What was your background before you joined the armed struggle?

Watching The Chopsticks

Like many Eritreans I studied in Addis.  The Teferi Mekonen School, a high school in Addis, where many Eritreans studied...People like Gabriel Fassil, Eden Fassil (now the AG in GoE) studied there.  I was 9 or 10 when I went to Addis; I became an Eritrean nationalist in Addis.   When I joined the University College, we belonged to the generation that founded the Ethiopian Students Movement.  I majored in political science, graduated in 1963 (BA Pol Sci) and did my post graduate in Europe (MA in Stockholm University).  Was working on a Ph. D from Stockholm University, Dept of Social Science.  I am ABD [All But Dissertation]...here again, in political science.  My area of research has been ethnicity and issues identity.  Minor identities in human beings, as with all other species, are disappearing.  Democracy must always consider identities. 

How is your view of the role of identity and nationalism in democracy different from what is going on in Ethiopia and do you think the Ethiopian model would work in Eritrea? 

No I don‘t.  It might work for them.  It didn’t work for the USSR.   Before I go there, the ethnic base has not been discussed other than linguistically because Eritrea is a small country.  With the exception of the Kunama and Nara, the rest belong to the racial anthropology of the Kush, Agew, Non-agews...all of which trace their ancestry to the Hemitic (Ham)or Kametic (Kam).  We don’t have identity crisis.  Ethnicity in Ethiopia is politicized.  The ethnic consolations make political demands; this doesn’t exist in Eritrea.  In the Eritrean context, the ethnic question is a cultural question not a political question: it is an issue of Eritrean independence and its continued independence.   It is: “how do we live together now that we have liberated Eritrea?”  Due to the fact that we have accepted Islam and Christianity, not by missionaries--we became Christians in 334 AD and we became Muslims before it spread in the Arabian peninsula and when the holy prophet was alive.  And therefore, they are part of our national make up and they were so before the political idea of independence of Eritrea matured and  before it became a political idea.  So, in Eritrea, these two great religions are not derivative religions.  We can say we were there in the making.  The ethnic question, in its configuration, is cultural one, not a political one.  And there are no cultural questions that are going to be resolved by the “cantonization“ and  “kliliazation” of Eritrea.

Why did you major in political science?

Has to do with my family background.  It goes back to my grandfather, Bairu Oqbit, who was a businessman in Asmara.  Along with the family of Lorenzo Taazaz, Aman Andom and Kentiba Bahta, he was an anti-fascist.  They were drawn to Ethiopia because they were anti-fascist and pan-Africanist, early ones.  He paid for that.  Because of that, he was banished from Asmara to his village Geremi (16 km outside Asmara, near Imba Derho.) 

This environment produced my father who studied in Italy (Florence) and came back.  His first job was a school inspector in Keren.  He was appointed by the Italians as the first principal in Agordat.  Which is where I was born.  It was also because my home was one of the centers of political debate and also due to the fact that my family was exposed to western education. People of the lowlands who visited Asmara visited our home; so, in many ways, the Tigre culture was part and parcel of our family life.  Due to that, the issue of national unity was significant to me from early on.

Tell us about your first involvement in politics.

It was the student union movement of the sixties and seventies.  The students union movement in Addis had grown quickly into a radical movement.  In England, the movement was under the umbrella of the Department of Education.  After the putsch of Mengistu Neway [the failed coup d‘etat attempt against Haile Selassie I], the first mass demonstration in Addis was organized and the initiative taken at Arat Kilo.  This huge demonstration with revolutionary slogans was in support of the coup d’etat.  It was largely influenced by the so-called scholarship students from Africa who taught us about colonialism because until then we were protected and infantile.

I became president of Ethiopian students union in England in 1966.  We hosted the Congress of Ethiopian Student Union, first of its kind.  It severed its relationship with the Imperial Government of Ethiopia and declared its anti-monarchy stand by revolution if necessary.  The movement included people like Hailu Fida,  who eventually became the leader of ME. I. SO. N. [Acronym of a movement to oust Haile Selassie I.]  In its next congress, which was held in France, Haile Fida became the president.  Many Eritreans demanded that the Student Union recognize the Eritrean revolution.  Ethiopians declined and that was why we broke off.  We met in Liege in Belgium and since the Ethiopians had decided in the congress of Montarge, France to decline our request, I decided to join the ELF. 

When did you join the armed struggle?

In 1967, I moved to Damascus.  I had contacts with martyr brother Osman Saleh Sabbe who was then in charge of Foreign Relations.  Sabbe was the most hard working person I have ever met in the Eritrean Revolution.  I became the head of the English version of “Al Sewra” [Arabic for “The Revolution“]--a newspaper which was our main tool of agitation and propaganda.  The Eritrean Revolution had a relationship with the Chinese Government and I requested Sabbe if I could go.  He said no.  He had other purposes for me: he wanted me to be a bridge with the English-speaking world and Tigrigna-speaking Eritreans. 

The ELF of the 1960s

By then, the armed struggle had stabilized itself among the remaining ethnic consolations of Eritrea.  The areas where they lived had become semi-liberated zone for the armed struggle.  But the period was also a period of dissatisfaction with “Al Mejlis Al A’ala” [the Supreme Council] because the “Fifth Zone”, which you might call the Tigrigna zone, was dismantled.  We don’t need to go to the history of that now...The action enhanced, more or less, the artificial cultural, linguistic and geographical divide. 

The sophisticated and accumulated political know-how of Haile Selassie regime played on it quite successfully, actually.  So it was difficult to convince Eritrean highlanders to join.  Sheik Idris Mohammed Adem who was president of Eritrean parliament and one of the founders of the ELF (along with Idris Gelawdios and the rest) said; “look, Hruy, you are located in the Middle East and I doubt whether you can achieve a lot by way of establishing links with Tigrigna-speaking people about the Eritrean case and the Eritrean struggle.”  And so I was sent to Stockholm; because it was known to my family.  My father [Tedla Bairu] was an ambassador and he had been a spokesperson of the ELF there.  So, I was sent to Stockholm. 

