues [as per] our program.  And what was in our program regarding the past experience? As per our program, our view was that they [EPLF] were part of the exclusionist [attitude] and a part of the instigators of the civil war. When looking at our revolution, they cannot be totally absolved of this responsibility.  They are part and parcel of the revolution… 

This was what they didn’t like [to hear]. They asked us, “how could you say that” and they argued strongly on this issue. Thus, firstly, there were such talks.    We asked for a presence, since we had a force inside Eritrea that would enable us to wage guerrilla warfare. Secondly, the forces that surrendered to Ethiopia, ‘wedo geba’, were from the ELF. We believed that we would win back this force and, in fact, we opened channels inside [with the wedo geba] to get them back and to organize them. We organized them…. We asked the EPLF to wage their struggle and that we would wage ours…in short it was a National United Front arrangement.  We asked to wage guerrilla attacks. We had a cultural group, a big collection of equipment that would cover all of the highlands and the Gash to propagate and educate. This is what we asked to do…  

Meanwhile, the wedo geba was shaking the fronts by fighting alongside Ethiopia. We targeted this force because we knew this force. Thirdly, on the economic field.   Economically, we had enough resources then. We had trucks, tankers…our tankers were operational in Gedaref [Sudan].  Our commercial trucks were generating income. We even provided services to the Sudan with our own tankers, drivers and resources. We planned to continue operating the trucks [to generate income] in the regions we controlled.  Dom tree for example, was a source.  Then there was the Red Cross. We agreed to ferry food aid to Eritrea and Ethiopia, which were then stricken by famine. The trucks that were inside Eritrea that we couldn’t get to go to Sudan and work were utilized in this. We agreed with the Red Cross that they would bring the food to Girmayka on [Sudanese] lorries and, for a fee of 60-70 thousand dollars, we would receive it in Girmayka and ferry it to Eritrea and Tigray, Ethiopia.  This was all part of the agreement.  

They were reservations on the military issues.  [First], they refused to agree to our plan of hitting the enemy in guerrilla attacks and to our plan of luring the wedo-geba from the Ethiopian side. We agreed that we would operate in the Eritrean field. Based on this understanding, we entered the Eritrean field.  Secondly, regarding our plan to go and move to the highlands and Gash for political mobilization, their answer was, ‘we are not ready for you’. If we went through this channel, there were many things we would find, especially arms and other things that would strengthen us.  They would not yield on this issue. Thirdly, even when they knew of our plans in the field of transportation, they were suspicious and were resistant. 

1.5 Would you say they were afraid you might get stronger?

Yes. These differences appeared and we couldn’t agree on many issues, meaning the practical issues. On the united front arrangement, we had put our view forward and we had issues on the formulation of procedures. But on the practical side, on what we must do, we presented all of this. Our aim was to execute based on that. Then we formed a committee to look into this. They presented two people and we presented two. From their side, Ibrahim Afa and Haile Derue and from our side, Zemehret Yohannes and Berhane Haile were delegated. This was to execute the agreement in practice. Those were chosen from the dialogue committee. When we reached the stage of implementation, they couldn’t agree.   After meeting twice in Zara, the committee reached a deadlock.  

1.6 Who was leading your organization at that time, and what happened to Totil and Zemehret? 

It was Dr. Giorgis; he was the chairman.   On the executive committee were myself, [Ibrahim] Totil, and Zemehret Yohannes.   But the dialogue committee was composed of Gergis, Zemehret, Berhane Haile, myself and …we were involved in the meetings between the EPLF & ELF- CL  when it reached a deadlock. And …Totil,  Zemehret, let me continue there….  

After we reached a deadlock, we reached a stage of giving up and we asked what should be done. We tried to break the deadlock. They requested that, above all else, our army should help them in the fronts; they requested that we mix our army with theirs. Of course, taking that decision before reaching a political agreement was difficult; however, to prove our patriotic intentions, we sent some of our forces to the Halhal front. Naturally, they didn’t like our influences; because democracy was a guide in our organization and, according to them, this was sensitive. It was a difference of cultures: the mingling with the democratic organization was not liked. This was, as far as they were concerned, crossing the lines.   

It would certainly influence their organization: criticizing leadership and administrations was not known within their organization; they didn’t like the mention  of  ‘democracy’ and they were afraid of the fact that this organization was getting closer to them. They reiterated that the mix would occur only when entering battles.   To achieve a breakthrough to the stalled talks, we agreed to send our forces.  Our forces participated in all the battles and many sacrifices were witnessed to show them the readiness of our organization to fight strongly for patriotism and against occupation.  

