With liberties and justice for no one�

By the time the detained members of the G-15 are brought to a kangaroo court, don�t be surprised if the ever-escalating charges against them include devil worship.     This is what happens in a nation of the political eunuch; more on that later. 

Between September 2000 (when the conflict first surfaced at the 13^th session of the �National Assembly�) and February 2002 (when the �chapter was closed� at the 14^th session), the G-1 kept adding to the crimes and the motives of the crimes allegedly committed by the G-15.  

Excluding the occasional interviews given by El Capo, there were four major media events that the G-1 used to make its case against the G-15:

�        The �Discussion Paper� of January 2001

�        The alleged interview Hadas Ertra, the government newspaper, had with Alamin Mohammed Seid, the ruling party�s Secretary, on August 10, 2001;

�        The New Year Address of Isaias Afwerki on January 1, 2002;

�        The �National Assembly� resolutions of February 2002

What is interesting to note is that, with the passage of time, the alleged crimes�and the motives for the crimes�kept getting longer and more serious.    Let�s now look at each media event:

(1) The Discussion Paper: January 2001

The G-1 first made its case against the G-15 in a secret circular called �Discussion Paper: Woyane�s Third Offensive And The Political Campaign That Followed It.�   Here at Awate.com, we called the paper a �brainwashing manual� because, despite the recently-concluded PFDJ Central Committee call for an �open discussion� amongst the membership of the party and the Eritrean people at large to assess how the war was conducted, the G-1 was going for its secret campaign of defamation.  There was not much that was open or a discussion in the  �discussion paper. �    By the time the don�t-take-sides middle-of-the-road types woke up to this, they were, as usual, road kill.

In the discussion paper, a whole group of Eritreans including the G-15 was accused of:

�        Lying;

�        Defaming the G-1;

�        Arousing sub-national sentiments;

�        Revisionism of history;

�        Second-guessing the decisions of the G-1;

�        Showing a defeatist attitude;

�        Using democracy as veil to weaken national unity;

�        Trying to demoralize Eritreans and weaken their resoluteness;

The �Discussion Paper� attributed the motives for these pedestrian �crimes� to �panic, hopelessness, absconding from responsibility and to create political opportunities by complaining about lack of position and authority.�  

In other words, back in January 2001, when the �crimes� of the G-15 were allegedly fresh in the minds of the G-1, the crimes were low and the motives were purely political.  It was standard dispute between two competing ideologies or, if we had political pluralism, it would have been the standard exchange between two political parties after a traumatic event like a two-plus-year war.

2.  The Hadas Eritra/Alamin Mohammed Seid Interview: August 2001

By the time the party�s Secretary was ready to talk, the party was sure that the G-15 would not have an opportunity to make their case to party members.   (The party had already denied them access in the government media forcing them to make their case via the Internet and the private press.)   Most of the G-15, particularly the outspoken ones, had been demoted or fired: Saleh Kekya (frozen on 11/8/00);  Hamed Hmed  frozen on 11/15/00; Berhane G/gheir: fired on 1/11/01;  Sheriffo: fired on 2/7/01;  Ambassador Beraki Gebreselassie: recalled on 5/2/01; Haile DeruE and Petros Solomon: 6/8/01; Estifanos Seyoum: 8/4/01.

Recall that in the Discussion Paper of January 2001, the G-15�s �crimes� were, as the title explains, following �Woyane�s Third Offensive� (May 2000.)  Now, explains Hadas Ertra, there were some worrying signs before that, but it was mainly  <<beginning from the day we withdrew from Barentu, they started saying, �We cannot stop the challenge and the onslaught of the Woyane Offensive.   The Woyane won�t leave us alone unless the President resigns; so he should resign.  If the Woyane occupy to the entire country, they will destroy our people so we should call on the UN and the US to take over and save us.� >> (Hadas Ertra, 8/10/2001, Issue # 11) 

So, as recently as August 2001, the �crimes� of the G-15 were tied to a specific time-frame (May 2000) and their �crime� was to show defeatism and to call on the President to resign.      There was no mention of conspiracy, of collusion or political intrigues.   The mouthpiece explains that in its sessions of September and October 2000, the �Party, after requiring self-criticism from the group, had every intention of moving forward.�   

In their last opportunity to rebut the G-1�s allegations, the G-15, through a letter that was posted on the Internet (�In lieu of defamations, Better To Argue With Facts�) categorically state �Not a single individual from the 15 accused said anything like the above [calling on the President to resign.]  If there is anyone who has evidence that states otherwise, we call on them to present their evidence.   They also challenged the G-1 to make public the minutes of the Central Committee and National Assembly meetings.

3.  The New Year Address of Isaias Afwerki: January 1, 2002

In his New Year address, the leader of the G-1 embellishes further on the alleged crime of the G-15.   The �treacherous acts� they allegedly committed include:

�        Engaging in a campaign of  �misinformation, lies and slander�;

�        Sowing seeds of division;

�        Encouraging �hooliganism and lawlessness�;

�        Sabotaging development activities;

There was a great deal of similarity between what he said on January 2002 and what his underlings wrote on January 2001, through the �Discussion Paper.�   The only difference was, according to the Godfather, the catalogue of the alleged crimes was �to mention but a few�, which would allow the president to add more crimes at a later date and under a different title of Chairman of the National Assembly.    (In this speech, he couldn�t list every crime of the G-15 because he had to make room in his speech about Eritrea�s other enemies that he and his government have been doing such a great job defending against:  the �Woyane�  (who were nursing their defeat by staring at a 25-km-wide buffer zone INSIDE Eritrea) and the sponsors of �terrorist fanatic adventurism� against whom Eritrea has been waging war for seven years. 