For the first time, our group was able to make an opening.  We were formally accepted by the Swedish government of the time.  They accepted Eritrean refugees despite their long-standing relations with Ethiopians.  Our first batches of refugees were from Egypt and that expanded the base of activity in Europe.  A lot of hard work had to be done because Ethiopia was everything to Sweden: many of the advisors to the king were Swedish; the Swedes developed its police force and its air force.  How we did it simple: we put together a film; we sent a journalist of Turkish ancestry; he interviewed people and he came back with pictures.  We then met a prominent journalist who visited Ethiopia and interviewed the emperor as well as Mr. Ketema Yefru (who was then the Ethiopian Foreign Minister) and came back with pictures of Asmara and Massawa.  Then he interviewed me and my father (as representatives of the ELF), my sister (representing the women‘s movement), Isaias Teweldeberhan (the opera singer).  The program was shown to the Swedish public 3-4 times by popular demand...

This was 1968, a period of revolution.  It was during the Vietnam War and Mr. Palme [the Swedish leader] had condemned the US openly for its position in Vietnam and any American draft-dodger found home in Sweden.  The anti-Shah movement [against Iranian Emperor] was strong in Sweden, as well as the Palestinian movement and the famous Student Rebellion in Paris.  The whole atmosphere was revolutionary.  The ideology of the day was Marxism and various born-again branches of Marxism-Leninism and we belonged to that ideological thrust.  It represented one of the signs of the times; we became professional articulators of this ideology-cum-religion until we discovered that it was intellectual laziness because it was ready made, pres-a-porte, and everybody could wear whether there was intellectual substance or not.

Quite early during the struggle, we began to realize the implication of Marxism were too many from the point of view of the great ideological divide of the gigantic Soviet “vaticanization” of Marxism.  We realized this when the leaders of the USSR became the Caliphs of the Soviet Empire and the Defenders of the Faith.

When exactly?

It was clear around 75 and 76 that we were getting into things that were too big for us.   Specially when the Derg came to power and declared the faith as described about.  Then the Eritrean case was treated as if it were a family quarrel among Marxists.

The Labor Party in the ELF

The ELF was led by an openly secret movement known as the Labor Party which was openly Marxist.  Many thought I was one of the founders...it was not true.  It was already founded in 1968 by people like Saleh Iyay, [who moved back to Eritrea in 1992], Ustaz Mahmoud [formerly head of the ELF’s Department of Education, deceased in 1992] and of course the brilliant Azein Yassin. This was the strength of a culture that produced giants.  Until recently, when our friends in power [PFDJ]--one of the things I am very angry about is that they are eradicating culture, tradition.  The individual is much impoverished without his culture.  Traditional societies are very comfortable with their religion; they feel at home with it; it defines their culture, their behavior and more importantly, the most important institution: the family.  An institution without a family only increases the population of prostitutes and tourists, Thailand style.  One of the things we have to fight for is the continuation of our culture; religion should be controlled by religious leaders...The state, especially its security apparatus, has no business to interfere in these beautiful and inherited religions.

Let’s save why you are angry with “our friends in power” until the latter part of this interview.  You are somewhere in Sweden, you are highly educated, you are a Christian and a Highlander and, no doubt, you have heard of the excesses of the ELF leadership by now.  Why did not the message of “Nihnan-Ilamanan Manifesto” appeal to you?

I was in the field at the time.  When I joined the field in 1970, the ELF was neutered of its Tigrigna speakers.  They were 8 or 9 people; one of them the old fighter Gebehiwot Himbirti--who joined the struggle in 1963.  He was an extremely famous fighter...the rest either left the field or joined the PLF.  For us, it was obvious that the solution of splitting was not the obvious solution...

There are conflicting reports on Sryet Addis: the massacre of students who joined the armed struggle from Addis Ababa. Did it happen?

Yeah.  This was attested to by even the leaders.  But it is the conclusion that you draw that it is important...it was a repetition of the 5th Zone phenomenon...Many members from the fourth zone (Red Sea) were jailed. There was a lot of activity in 1970.  In 1969, the ELF leadership had a meeting in Adobha.  Shortly thereafter, as a counterpoint to that, the nascent PLF had its meeting in Sedoha Ela (in Denkalia) and following that, in 1970, there was the famous “Conference of Oman” which was headed by Sabbe and attended by my father, Tedla Bairu (who declined a post he was elected to) and the father of our revolution, Woldeab Woldemariam, who was elected to a post.  We discussed the possibility of forming an organization when I was in Europe because Qyada Ama (Supreme Command) committed major mistakes at the strategic level.  Among other things, they declared that henceforth and until the next Congress, the Foreign Office should not represent the Eritrean Revolution.  In other words, it was a kind of political coup d’etat severely hampering Sabbe which more or less created the congregation of the Oman Congress by Saleh Sabbe.Then there was chaos in the Eritrean Revolution.

When we met in Berlin, there were students from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Demascus (Yahia Jaber, and Dr. Omerein (two Omars) and others) and we assessed that there were errors but we decided that the solution is not an organizational split.  We felt Eritrea was too poor and too inexperienced.  Moreover, the fact that I am from Aqordat maybe I look at things slightly differently...

If Sabbe is the guy that recruited you originally, why didn’t you stick with him?

Somehow we went to different paths.  Sabbe brought money and arms, the staple food of any armed movement and he did it with elegance: he was using his deep knowledge of the Quran and Arabic language...he was also a poet.  He was using his personal qualities.  But then, I am not sure his solutions were always right; he tended to like the splitting type of solutions.  I considered him too traditional....