Despite all of this, we didn’t see any change [in their attitude]. Finally, what we observed was their wish to crack our organization and divide it and solve the impasse. From that point forward, we decided to go our own way because there was no hope in executing joint plans with them [EPLF].  They don’t believe in political democratic rights.  Their organization was not a democratic organization – it’s national and patriotic; it was a patriotic organization but it was not a democratic organization.

2.  LURING  IBRAHIM TOTIL AND ZEMEHRET YOHANNES  

First, they called Totil alone and talked with him—they could have given Totil promises, but Totil was in line with our views. We had militias, from the Nara nationality. But militias could not be as mobile as we were because they were limited to their region. Of course there is the issue of balances of power and that is what gives him [Totil] the power—they were cooperating with by giving us supplies, even to the militias.  

When Totil came back, they had asked him for a complete unity. Of course, this was rejected by us but they managed to convince Totil even though Totil, until then, agreed with our views. Our organization was composed of three tendencies.   It was a front and it had the side of Totil, the side of Berhane and our side.  It was an alliance.   

2.1 What were your differences? 

Our section was different from the beginning; its capacity was known from the beginning. This was being organized and reorganized again.  Finally, at Karakon and Tahadai, each and every section was grouped in a national front.  It is considered an alliance of political wings. 

2.2 What kind of wings are you talking about?  You said three political wings: how do you explain that when you say Totil’s wing or your wing? 

What I mean is that all three within the front held to the program.  It had arrived to that level from different historical perspectives.  It works in one front--it had come from the struggle through a process, it didn’t come together. It was operating separately until the blocks with difference in the mode of struggle came to one program in the events of Karakon and Tahdai… 

2.3 In short, are you saying you were three different blocks with different views that developed and merged into one view and one front in Karakon/ Tahdai? 

No no.  First the views become one. Initially, the program and goals were one. But the tendencies were created because of interests and benefits. There came the issue of momentary gains or otherwise. What caused the convergence was the slow development of the opposition into common advancement.   Until the convergence, each block had its own development.  It didn’t come together.  

Zemehret is from our group. Our group came from the first tendency. Others had similar developments. Then we came together and converged. This is how we developed. But when the Shaebia tendency appeared, and when we were planning to confront the EPLF, something was created: Totil, based on his social base, could be given his interest if he would join the [EPLF]… 

2.4 Are you hinting that Totil's decisions were based on his ethnic identity? 

Totil is on an ethnic base… 

2.5 Are you saying it was an ethnic-based negotiation? 

With them? 

2.6 Yes.. 

Naturally.   He was not negotiating with them individually; he was [negotiating] on behalf of all the organizations. He was planning to take all the organizations along with him. They [EPLF] knew the composition [of the Sagem leadership] and, naturally, they know the experience of all. 

Anyway, he met with Isaias. He came to us with a package. He said that we have to make a breakthrough and we should move towards unity. This was not his stand before. He was saying, “we have to move on our way”. But when they talked to him, he came with a new arrangement. That arrangement puzzled those on our side who were in a relatively weaker position.    Others knew the EPLF well, and they considered the proposal as getting muddied after a shower.   Besides, there were cadres from the EPLF who were encouraging us to go our way. This was not an easy matter. Totil came with the package and there came the talk of joining the EPLF. We warned this was risky and we couldn’t change their mind as they propagated their decision. So, they took a big chunk from the group of Berhane Haile, although there were some who refused to go. From our side he took a group including Zemehret and other elements.  But the majority refused to join them. 

2.7 How did you part ways? Amicably? Did the comrades, for example, kiss one another good-bye? 

No they didn’t. We held meetings; we had a seminar. Our conclusion was that whether we said yes or no, there would be problems. But we tried to find other ways. Because the plan was not feasible. Therefore, we held a general organizational seminar including the forces and members of the civil organizations. We took the decision on January 9, 1985.   We planned to go our separate way because we saw him [Totil] and Zemehret going. It was a finished issue because they were even campaigning to gain more followers.  We decided that the day of the seminar would be the day of leaving them behind. While they waited for attendants to the seminar, we had decided we would all leave. We left; Zemehret and the rest joined, and were assimilated in, the EPLF. 

2.8 Were you having talks with the rest of the organizations, the ELF, ELF-RC?

We tried with all. We had decided to talk with all concerned parties. We started with ELF, then the ELF-RC.  They didn’t have a will; they had no readiness to talk because they believed we would join the EPLF. But after we made our decision, they were surprised.  