4.  The National Assembly�s Resolutions of February 2002

Eritreans inside and outside the country have been discussing the issue of the G-15 for over year.   Some support the G-1, some the G-15, some both, some neither.   But the �people�s representatives� who met in an executive session to listen to the report of the Chairman somberly, all agreed that the G-15 were as guilty as original sin.  The G-15 were guilty of:

Defeatism (proposing the intervention of the US and UN)

Plotting a coup (�actively� working �to bring down� the President;)

Compromising Eritrea�s safety (by �transmitting a message to the Weyane leaders through the peace facilitators asking them if they would be prepared to stop their offensive in exchange for the President's ouster�);

Compromising Eritrea�s sovereignty (by proposing that we accept a bad peace treaty);  

Using government office to wage a propaganda and psychological war;

Weakening Eritrea�s negotiation power by giving national secrets to peace facilitators);

Promoting sub-national sentiments;

Attempting to incite violence from students, disabled veterans and soldiers;

Attempting to isolate Eritrea from the world.

They drafted this in a resolution accusing the G-15, their former colleagues and to whom some had said �msaKum alena.�  Some had gone as far as signing  the open letter, some as far as giving moral support and some, like our defense minister who said  �msaKum aleKu�, �msaKum yeleKun� so many slippery times that he earned himself the moniker of Sebhat Sabuna (Sebhat The Soap)

With the G-15 safely in jail, with their platforms (the private media) shut down and the reporters arrested, the G-1 expanded its �Discussion Paper� of January 2001 to include all sorts of allegations.    What a difference six months makes: in August 2001, the G-15 were accused of calling on the President to resign; in February 2002, they were accused of actively working �to bring down� the President.   In August 2001, the alleged crimes of the G-15 which were so minor that the party would have �moved on� if only the G-15 would exercise some self-criticism; in February 2002, these same crimes had grown to treason. Last year, their crimes were limited to the Third Offensive; now they extended all the way to the First Offensive. 

Most of the G-15 had never met with the Facilitators (when and in what capacity did Aster meet with them?  Germano Nati? Saleh Kekya? Mesfin Hagos?  As for the ones, who according to their job descriptions, were empowered to, when did they meet with the facilitators without the presence of a G-1 loyalist�and specifically Yemane Gebreab (who actually negotiated the peace agreements)? 

It was left to our imagination to figure out how people who never spent a day alone with the Facilitators were passing telegraphic messages to them.  Maybe they faxed them or e-mailed them?  If so, why did some of them keep their jobs until August 2001?  

Within one year, the acts of the G-15 that were dismissed as noises from an empty barrel had suddenly become a deafening and grave danger to the nation.

There are two possibilities for this:

(1)   During 2001, specially after August 2001, the government uncovered new secrets that it was not aware of and thus decided to supplement the existing charges against the G-15;

(2)   During 2002, especially after September 18, 2001, the government decided that, with the G-15 arrested, it could say anything and they wouldn�t be able to respond.

Those who are close to the President know the precise answer to this question.   It is no use appealing to their conscience or their sense of justice because they take pride in their lack of scruples or decency.   One cannot appeal to someone who brags, �isKn deqi ShuQ enteKonkn, nHna Shuq ina� (roughly translated: �if you think you are street-smart, I am The Street.�)  How does one use ethics and morality to someone who takes pride in being a hustler and an amoral fiend?

Those who are close to the President, now, should remember that they are one bad temper away from the fate of G-15.   Loyalty is one way.   They can never pass a final exam; their life will be a series of surprise tests: one innocent mistake, one letter, one wrong move, and one stolen glance, one assertive response, one from-the-heart answer and their fate is that of the G-15.

There is much talk about �political opportunism� and �political prostitution�: to say what you don�t believe for the sake of self-interest.   The G-1 really has not made the case of how those who were already part of the privileged few �prostituted� themselves to get more power.   In any event, even if they did, �political prostitution�  is not a high crime; it is mere opportunism. 

What Eritrea is suffering from is not because of the �political prostitutes.�  Political prostitutes at least pay attention to what their customer wants and they want as many customers as they can get. What we are suffering from is from those who have refused to practice politics�politics in its noble sense of being concerned with justice and, instead, have chosen to neuter their political instincts.   What Eritrea is suffering from�and it has a National Assembly full of it�is that new Eritrean breed, one that was nurtured by past colonialists.   The one whose sole aim in life was to please The Boss; the one that kissed the ground Emperor Haile Selassie walked on and memorized two Amharic words: �ishi getaye.�   That toadying, always-scared, timid, apprehensive gentle soul.   The one that we had come to believe had been eliminated by our armed struggle.