What led to his split from EPLF or the EPLF to split from him?

The EPLF was created in Seminawi Bahri after the split with Sabbe in 1976.  When he attended the Numeri organized Khartoum Conference, a meeting attended b Bereket Ab Habtelselassie, Abdella Idris and the Father of the Revolution, Woldeab Woldemariam, as well as the entire Revolutionary Council, it created tremors within the ELF.  The conference was supported by Iraq and it was regarded as a Pan Arab movement.  It created political ripples.  It offended even the Red Sea fighters.

Within the PLF, this step was regarded as too drastic and they severed the umbilical cord with him. This break this threw them into the warm embrace of Isaias. Osman Saleh Sabbe dealt without consulting anybody and the step was too big to take without consulting anyone.

You have held various roles in the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).  Could you briefly tell us what they were?

As I said, in 1968 I was sent as representative of ELF to Stockholm by Sabbe and Idris Mohammed Adem.   I was recalled to the field to be a member of the Congress Preparatory Committee in 1970.  I became the chairman of the committee for the First National Congress.  This was a huge victory for the ELF.  The emperor being a wily politician understood that a congress held in Eritrea by the ELF would go a long way towards legitimizing the struggle.  So he did his best to stop the first congress.

Like what?

In the Sudan it was his security service.  Money was spent liberally to gather information.   The army was there seeking out the ELA [Eritrean Liberation Army].  In a short period of time, there were so many battles from Keren to the Sahel where our congress was held. 

The First National Congress

The congress was successful. It started near the end of 1970 and ended in early 1971. Delegates came from all over Eritrea, including Denkalia.  We stuck together for a whole month.  People got to know each other and members of the ELF.  There I had the honor of presenting the three programs of the ELF; I convinced the ELF to accept all three: the political, organizational and military program.  The congress accepted them as the political document of the revitalized ELF, which enabled Eritreans, regardless where they are, to speak with one voice.  Because of this, the ELF grew by leaps and bounds.

The Congress also elected its leadership and adopted programs.  The Executive Committee (EC) was elected directly by the Congress.  The four member committee had Idris Mohammed Adem as president; myself as the first VP and head of political office and president in absentia; Saleh Iyay, who was in Demascus and couldn’t attend the session, was elected to be in charge foreign relations; and Abdella Idris was elected to head the military office.  These four people were directly elected.  The reason we selected this organizational structure was to stop the dissolution of the ELF.  Despite Eritrea’s size and excellent transport facilities, because the Tigrigna did now know a lot about the Tigre and vice versa; despite the two religions being there since inception, more or less, these two reservoirs of culture were not known to each other.  The nationalities were as if they were non-existent.

The rest of the leadership--the Central Committee--were elected only as individuals but not for specific posts.  Among them they had to decide who gets whom, which would force dialog and compromise.  This is why there was continuous changes in posts and personnel. 

The success of the congress was this: for the first time, Eritreans were able to legitimize their struggle through a national congress, including internationally.  They could speak through the collective will, the resolutions of the congress.  It was a tremendous step towards the legitimizing of the struggle in the International Arena.  Militarily, we were able to move from the liberated zones to the outskirts of Asmara.  This opening which was made by the ELF may have created the emergence of the EPLF.

The Years between the Two Congresses (1971 - 1975)

The ELF made a breakthrough militarily.  After the Derg took over [overthrow of Haile Selassie I in 1974], despite the fact that the PLF [later EPLF] was touted as a progressive organization and the ELF was one for the Muslims, it was evident that the assumptions were in the mind of their makers.  The proof: when the Imperial System in Ethiopia collapsed, 5000-7,000 Eritreans joined the ELF; only about 1,000 joined the EPLF.  As far as errors and mistakes are concerned, I am not going to wash my hands and claim they are clean.   In politics, the “I am holier than thou attitude” is to be shunned, I think.

Tell us about “the Errors and Mistakes”

The first error was made, I believe, when we did not assess our situation properly.  We were slightly blinded; we were victims of our own success.  We saw the large number of Eritreans who joined us; the entire institution of Ethiopian imperialism--the civil service, the police, the army, the air force, even great sportsmen, musicians joined the ELF.  This blinded us and gave us the impression that the Garden of Eden was only a stone throw away from us.  And it seems that we were staking claims on this Garden of Eden.   

By that I mean, we did not assess what the situation was like in Ethiopia properly; we did not assess our situation internally; how to deal with the new: was it a threat? Was it a blessing?  Were we sufficiently prepared to assimilate a new element in large doses into our organization?  We failed, actually, to use the opportunity provided by the second congress to solve these opportunities, these problems which confronted us in 1975.  I don’t think we assessed the challenge by the EPLF because the ELF covered the huge middle ground; its support came not only in Eritrea but also from Eritreans in Ethiopia.  Also, because the traditions of the ELF in the international arena were highly developed, we did not depend on our own Hafash.  We did not collect money from our Eritrean communities.  It was help that came from our friends in our region.  The tradition of international relations was quite advanced; we had the language, we had the formulations we inherited from leading lights from Osman Sabbe who was an excellent example of how diplomatic relations should be conducted with charm and culture. 

You did not depend on Hafash?

Of course the armed struggle depended on Hafash: the boj-boj [meals provided by Eritrean civilians] is a perfect example.  I am talking about collecting money.  But there were contradictions within the ELF and the more contradiction within the ELF, the more the opportunity within the EPLF to grow.  And the fascist-Marxist regime in Addis was concentrating on our internal squabbles.  The organization unity was sacrificed at the altar of believing that the Garden of Eden was a stone throw away.