2.9 Where was EDM [“Falul”]? 

At first, they had an armed wing within the ELF for a limited time in the Gash but later they were limited to political activities.  We started a dialogue even with them.  We believed in having a dialogue with all; this is one of the things the EPLF didn’t like about us. But that was our way. 

2.10 When you look back, Totil, Zemehret and others were with you and then they decided to join the EPLF. What do you think made them take that decision? 

It [their decision] is based on not being firm to one’s principles. Our decision was to be loyal to our principles. Even when we were with the ELF, we were one of the parties struggling for the democratization of the ELF.  And at the end, when the civil war subsided, we were calling for a general seminar Eritrea.  And then, when the forces were pushed [to the Sudan] in Karakon & Tahdai, we continued to organize. We wanted to democratize the ELF.  

The main problem of the ELF was internal and not external. It needed reformation. We went through all this. After this entire struggle, we didn’t hold the belief that the EPLF was more democratic than the ELF. To us, joining the EPLF was like destroying all the struggles that were waged. What they did was to waste the results of the patriotic armed struggle and the democratic struggle. Therefore, according to us, it was not to the benefit of the Eritrean people. When we say there was no political democracy in Eritrea, how could we join that organization? I think they were motivated by personal gains, mainly. But as for Zemehret, I think he lost hope. We had gone through different phases of splitting in the ELF, with Abdella Idris and then with the RC. 

One can see it in different ways. It was not based on strong conviction.  Of course, it boils down to nor being firm on one’s principles. 

2.11 Let’s see it from their point of view. Is it not possible that, since the struggle then was one for national independence, could it be that they thought the EPLF was the only able organization to realize it and they wanted to be part of that? 

Even if that is true, there is a basic element that could not be seen in isolation from the internal conflicts of Eritrea because that is not solved yet. It should have been attended to parallel with the war for independence because a right solution of unity is not found yet. Knowing that this was hurting the people, there was no point in that choice. The forces were struggling. They wanted to play their role in the anti-occupation armed struggle and the other force was blocking them. Therefore, to see this in isolation of the other struggle, even if that is the choice they took, it is not a good choice. One has to work to solve issues democratically; if not, a worse situation could arise. History is still showing us the truth in that. 

2.12 Are you saying the current unresolved issues should have been solved then, during the period of the armed struggle? 

Yes, more energy should have been spent on that. If the struggle had found perseverance and firm democratic shield through democratic united front, the results would have been better. They should have been firm on their principles. The issue was whether to solve the problems efficiently or not. That was the issue. Therefore, the right thing was to challenge and not to give up and decide ‘I am done with democratic struggle.’   And, if one believes that the struggle can only be waged within the EPLF, this is not a solution. The decision hurt the democratic struggle within the EPLF and it didn’t benefit it. 

2.13 You started to struggle alongside Zemehret Yohannes. On a personal level, what do you feel now that you both hold diametrically different positions? 

It is sad when you see it from one side. Zemehret as a person has many good qualities. And he has played an important role in our organization. He played an important role at the forefront. Not only that, he was firm; he was straight. When we were holding all-nighter dialogues with Isaias, and Isaias was highlighting our programs, it was Zemehret that was debating him. He was part and parcel of the organization.   One has to give the man his true description. He never had any interest in personal gains. He was a selfless struggler. He was free of any interest in temporary gains. That is why we think it [his motivation for joining EPLF] was hopelessness. The fact that [he] didn’t stay firm on his stand and continue his struggle is sad. 

3.  SAGEM & ITS RELATIONS WITH TPLF 

3.1 There is not much I want to ask you regarding the rest of the period until Independence Day. I will go to your relations with the TPLF. When did your relations start and how was it like in the period before independence and how did it develop after independence? 

We had put strategies and a plan to cooperate with all forces that oppose the occupation army.  That included the Ethiopian organizations.   Based on our principles, we planned to form means of joint struggle. When we entered the Eritrean field, and when we were split, we started communications. The EPLF didn’t like it. There were hindrances that prevented us from developing economically.  

In 1986, we started to cooperate with them. In 1987, we met and identified the points of agreement and differences. We all had our own problems, and we started to cooperate. We differed, for example, in their interference in the Eritrean revolution. But we were agreeing on the mode of the struggle. 

3.2 Did you have military presence on the eve of the independence? 

Yes. We had military presence inside Eritrea in Gash and on the other side of the highlands, in Akele Guzai.   

3.3 Let me ask you this.  Your vision of governance of Eritrea is based on the Killil module-- where each region would have its own government federated with the rest of Eritrea along with a right of self-determination up to secession. Why did you adapt this view? 

This was adapted in our congress, which was held just before independence. The vision was developing from the beginning. And this is our basis for it.  Eritrea is a multi-ethnic country. Therefore, there was a discussion on how Eritrea should be administered. This issue was being developed and we reached to an understanding that the administrations should reflect the situation. We believed that a federal system would be better for Eritrea because the differences were growing and the gap was widening.  

We believe that nationalities should have big autonomy with regards to internal administration. This is our belief because, when the differences are widening, the solution should be this.  But the barrel of the gun should not impose this solution; the people should consent and accept it. This is our view; but it is not a “final” view: that decision is up to the people.  

This is only the choice of administration held by our organization. The Afar issue and the Kunama issue are all emerging; and we saw our proposal as a means of diffusing this potential explosion because we have an obligation to present a solution.  

We believe in equality. What we see in Eritrea today is a ruling class that emerged out of the Tigrigna ethnic group, allied with the ruling class from the rest of the ethnic groups. It protects the gains and interests of the ruling classes. It doesn’t protect the interest of the oppressed Tigrigna people but protects the interest of the ruling class. It practices class oppression on the Tigrigna people and practices ethnic oppression on other peoples. It is hurting the Tigrigna people through class oppression and hurting the rest through ethnic oppression.   The chauvinism it created is to make the Tigrigna feel as if it is developing the Tigrigna culture to make them feel like they have  an upper hand on everything and to relegate the rest to feel like second class citizens.  

This chauvinist attitude is spreading… economic oppression, political oppression, social oppression and religious oppression. It [PFDJ] uses all divisive elements in all manners. This is why ethnic and class oppression is getting bitter. We saw this and found that everyone in Eritrea is not able to feel the freedom.

3.4 Do you think it is that bad? 

Naturally. We are witnessing it; we are aware of all the sentiments. We want a democratic solution. Based on this, we advocate internal autonomy…. And it is not necessary that each should go alone, maybe two or three can agree to go together. There are others who believe like we do. For example, Dr. Jallal, in the paper he presented in Stockholm, proposed a federal solution for Eritrea. Those ideas are developing from the concrete problems facing the Eritrean people. What would happen tomorrow: would the Tigre ruling class control power and oppress the others? 

3.5 SAGEM believes in the self-determination of nationalities up to secession. Your program is seen as a carbon copy of the TPLF program. You place too much emphasis on the chauvinism part.  Who is oppressing whom? Don’t you think everyone is sharing the same fate, whatever the fate is? 

First, the fact that Ethiopia adapts the system of self-rule by nationalities is a product of their concrete situations and experiences. Secondly, this system is not limited to Ethiopia; there are many countries that have adopted it.  For many countries that have different nationalities and face similar problems, this is a solution. For example, in the Sudan... 

3.6 Could you mention three countries with similar systems? 

The system is adapted in countries as far back as pre-1956.  For example, the Soviet Union. Self-determination is even adapted in the United Nations Charter. Practically, it comes from the concrete situation in our country and it is a solution to situations like those in Eritrea. Now,  there is a situation to respect the right of everyone. Even during the anti-occupation struggle, everyone came from his distinctive and different social, linguistic, religious, cultural, geographic and historical background. And, practically,  that is how it really works.  They don’t express it openly, but that is how they share power.  Unless it finds a means to share power, no political power can continue.     

All organizations do this.  But, in the process, they oppress some and misappropriate power; otherwise, that is what it is.    This is the premise; this is the development of this issue.  We start from that.  

We have to think of alternatives. The country is a multi-national country. For example, I remember during the period of armed struggle, when the ELF was pushed out, the issue of autonomous regions was considered in Denkalia.  Even the EPLF had similar problems. This is very sensitive. Unless we hold that we are democratically equal, there is a problem. We don’t believe there will be secession. But in principle, you can’t say ‘you can enter but you cannot go out’. This is a contract. You enter because you believe in equality. We believe in the unity of choice and not a compulsory one. Democratically, Eritrea is not for one more than the other. That is what we believe; that it should be stated that we are equal. This being our stand, in principle, our propaganda and politics is not about disunity but for unity. We aspire for a democratic state and we believe that the right of people should be handled that way.  

People try to relate this to many things. There is nothing wrong in taking good examples from others. This issue was being debated in our organization for a long time. We believe this is right for Eritrea.  Secession comes from pressure. 