Which takes us to the Second National Congress.  Given the success of the First National Congress and the growth of the ELF between 1971 to 1975, why, in your opinion, were you not elected in ELF's Second National Congress?  By the way, was the 2nd congress held on schedule?

It was held 1975.   It was a scheduled congress. It was supposed to be after 3 years; it was one year behind--given the unexpected elements of the struggle, it was in time. It was peculiar; it wasn’t a split with the ELF; it was a split within the Labor Party. 

Meaning Direction?

Our contradiction within the Labor Party had gone so far we started mistrusting each other.  Party members who were inside the battlefield had their own assessments of the major players within the party.  There was an element of mistrust and ill-feeling...

Is this typical political maneuvering?

I think the new element--the new comers--had a role to play.  Tigrigna and many of them educated...it changed the balance of roles and roles of personalities.  Quite naturally, this created mistrust on motives.  We did not know how to handle them. 

All the leadership was in the Labor Party?

I think the most important players were in the Labor Party.  The ideological split was a consequence of the realization that there was a Marxist-Leninist movement [The Labor Party] within he ELF.  This necessitated the creation of the adherents of the Ba’ath Party, the Qoumiyeen, and Ahmed Ismail’s (who was in the Revolutionary Council) Islamist movement. Ahmed Ismail felt that within the linguistic and culture hierarchy, Islam was not getting a good deal.  That was an element.  There was a second element...

THE SECOND ELEMENT

The second element was just as influential in creating rancor.  After our military success around Asmara (in 1975), Isaias [President Isaias Afwerki] and I met in a village called Ametsi (not far from Asmara)....

So, the rumor of your stealth meeting is true?

Actually, that wasn’t the first time.  We [representatives of the Labor Party and the PLF] had been meeting in Aden [Yemen] from 1972 onwards under the umbrella of the progressive (actually, Marxist/Maoist) regime of Aden.   Saleh Iyay and myself representing the Labor Party/ELF and Bahdouri [now Eritrean Ambassador to UN], Woldenkiel Gebremariam (a member of the PLF office in Aden) representing the PLF.  At a certain stage, the negotiation was taken over by the prominent revolutionary Ramadan Mohammed Nur.  By 1974, the PLF decided to send us Mr. Isaias Afwerki.  We were in Aden because the Yemenis would not let us take our arms from Yemen under the guise that a civil war was raging in Eritrea.  Numeri [formerly President of Sudan] had closed everything in Sudan.  Eventually, four boats of arms were secured; two were routed to Denkalia, two via Sudan.

In any event, we met with Isaias and we concluded an agreement, under the auspices of the Yemenis, in the presidential palace, documents were signed and related ceremonies were conducted. 

What was the agreement about?

Basically that we the progressives should unite first; then the Eritrean fronts could merge at a later date.

I took the trouble to give you the details of the signing ceremony because, at a certain stage, it was announced by Isaias Afwerki, that a meeting had taken place between the ELF and PLF.  But he said that the meeting was held in Baghdad, not Aden. 

This was regarded as living proof by non-labor party ELF members for suspicion.  Because it was seen not just an ideological union, but a meeting of Tigrigna speakers because there were two high profile Tigrigna speakers in the meeting.   This sent negative tremors within the ELF. 

The Ametsi deal, my meeting with Isaias, was a confirmation of the suspicion. Except now the “Tigrigna connection” was more pronounced than the “Marxist connection.” 

What was the real reason for meeting Isias at Ametsi in 1975?

The Ametsi deal was this: the two organizations should not return to status quo ante: organizational confrontation.  Each should go to its congress and emphasize unity and cooperation.  And then, probably a military strategy to engage the enemy wherever he has the upper hand...

OK, Back to the drama of the Second Congress...

The Second Congress was a divided congress.  The main axis was within the labor party.  My intentions were suspect and to remove me from the leadership became critical.  This was strongly supported by Abu Ala [from Iraq’s Baath Party].  Many of the ballots voting for me were thrown.  Nevertheless, I felt it was best to leave the ELF in peace.  Then I could concentrate on Labor Party work.

Now here is the organizational error: Unlike the First Congress, in the Second Congress the Executive Committee was not elected by direct vote. The revolutionary council was elected which in turn elected the Executive Committee.  And so, instead of stabilization of the ELF; politicking and polarization started.  And these polarizations contributed to its downfall.  This was avoided in the First Congress because the Executive Committee was elected directly.  The Second Congress was warned of this danger mainly by me. I don’t want to take credit for this; it was a matter of conviction and I don’t want to attach a degree of prophecy to it.  Simply put, I was convinced in a different kind of organizational structure...

The “Gedim” vs “Mustejid” [veteran fighter vs new recruit] polarization continued.  And there was always a regional/religious/ethnic baggage to it.

The MaMaGu Movement

Within the ELF, I created another organization: “Makelawi Marxiawi Gujle” (Ma.Ma.Gu.)  The reason we did that and the reason we called it Ma.Ma.Gu was to show that this was an ideological split and not a spit within the ELF.  Meaning, if the elements which wanted to take military steps to solve contradiction approached us, we would tell them we are Ma.Ma.Gu.   When the military step was taken...

When?

In 1977, with battalion 149.  It was a step taken by Abdella Idris. I should avoid talking about this, because it would not be fair to talk about things from my perspective which would have different interpretation by others...we decided to change Ma. Ma. Gu to Eritrean Democratic Movement (EDM).  We formally rejected much of Marxism-Leninism (this was in 1977) and the emphasis became democracy.

What was EDM calling for?

It was calling for a speedy congress--an extra congress--to resolve the contradictions of the ELF.  When the military steps were taken, we suggested that we should move to Hazemo [in the Senafe/Adi Keyh zone of the Eritrean highlands] and be stationed as far away as possible from centers of confrontation.  The religious element was lurking was there, the kebesa metahit [highland/lowland] was there...it was very hard to define because it resulted in a very polarized ELF...at the personality level, there were contradictions, also...The ELF was not itself.