On your question about chauvinism, the oppression of the Tigrigna is the worst. It is class oppression. The poor peasant is poorer. The poor worker is poorer. The Tigrigna who has a capital is hurt, as well. We ask, who is benefiting then?  Who are benefiting from this system?  

The ruling class, very little in number, is benefiting.  The way of thinking of the ruling class even goes to the poor peasant. Even the oppressed think that it is their government; that is how it is presented to them while, at the same time, they are oppressed. The beneficiary is the class on top, by allying with the other ruling classes with the other nationalities. And all the common people are oppressed. All are oppressed.  

It is chauvinism. The kernel, repeat, the kernel, repeat again, the kerenel of Eritrean politics is chavinism: this is what the intellectuals have not tackled.   And if chauvinism is not broken, there could never be a democracy in Eritrea. The chauvinism of WE, WE, WE.  A typical intellectual thinks that Eritrea is only Asmara. This sentiment is psychological and is inculcated. Tactically, they are flattered into thinking that they are the makers and the breakers. He shows them that they are the center of attraction. It is chauvinism that makes one think he is above the others and that he is more important that the rest. To see the rest as second-class citizens. The ruling class creates such sentiments and spreads it in the oppressed people. The chauvinistic class thinks that if he is gone, so will the nation be gone. Though religions in general are oppressed, he shows the “superiority” of one religion over the other for the purpose of divide and rule. This is what we call chauvinism. In a unitary form of state, where everything is centralized and trickles down, the participation of the bottom becomes lesser.  

3.7 Fast forward to the last war. You had presence in Ethiopia since 1991. Then the Ethiopian government kicked the ELF-RC out of Ethiopia in the nineties and left your organization and EDM to stay in Ethiopia.  Why didn’t you face the ELF-RC’s fate? 

Our presence in Ethiopia started in 1986 and mainly since 1987. We were moving among our people in the regions. The EPLF was hindering us from struggling against occupation and from organizing our people in Eritrea. We were in the region between Gash and Ethiopia and were struggling in the region. Starting in 1989, when we observed that the independence of Eritrea was about to be realized soon, we changed our orientation. We started to debate our future mode of struggle. In spite of the differences that we had with the EPLF, we gave our full support to the anti occupation struggle that the EPLF was waging. We believed it was a national patriotic organization. When independence was declared and we evaluated the EPLF, we concluded that after the victory over the occupation power, a new ruling class had emerged in the form of the EPLF. We concluded that the EPLF was a hindrance to the democratization process and was becoming anti-people… 

3.8 Did you vote in the referendum? 

Yes. I was given a card and it is a ‘Tegadalay card’--a combatant card--for the referendum and I voted. We had communications with the referendum [commission]; in the end, though it [the referendum process] was not inclusive, we declared that the referendum was a continuation of the armed struggle. I went and voted. Then we suggested that they form a transitional government from all the opposition forces. We struggled on this. And we reached to a stage were we had to draw plans for the future struggle for the democratization of Eritrea. It was difficult to be transformed from an armed struggle to a peaceful struggle. But we decided on a peaceful struggle in our congress.   But the EPLF doesn’t allow for peaceful struggle! We decided in clandestine, peaceful struggle. We released all our combatants and we were left with the cadres and some elements to perform political education. Step by step, we transformed ourselves to a peaceful struggle. Then came the agreements and pacts between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The EPLF never like our presence in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians were exerting pressure on us and limited our operations. Those who were found operating underground were being jailed. We went underground and our cadres were deported. We had many problems. There were issues that they saw from the security point of view. 

4. SAGEM AND ITS ROLE IN THE ERITREA-ETHIOPIA WAR 

4.1 In the war that erupted in 1998, many—but particularly the PFDJ and its supporters--accuse your organization of having: (1) Stood by the side of the Weyane; (2) taken all your marching orders from “Weyane”; (3) expected to replace the PFDJ with the help of the Weyane who had intentions to install you in Asmara; (4) During the war, entered on the back of the Weyane invasion and jailed, mistreated and killed citizens; (5) desecrated the tombs of Eritrean martyrs; (6)  raped even eighty-year old women.   What is your reply to all these charges?  

Basically, when the war started, our movements were underground. But we had a stand on the war: we believed that the issue should be solved in a peaceful democratic way. This is because, even though it was initially seen as a border conflict, we didn’t share that view, we didn’t believe it was a border war. It was a war to solidify the PFDJ’s political and economic interests and superiority. It was about the introduction of the Nackfa currency and the PFDJ’s wish to have it valued at par with the Ethiopian Birr and in rejection to the Ethiopian decision to trade with Eritrea based on Letter of Credit  (LC) where the medium of exchange would be hard currency and not the local currencies.  

This was a dimension of the interests that they [PFDJ] used to gain [in Ethiopia] legally or illegally. There were many benefits that they were gaining [prior to the war]. We observed they wanted to continue with that; and we concluded that the cause of the war was purely economic. That is why we didn’t want to see the dispute being solved by force, but through legal means….  

We believed the Eritrean people were being pushed to an unjust war. This was our belief. The PFDJ was not waging a war to defend the nation but to defend the interest of the ruling class that I explained earlier. Since we believed that the issue should be resolved peacefully, we also believed that the PFDJ should pull out of the areas that it occupied by force and pursue the legal way. Then there were many initiatives and proposals—the US-Rwanda, others were all similar, and we believed that was how it should be solved. When the war continued, we continued to hold the same view.  

Therefore, the accusations ‘they fought against us, they raped women, they took properties, they desecrated grave’ is all a fabrication. It is all fabricated. Basically, the concrete information is that, be it before or after the war, months after the signing of the Algiers agreement, our military wing was strictly involved in political and propaganda activities and didn’t have any directives to engage in combat. Even when they had the PFDJ in a vulnerable situation, our forces never engaged in a military activity. Let alone to side with Ethiopia in a battle, our forces didn’t have any directive to engage in a battle.   We were fully involved in organizational activity… 

Our military had not reached a stage where they would operate in guerrilla warfare. If any of our combatants took a decision himself and started to shoot, he will face a severe punishment.   

The leadership decided that an offensive attack should start many months after the signing of the Algiers peace agreement. We trained our forces and the first attack that we carried out was seven or eight months after the Algiers agreement…that was around Adi-Khwala. Before that, we had presence in the conflict areas and we had to do what we had to do: assist our people. Civilians on the battle zones were wounded and were bearing the brunt of the war. We offered medical services.  We had to help them because they were on the verge of dying of hunger.  

Around the region of Senafe for example, people were destitute and hungry. The people grow barley in the area and earlier, before the war, the PFDJ has taken all the barley from the farmers, for the beer factory in Asmara, promising to give them wheat as a replacement.  When the war broke out, they hadn’t received the replacement and they were left without barley or wheat.

4.2 They didn’t get the replacement? 

No. They just left during the war. This is what faced us when we came to the area.  We didn’t do our political work but we had to run everywhere for help, including with the Red Cross, to get food to the people.  Bombs were flying over their heads; they were being shelled by both sides.  This is the situation we found.  This is what we did.  

This is what our people were facing this inside Eritrea.   In Ethiopia, our people were facing other problems. There were instances where the people were being wronged mistreated and their properties lost. We were also working to alleviate this problem with the Ethiopians. There was a lot of struggle on that side as well; we rescued a lot.  

So, whatever the PFDJ is saying in this regard, digging graves, raping, taking property, is a falsified story. This is a propaganda ploy. If that is true, if there is anyone from the people who says that anyone from us wronged them (we were in that area for around nine-months, together with other forces besides SAGEM), if anyone is found to have such claims, anyone who claims that we wronged them, took their property or any thing of that sort, let them come to the court.  Let them put claims not only at the organization level, even on the individual level.  This is the true history and we will see this. Because what we did is totally on the contrary. 

4.3 Are you saying that if this accusation is raised against you in a court of law, then you are willing to face it? 

We are ready to answer any accusation. Even on the individual level. Our organization is all about fighting against injustice.  Our purpose is to struggle against the injustice befalling our people by the PFDJ and not the other way round. We were busy trying to alleviate the difficulties that our people faced. The other proof is that people, in great numbers, joined us from the areas in question. They joined us in droves voluntarily. From that region, many youth, including females, joined us willingly. This shows the extent of commitment created by our interaction.  

4.4 Do you receive financial aid from the Weyane, or… human resources, arms and the like? 

From the beginning, the history of our organization, SAGEM, is that of one that came up clawing and scratching on its own nails [hard work].  Our organization has survived from its internal resources and from its members. What comes externally is secondary. Just like any other organization, our organization gets limited assistance from external sources, but that is insignificant with what moves the organization. It is very minor and it can’t be considered assistance.  It is a limited assistance. Secondly, we don’t have any manpower assistance. The assistance is limited to propaganda and radio. We don’t consider this assistance decisive. 