At the time, the EPLF which used to prophesize “Ama ktHaQiQ iya”[ELF will dissolve away] had the right to say...and it did say...aybelnando [we told you so]?

Yeah.  But the “aybelnan do” attitude was expressed much earlier by Isaias; as early as “nhnan ilaman.”  The new element who had not joined PLF/EPLF, joined them after the contradictions emerged. 

THE FALLUL MOVEMENT

That was the EDM.  What about the Fallul Movement?

They are one and the same!  The guys in Kifli Zena [the Information and Propaganda Section of the ELF] were looking for a term that would describe this explosion to the rank and file and mostly to the new recruits (the “mustejdin“)  They borrowed a term from the political vocabulary of Addis: a moniker the Derg used to apply to the EPRP [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party] who were described as anarchists.  The Kifli Zena picked up the word and translated it to “Qeydi Betek” [Rein Breaker].  But that was a compound word and there was an element of liberation to the phrase so they chose a word they thought would have a negative connotation: “fallul.”   It shouldn’t have a negative connotation because “fallul kede gobezai” is the adventures of a young man. 

Fallul was the EDM.  I was one of its founders and its general secretary.  Our main aim was to stop the disintegration of the ELF and we thought Abdella Idris was playing a negative role...

Because?

Throughout his career he opted for the quick solution which was the military solution.  My friend Burhan Blata [now in the Eritrean Parliament] did not like the military solution; Ibrahim Mohammed Ali [now leader of the Eritrean Alliance Movement] did not like the military solution.

Why has Ibrahim Mohammed Ali grown to be so militant of late, then?

I hear so nowadays...but my experience with him was very positive. He is an extremely decent human being...my experience with him is an extremely positive one....

If your “main aim was to stop the disintegration of the ELF”, isn’t it ironic the Fallul is seen as THE cause for the disintegration of the ELF?

The philosopher Carl Popper, whose work had a profound influence on me, a man who fought Marxism intellectually, the articulator of the Paradigm Shift and developer of “the falsification theory“, had this to say in “The Open and Closed Society“: Truth can be sought only by the process of falsification.  

Unfortunately, if you look at things from the “consequence” point of view--which is the difference between the experienced and inexperienced politician who concentrates on blueprints, planning without concentrating on deviations--if one looks at things from the “consequence“ stand point, I wouldn’t blame people who blame the EDM with the disintegration of the ELF.  As a result of what took place, ELF was neutered of thousands of its people: as a result of self-defense and political choice, the well armed, well-trained members of the ELF chose to join the EPLF.  And this process continued...The presence of the EDM was a continuous challenge to the ELF and the ELF was forced to make choices.   EDM’s platform was a continuous condemnation of the ELF.  So, yes, if you look at it from the tail end of it, one can say “gedifomna indiyom keydom” [they abandoned us].

In reality, the exodus was caused by the leadership of the ELF.  They shoot to kill, and they hit your ear and then they blame the victim for surviving the assassination attempt.  Instead of crying over spilt milk, just don’t spill the milk.

The ELF was removed from the armed struggle.  The central distinction between EDM and the other organizations is that the EDM came during the life of the ELF and the others came after the demise of the ELF.  EDM was a genuine organization within the bosom of the ELF. 

Sometime between 1982 and 1984, while I was in Baghdad, some of the cadres of the EDM had a meeting.  The EDM split into two: because of their alliance with TPLF, some felt they had to form a new party.  They added the obligatory “P” to “EDM” and became “EPDM.”

“P” for Popular or “P” for People?

“P” for People.  For reasons known only to themselves, while we the EDM went to Asmara, they, the EPDM went to Addis.  I think this is a fair assessment of the split.

You mean they developed pro-Ethiopia tendencies?

I do not care to judge.  But let the facts speak for themselves.  In reality while we moved towards Asmara, they moved to Addis. 

Sort of like the Saghem movement?

Yeah.  Actually, when Saghem was split; “Saghem-Qetsil” allied itself with EPDM which, as I said, was allied with TPLF...

[The EDM with a P is known by its Tigrigna accronym as De.Ma.Ha.E.]  What was the agenda of DeMaHaE besides wanting to go to Addis?

The agenda of DeMaHaE has not been declared, in all fairness.  The only thing we know is that around 1982-84, they identified their enemies which was the EPLF and the leader of the EDM, Herui,  whom they regarded as a feudalist.  And they identified their friend as the TPLF.   

Is one of the founders, Gebrehan Zere, presumed dead?

That is what we hear.  Dead men don’t talk.

One of the common criticisms of the “Gedim” [old establishment] ELF was that the EDM was a product of “highland chauvinism” and that you exploited these raw passions of new recruits.  What is your response?

I can understand how people would say that because of the nature of the large influx to the ELF.  THE ELF organization at that time was not prepared to accommodate such an influx in such a short time and also the quality of the influx from the point of view of quality, education and experience.  It really unsettled the traditional views of recruitment, central organizational formulation in the armed struggle.  The old ELF recruited by testing loyalty, staying power, and motives.  But now, in 1974-75, a number of reasons caused by the sudden changes in Ethiopia actually caught the ELF by surprise.  And so, unfortunately for us, it came during the preparation for the Second Congress.  And already between the First and the Second Congress, there had developed ill-feelings between the Labor Party and the Conservatives of the ELF and the Pan- Arab Movement (such as the Ba’ath, Qewmiyeen the Islamist..)

Who were the Conservatives?

People like Ibrahim Idris,  Hamid Turki [now in jihad]; the Baathist were led by Jaffer Assad.    All the Labor Party leadership including myself was regarded as political opponents by the conservatives.   And the “new element” [new recruits] were from the highlands and they were Tigrigna speakers.

Then, actually, ELF felt threatened by this influx who identified only one name which was my name.  Only my name was recognizable to them [the new recruits.]  And there was a challenge from the EPLF.  The conservatives felt our organization is being taken away from us.  And this is being organized around the personality of Herui, no amount of denial could free me from the allegation being made. 

But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, which is to say, this:  In 1975, when groups were splitting from ELF, I remained with ELF.  I was only one of  9 or 10 [of the Gedim Highlanders] who stayed.  That was the time to be a “Tigrigna Chauvinist” when new organizations were being formed opposed to the traditional leadership of ELF.

During the congress itself and before it, the polarization within the Labor Party became quite obvious.  And so we had an agreement within the labor party itself that in order to win the election we needed the support of the influx [the new recruits] to the advantage of the Labor party and I was tasked with working out a list [of potential leaders from the new recruits] who would be acceptable to the central committee members of the Labor Party .  We floated a separate list [of candidates] which was known to the Central Committee of the Labor Party but not to the general membership of the Second Congress. And even then, there were contradictions within the central committee.  Despite that fact that there was a deal between us [Herui and the rest of the leaders of the Labor Party], it appeared that a split occurred on the basis of Tigrigna and non-Tigrigna.   The representatives of Libya, Sudan and especially Iraq gave an ultimatum: if you wish to have our support,  if you wish our finances, get rid of this guy [Herui.].  

That was the beginning of the end of the ELF. What is your opinion of the various ELF offshoot organizations that have sprang since 1981?

Of course, we have to take these organizations individually.  The way the contradictions emerged within the ELF is important.  The polarization within the field developed between the security forces represented by Melake Tekle and Abdella Idris.  We can assume the Gedim/Jedid, the linguistic, traditional elements of Eritrean disunity was there.  Whenever there is contradictions, these elements arrange and rearrange themselves.  It is up to us democrats to resolve these issues once and for all.

Under pressure of the EPLF and the TPLF (the external element to the equation), it became impossible for the organization to survive in its old form and they withdrew to the Sudan.  It is when they withdrew that the real wild dogs pf the ELF appeared in their true selves.  By that I mean, Abdella Idris with some of the armaments, created his own post and he tried to bring the others into it and imprisoned many including Ahmed Nasser.  People were trying to liquidate each other, the entire thing became bloody especially in Tehadai Kerokon [Sudan]. 

Speaking of liquidating each other, there was an assassination attempt on you during that period, right?

It was about the time Osman Ajib [leader of the pro-Ba’ath organization within the ELF] was assassinated.  We were about to make an alliance with Legnat A’sewra [Revolutionary Council]

Who was behind the assassination attempt?

The Sudanese authorities asked me the same question.  We said it could only be the Derg [Ethiopian Government] authorities.  Later, we heard it was the security services of the ELF.  But this is pure speculation and it is not fair...it is not fair.....

Sorry I brought it up...let’s continue...

People went to their primordial in the absence of a political organization that would keep them together by their bootstraps.  The element of unity were discarded and the element of disunity became king: regional, religious, linguistic and geographic affiliation. 

All the organizations that were created after that reflect the disunity.  You wouldn’t assume these organizations reflected the ELF.  (1) Saleh Iyay allied with Osman Sabe; (2) the revolutionary council continued with the Labor Party which continued with Ahmed Nasser and Ibrahim Mohammed Ali;  (3) Zemihret and Dr. Giorgis (the “Saghem” people) decided “let’s pick a traditional leader” and they picked Ibrahim Totil; (4) Abdella Idris became himself which is Beni-Amer oriented.  And they continued this way.  They tried to come to the field but once it was dominated by the EPLF/TPLF alliance it was impossible for them to reassert themselves in the armed struggle again.

And then they lived their lives separately floating in the Diaspora community.  Some in Saudi Arabia and the Revolutionary Council in Germany and the West.  And then during the national independence period, for reasons which are not self-evident, they decided not to participate in the referendum.  With the exception of Abdella Idris...

Abdella Idris did participate in the referendum?

He did.  Being a tactician of considerable vintage.  At least he voted and he encouraged his followers to participate in the referendum...

It so appears now and it appears then they denied themselves legitimacy and they became Diaspora politicians.   And legitimate power was left in the hands of EPLF and later PFDJ.  At least to the casual observer, it appears they lived a life of political lamentation in the Diaspora.  And over the years, there was an element of political decay and disappointment until revitalization took place when the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out.  This drastic event brought the various organizations of the alliance together.  Although I don’t know the exact nature of their association with the Ethiopian government and what the justification is, it seems that they decided to retain the autonomy of the various organizations while at the same time agreeing on the bare minimum which is the replacement of, as they call it, “the EPLF Government” by this or the other means.

Here in Sweden, during the recent conference we held, when I was interviewed, they asked me whether I should condemn the alliance.  I was surprised by this question.  The first thing I wanted to know was whether they were condemned by the Eritrean government.  They told me “no.” My response was: “ how can an individual condemn them when the government hasn’t?”   The government cannot just condemn them, it should make its case in a court of law where they can be charged and they can defend themselves.  I am not in the business of smear casting when evidence is not evident. But nobody can take their birthright or their right to participate in the politics of their country.  And also, they have the right not only to defend themselves in a court of law but they have the right to formulate accusations even against the government.

All this goes into the luggage of citizenship.  From this point of view, I encourage them in the democratic demand, which is being made by the Eritrean people.  That is why at the Stockholm Conference probably the most important resolution passed was that a historic compromise must be achieved and a massive reconciliation drive must be undertaken because you can call people fifth columnist and they can defend themselves.  But you don’t have the right to call entire regions west of Adi Tekelezin as Fifth Columnist...who the hell are you to depict half of Eritrea as Fifth Columnist?