4.5 How about arms and equipment? 

The organization had arms from the beginning. During the struggle against the Dergue, the organization had enough arms and it maintained enough of that. 

4.6 Does that mean you have limited arms left from the pre-independence days or you have enough arms and you don’t need any help… or you didn’t get any arms from the Weyane at all? 

Well, we had arms that we carried from then. In short, it is the radio and limited things, but no arms. 

4.7 What about the accusation that the Weyane intended to install SAGEM as a “puppet government” and you went along with the plan?

During the war, we had two understandings. First, we condemned the war because we believed it was warmongering and unjust. Had it been a just war, regardless of whatever power we had, we would have, consistent with what we did during the referendum process, helped.  Regardless whether they accepted our help or not, we would have acted similarly and would have helped.  

Secondly, there is a surprising thing: when they have relations with Ethiopia, they see it as a blessing and when we establish relations, they see it as a curse. Basically, we don’t start from the premise that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. We start from the mutual respect of the two people, the sovereignty of Eritrea that protects its people and its territories, the interest of the two people and a policy that depends on the mutual interest of the people.  

It is strange because, as we speak,  the PFDJ are begging to reestablish relations with Ethiopia. It is the Ethiopian government rejecting normalization by saying that, ‘there should be an accountable government in Eritrea before normalization’. But Shaebia is begging. The system in Eritrea is asking to bring the status of the relations to the pre-war level. How would they explain this to their members? They are always interested in short-term gains; their interest is never based on strategic interests.  

It is natural that we find ourselves in the region [Ethiopia, Tigray]. Our people have been in this area since the forties and we have been there for a long time. For us, it is natural to struggle based on the legal means. We will want to struggle inside Eritrea, but when we are denied the legal right to struggle inside our country, it is our right to struggle, in whichever way we see fit, be it from Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen or other in the region. We didn’t go to Ethiopia because a war suddenly started. We have been there because the PFDJ denied us entry to our country and made our existence illegal by its own definition. We have been in Ethiopia before and we were not going to leave because a war started. 

The accusation that the Ethiopians were grooming SAGEM to be installed in Asmara is ridiculous. It is not true. Ethiopia recognizes the Alliance and not SAGEM. As for who comes to power and how, this is decided by internal Eritrean dynamics of struggle and it is nothing that can be decided by external forces.   

4.8 Well, then, where they planning to install the Alliance? 

No. This is an internal issue and no one from the outside can install any force on behalf of Eritreans. If the Alliance were to seize power, it would be based on its own struggle and not something that will be given by external forces. 

4.9 There is another accusation. In the time when the Ethiopian government was deporting Eritreans, some members of your organization were helping the Ethiopians carry out the task of deportation and they were reporting on Eritreans who went into hiding. How would you reply to this? 

This is baseless. We never were involved in such cheap acts. On the contrary, during the deportation, there were mistakes in the execution of the deportation decision and in fact we tried hard to save many people and we did save a considerable number of people.  This was done by all organizations and not only our organization. We have to state the truth: those who were deported were about a quarter of the total number of Eritreans in Ethiopia. There are three fold of those who were deported who are still living in Ethiopia. There was a sizeable number of people who were saved; people should not be deported or wronged on deportation, if the deportation is inevitable. We totally reject the accusations that are spread with the sole purpose of propaganda. If one has an accusation, then people should come and identify who wronged them, which would be a matter of legal process.

4.10 Would you give us a close estimation of the number of Eritreans currently residing in Ethiopia? 

I think it is about 250, 000 – 300, 000. 

4.11 That is the number of Eritreans left in Ethiopia? 

Roughly, that was the estimation before the deportation. Now, if you subtract the deported, you are still left with a big number. 

4.12 Are you able to move within the people and organize? 

Yes. They decide whether to be our members or not because they carry Ethiopian residence cards and they do not need our services. Therefore, if they become members, it is on their free will. 

4.13 How about those who were surrendering to the Ethiopian army or are prisoners of war:  do they give you preference to recruit among them? 

There is nothing like that. First, the prisoners are held in the ICRC camps and we can’t go there. But later, many decide to join different organization and what we get of new recruits is based on our activity. We all have to propagate our mission, just like the other organizations  

5. SAGEM & ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE 

5.1 What is your official name, by the way? 

Hizbawi Demokrasiyawi Gnbar Harnet Ertrea (Eritrean People’s Democratic Liberation Front) 

5.2 Which is the organization known as DemHae? 

Some from Sagem and EDM, [Sewrawi Democrasiyawi Gnbar Ertra, se.de.g.e] 

5.3 Are you united? 

No, three of us we have Hzbawie Democrasiyawi Hailetat Eritrea – (smur demkrasyawi gnbar). Popular Democratic Forces of Eritrea-United Democratic Front.  The three have formed a united national front. 