You took a different path from the ‘Alliance.’  You joined the EPLF after the liberation of Massawa?  Why?  Did you consult with your followers before you did?

We were talking to each other closely before that. At the liberation of Massawa, what happened was the two organizations (EDM and EPLF), instead of negotiation between two organizations, actually became one.  The word is “tesenbiren”.  We joined EPLF and became full members.  We became ordinary fighters.

And what was your new position with the EPLF?  

A simple soldier.  And yes, I absolutely consulted with my people...with the exception of EDM with a P.

You are associated with so many Eritrean organizations.   Is the reason you set up so many of them that you get bored easily?

How many organizations have I set up?  The truth of the matter is: I was a member of ELM/Haraka [Mahber Showate] and the founders of that organization are known.  I was a member of the ELF and you know the founders.  I was merely a member.  And then the Labor Party which we mentioned.  It was already set up in 1968- 69.  The only organization which I was involved [in its creation] was Ma.Ma.Gu and later EDM [aka Fallul.]  And we brought the EDM to its natural organization and it lived up to its natural conclusion.  So the only organization I set up was not left or abandoned but brought to its natural conclusion.  Now, several decades later,  with literally thousands and thousands of Eritreans, we are linking hands to save our country and people from total disaster.   And this movement for salvation of Eritrea and implementation of democracy was not started by me but by literally thousands of Eritreans. The present movement has not been set by me.

Speaking of organizations, can you assume any position in an organization except that of a leader?

In African politics, we use vintage terms.  And you can be easily misled and you can think into believing you are making realistic political organization.  We are talking through our hats and we think we are talking politically but we are actually talking beyond each other.  The safest one is to use the most neutral ones as used in political circumstances.  Such as:  that a political movement is a project, like a business project.  The central is idea is that it is put up, it is being financed, it is a project, and then competent people in prominent roles are carefully selected and then execute the plan, etc, etc.  Putting up a political party is like putting together a business project.  So, usually, those who propose  such a project are best employed as its managers.  Otherwise, a process of family [nepotism] might follow.  If the [right] combination is not made, unexpected errors follow and the project might collapse. 

The myth was spread that this [the Herui family] was a power mongering family by the same propaganda machine knowing full well in the past decade, although I was expressing my views in the parliament and outside the parliament, I have never tried to set up an organization which could or might be construed as illegal by the government.  I could have been a “yes man” and accepted any position in the ministry or built an opposition party which would have led to jail terms , etc.  That would have been the definition of power mongering.  Leadership post without a meaningful project has never been of interest to me.

Eritrea was liberated in 1991.  What was your role--political or otherwise-- between 1991 and 2000?

I was a member of the Assembly until 1994. 

Elected?

Actually, selected.  Along with people like Saleh Iyay, Seid Naud, Mohammed Nur Ahmed, Zahra Jaber and Burhan Blata. 

Does the Baito meet?

Yes, that is where I used to formulate my opinion which I understand we will talk about later. We met no less than 6-7 times; a minimum of  twice a year.  the presidents’ museum. 

The Baito is not at the same place that your father and the Eritrean Assembly of the 1950s met, is it?

Actually where my father [and the Assembly ]met is now the Ministry of Education. 

So what did you do after 1994?

With the exception of Zahra Jaber and [her husband] Mohammed Nur Ahmed, all the non-EPLF nationalists (like Naud, Iyay and myself) were not nominated to the Baito after the EPLF Congress.  In my case, there was no post offered after 1994.  I decided to be a private citizen and went into business for myself.  The first business that I, in conjunction with an expatriate Sudanese of Syrian origin, started had to do with Gum Arabic.    And it became very successful and we created employment; we created a market.  We were growing at a tremendous speed.  At the end of 1994 or 1995, I traveled to Sweden to visit my family.    [While there], I got a call from my Sudanese friend who told me that the government had notified him to leave the country within 48 hours.  And so, he said, “ I am going to fly to Addis.”   I flew there and I inquired as to the background of the whole story.  He said he was in the dark.  He said, “since I am not a diplomat, I don‘t understand.  Expulsion requires certain diplomatic steps; I should have been kept in prison until I was accused of something of definite and proven guilty.  Now, I cannot give you a definite answer as to why I was kicked out.”

I went back to Asmara to find out.  To make the story short, nobody was able and willing to give me an explanation.  And today there is no export of Gum Arabic.  We used to clean it and pack it and give it an Eritrean nationalism.  Unfortunately this business died.  I went into debt; the business  collapsed:  bankruptcy.  [In bankruptcy], people under you become unemployed.  We employed 80 - 100 people per day; 5 administrative positions in Asmara;  20 in Tesseney.

Let’s talk about something sensitive.   You are accused of having been an excessive drinker while you were in Asmara in the late 1990s.  To an extent that you used to attend Bayto meetings under the influence of alcohol.  Would you like to comment on that? 

This is usually...That doesn’t usually merit an answer.  Who is accusing whom? Let’s talk about the issues I raised at the Assembly and let your readers judge:

(1) Why isn’t Arabic our official language.  I stated that Arabic is an Eritrean national language and should be declared so; (2) What is our foreign policy.  Their response of  “national interest” as if other nations did not exist is not sufficient and I said so; (3) What is our economic policy.  Etc, etc.

So all the questions I raised were central to the unity and development of our country.   Do you think these kinds of questions would be raised by someone who is....I am sorry to say that this is nothing but a cheap vilification campaign.   It is their way to vilify and blacken. 

What is your view of the PFDJ?

In the first article that I wrote in the process of our democratic debate, I said I believe we need to make a distinction between EPLF and PFDJ.  The “Hafash” movements (hafash wdbat) of the EPLF were dismantled without notification around 1988.  During Atlanta [the Carter sponsored peace talks held in Atlanta] and Afabet [the liberation of Afabet], when Eritrea was moving towards victory, they [the mass organizations] were expected to close shop.  This was regarded as very strange, a tremendous amount of bitterness ensued.  The leadership felt it was the best time to do it to prevent a power struggle.  And the second step was ERA [Eritrean Relief Association] was dismantled.  Its old structure was changed in Khartoum and the liberated zones.  ERA had played the role of the foreign office.  Many of the educated Eritreans partook in it; they were the international link of the EPLF in the old organization form.  Petros Ba’atay (of “G-13“ fame ) was removed and replaced by Tekie Beyene [now the governor of the Central Bank of Eritrea].  ERA was requested to function from Sudan and later from the field.   After independence, the process of gradual dismantling of EPLF was continued.  In the end, at the Third Congress [of EPLF], the people elected were the new guys, not the old fighters, the old legends, but the ones who reaped the highest votes were the people associated with books and pens rather than heroic feats in the battlefield.  And, a new power base emerged.  The old EPLF was being  swallowed by PFDJ.  And gradually, the power center of PFDJ was reduced to no more than 3, maximum 5 people.  None of them, with the exception of the President of the Republic, were old fighters of EPLF vintage.   One could clearly see the difference between the blue and white....

Which was Blue and which was White?

It doesn’t matter; I am comparing it with the Nile River, one river from two difference sources.   The point is that this seems to have strengthened the hands of the President of the Republic to the detriment of the leading figures of the EPLF which, I believe, is the reason for the crack or structural crisis right now.

Which takes us to the present.  Why is your political activity centered in Europe and not Eritrea?

The first question people ask you is “how come people like Herui are staying abroad for more than 7 months and plunging into the political debate not in Eritrea?”    There [in Eritrea], you have a media which is totally dominated not only by the party but the President of the Republic himself.  He is the lead player in Eritrean politics, economy and everything else.  And the crystallization of ideas needed to be done from abroad.  But no movement is worth its salt unless it is planted inside the country . We are laying the preparation ground for the new political language and infrastructure inside Eritrea.  What is said from abroad is going to be the staple in Eritrea.  The leaders of the government know it.  The political parties, however they try to stop it, will mushroom in Eritrea.  We have reached the stage where nobody is scared of imprisonment of anything worse. But we are not going to be pushed to making a political agenda which is not our own.  We will make one when we are good and ready.

You are now politically active in Sweden, exactly where you were 33 years ago.  The UN is involved in defining the future Eritrea, exactly what it was doing 55 years ago.  Does this give you a sense of Deja vu?

There is an element of deja vu but this is far more serious.  We never expected to fight a war with Ethiopia; neither the government, nor the people.  With the exception of some political observers, nobody expected a war.  The worsening of the relationship with the Sudan was not expected. Whereas in 1968 I was sent by the high council to Sweden to organize Eritrean intellectuals who were avoiding the Jebha (ELF), now we are facing a situation where the Tigrignas dominate the politics of Eritrea and I am not sure that is going to help the unity of Eritrea.....

Let's go to 1998: the breakout of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.  This has been discussed ad nausea so I want you to approach it from a different angle.  Could you talk about the war in the context of an old ELF book "The Strategy For Victory ." (1974).  You wrote that, right?

Actually, yes, I wrote it.  Here is the summary of the book:

Our armed struggle will reach a point when it will be sufficiently developed to meet the Ethiopian force in Dien Piam Phu type of war.  Taking into consideration, the justness of Eritrean case, the heroism of the Eritrean people, the preparation, Eritrea can win this type of war.  Eritrea can establish a government.

Since Ethiopia is not only a representative of African independence but a victim of the fascist axis and, as a result, the Emperor was regarded in line with people like Tito--people who survive nazi-fascist onslaught on civilization and small nations of the world.  And so, in the new post-war international rearrangement as reflected in the UN, Haile selassie was an important personality.  He was also a key player in the Cold War, especially because of Kagnew, etc, etc. 

An independent Eritrea will not have a chance. It will be possible for the Ethiopian army to organize itself for a 2nd engagement.  The question is raised: Can Eritrea win?  Of course it can.  But it cannot win endlessly taking the resource of Ethiopian demographics and international relations.  Unless....

Unless Eritrea secures support from the region and full support from at least one nation.  And what we had in mind was the Middle East supporting Eritrea and the full support coming from the Sudan. 

This was the strategy for victory.  And it worked for us; and that is how the Eritrean people achieved Eritrean independence.

Now, from this strategic point of view, look at our relationship during the recent engagement with Ethiopia.  Our relationship with the Sudan was severed and an element of survival from a possible onslaught was missing.

Yemane Gebreab, the political director of PFDJ, and Advisor to the President, was in the Oakland area a couple of weeks ago.  During the Q & A session, he said the equivalent of Eritrea’s mending of relationship with its neighbors will be dictated only by national interest.  In the context of the Sudan, he said that this meant we should not expect Eritrea to have the type of relationship of excessive love we used to have [in the 1980s.]

Political calculation is less important than our organic interest. If we have a strong national unity, how can we fear our region?  We fear it only if we are at odds with each other; if we are not united.   We have to avoid being drawn the so-called “Tigrigna cultural complex” (Tigrai/Tigrigna) or the so-called  “Arab-Muslim” complex.  Both threaten and put an end to the Eritrean identity.  If we have a covenant to what the Eritrean identity is, then we have a conflict-free relationship with our region.  Our national interest requires an organic relationship with our brothers and sisters in the region, not vice versa.