5.4 This is how you operate then, united? 

Yes. But two organizations, Sagem and se.de.g.a are diverse in terms of nationalities.  We have decided to combine our organizations. 

5.5 How about the Kunama liberation movement? 

Kunama, we can’t merge with.  We can only have a united front arrangement. It cannot merge. Both of us are mutli-cultural organizations; the Kunama is a nationality-specific organization. On the other hand, we have all ethnic groups; we have Tigrigna, Saho, etc. The same with se.de.g.e’  

5.6 What is the current problem that has arisen within the SAGEM organization?  There were several announcements and the like. Would you explain that? 

In a democratic organization like ours, we believe chauvinism and narrow mindedness are always present.  These types of tendencies are always there in such an organization. We believe that chauvinism pops up every now and then. It is a reflection of the society. Such issues should be solved in meetings and congresses through a democratic means. The recent incident will be looked at in the future. Meanwhile, we have formed a committee to look into the issue. We have the view that we will experience such incidents. We experience this even in the ranks of our fighters. If one chooses to part, we offer them a paper of release and bid them farewell. This is our belief; this is the centrality of the organization. We have no problem with this because such incidents focus the organization and the struggle to a clear vision. 

5.7 Could you list the members of the Alliance of opposition forces? [ED: Listed Alphabetically; leader of movement, when known, in brackets] 

ELF [Abdella Idris]
ELF-RC [Ahmed Nasser]
ELF NC [Hassen Assed]
Eritrean Peoples Congress (Mohammed Thahir Shengeb)
Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement (Khelil Mohammed Amir)
Eritrean peoples Democratic Front for the liberationof Eritrea (Sagem) (Tewelde Gebressellassie)
Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front (Berhane Yemane)
Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Kunama
Eritrea (Kerneleous Osman)
Eritrean Democratic Resistant Movement Gash Setit (Ismael Nada)
Initiative Group (Yassin Mohammed Abdella)
ELF National Unite Organization (Ali Mohammed Said Birhatu)
Eyob Measho (Individual)

5.8 What can you tell us about the Red Sea Liberation organization (Afar) and why is it not a member of the Alliance? 

This organization was created as a result of the situation in the Afar region. There have been many problems in the region for a long time. And the PFDJ has hurt this region. The system has denied it its internal right and its national right. An opposition faced the PFDJ and, after independence, we tried to find them. But the Afar [Red Sea] is new; it appeared recently.   There are efforts to get it to join the Alliance. There is not much knowledge about this organization. There are relations with elements from the organization. Individual organizations are working to establish stronger relations with the Red Sea. The Alliance is yet to come with a clear vision regarding the Afar but efforts are underway to establish good relations.  

5.9 The organizations of the Alliance say that they were working towards creating the Alliance for a long time, but the accusation is that the Alliance was hatched during the recent war with Ethiopia and formed by Sudan and Ethiopia.  How do you reply to this? 

This coalition was created after a very long and hard work. There was bilateral relation, there were tripartite relations and, at one time, it included five organizations. We kept working towards this end for a long time. For example SAGEM and De.me.ha.e (before they renamed themselves se.de.ge.e) were working together and other organizations were having close relations. It was a learning curve. True, the war hastened the developments; it was an incident that accelerated the inevitable. Not only that, the war was reason enough to do something faster because the whole country and the people were at risk.   Everyone was feeling a sense of responsibility; everyone was asking what should be done. The path that the PFDJ was following was very dangerous. The country was facing a risk and something had to be done. This gave us an extra incentive to do something. People wanted to take responsibility and try to save what can be saved. The external is not a main factor and the Alliance was not created by anyone.  

5.10 Are you saying they never had a hand or had no concern? 

There is nothing new here. This is one thing on which they agreed with us and disagreed with the PFDJ.  Even before the war. This was not a new stand for them. They were favoring our view. They had a view of the Eritrean issue. For instance, regarding unity, they favored our views; they never agreed with the PFDJ’s view. Our organization preferred to have a broad national front. During the armed struggle, TPLF had different views and they differed, among themselves, when they debated the issue. The PFDJ never accepted any other force. Therefore, it was natural that we came together for historical reason