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Editorial
“I don’t believe that the situation will escalate to confrontation. Because solving problems through debate and discussion is a sign of civilized tradition, I hope we will resolve it that way” – Saleh Kekya, interview with Admas, June 27, 2000 On June 18, 2000, Open societies ask these questions— Sharpening The Blades Beginning in September 2000, the ruling party’s central committee (with 75 members) and the national assembly (the 75 central committee members plus 75 “elected” civilians) held meetings—a meeting they did not have throughout the 2 year war with In the good-cop, bad-cop routine that Isaias Afwerki and his chosen advisor (in this case, Yemane Gebreab, the political director) like to play, the bad-cop Yemane Gebreab stated at the meeting that multi-party system was not the right step for Eritrea to which the good-cop Isaias Afwerki responded that this is not a controversial subject since the party had already accepted in principle in 1987 (at its 2nd “unity congress”) that political pluralism was the preferred governance for post-independent Eritrea. Whether the parliamentarians who called for them truly believed it would happen and were betrayed or whether they knew all along that they would never happen but chose to take a stand and, as necessary, martyr themselves for the cause is unclear. What is clear is that all three of the promises were broken by the end of 2001. This was done by (a) isolating the reformers; (b) muzzling the free press and (c) hyping an imaginary war and creating another illusive deadline.
The Bloody Stalinist organizations, and PFDJ is certainly one, are good at fixing derogatory labels on their challengers, all the more to marginalize them. This website resisted the “G-15” label for long and opted for “Reformers” because that was more accurate—they were individuals with long history with EPLF/PFDJ who were proud of their membership in the party and wanted to reform the one-man rule of their party and, by extension, the country. Although the number of the reformers would ebb and flow—depending on the promises and threats delivered by Isaias Afwerki and his advisors—the final tally of those who signed the Open Letter were 15 (thus, the G-15.) The first isolation step taken against them was to separate them from their jobs (and thus their sympathizers.) Some were fired (Mahmoud Sheriffo), others were reassigned (Haile Weldensae, Petros Solomon) and others were frozen. All these moves were explained as completely unrelated to their calls for reform. The first person to refuse to be reassigned (from Ministry of Transportation to Mayor of Assab) was Saleh Kekya. The second step taken was to try to divide and conquer them. Although each of the reformers signed several letters and made the same arguments—constitutionalism, institutionalization, regular meetings—they were telegraphed messages to make them doubt one another. The core of the G-15 were actually G-3, they argued, without mentioning who the three were. The third step taken was to separate them from the party. In this regard, although the national assembly had agreed to hold post-war evaluation of the performance of the entire government at a committee level, the President’s office decided to have a post-war evaluation of the Reformers. In classic Isaias style, an unsigned, undated document called Woyane’s Third Offensive And the Political Campaign That Followed It (reminiscent of documents issued when PLF-2 was separating from ELF in 1971 and when EPLF was hunting down the Menkae movement) were distributed in party-meetings, beginning January 2001. For eight months, the President’s Office threw every kind of mud to see whichever would stick. The reformers were “old blood” who are in the way of younger blood taking their rightful place at the party. The reformers were corrupt. The reformers were driven by personal grudges. The reformers were incompetent and had run down their ministries. Some were not even real Shaebia (as Tirgta, the party owned paper, mocked Hamed Himid.) In the same method that was perfected with Menkae, the G-15 were banned from these meetings and could not ask for evidence or rebut the arguments. When fair-minded individuals attending the meeting said that they are unable to make a judgment without hearing both sides of the stories, the president’s office planted witnesses who would make impassioned patriotic speeches calling on the arrest of these dangers to national unity. The document is full of accusations and presents a perfect defense of President Isaias Afwerki which would be funny if it weren’t so tragic: the paper argues that the problem is not that he exercises too much power; the problem is that he exercises too little. As the party members were being told that the reformers were an imminent danger to the republic, the people were told that there was no problem at all. On June 25, 2001, in an interview with the private press, Isaias Afwerki was asked: Does the current misunderstanding have internal and national security ramifications and pose a threat to the nation? President Isaias Afwerki responded: Absolutely not, I don’t feel that way. Nonethless, I have noticed that some people are anxious about this. And I’ve advised them to be patient. But, he went on to say, there are laws for law-breakers. It is possible that Isaias Afwerki does not remember saying this and does not remember seeing what he was quoted saying because he made it clear that “I don’t read the private press and I have no intention to read the private press.” That Isaias Afwerki would hold his nose and participate in an interview with an institution he despised (the Eritrean private press) is all the evidence needed that the nascent press had replaced the staid, state press as the reliable source of information by the Eritrean people. All the papers (which were weeklies or bi-weeklies) would be sold out every week—presenting platforms to Eritreans who hadn’t been heard before or since: critics of the government. In fact, most of their content were letters to the editor and analysis by guest columnists. In other words, it was exactly what Isaias Afwerki allegedly wanted: "let the people decide." And the people had decided that Isaias had too much power. By August 2001, the president’s office had settled on one piece of mud that was sticky enough it had to be tried: the reformers were “defeatists” who had panicked, called on the president to resign, blamed “Eritrea” and beautified “Weyane”, and called for UN intervention, and demoralized the people. So accused Alamin Mohammed Said on August 8, 2001. It was not a coincidence that this accusation was made by the Secretary of the party, Alamin Mohammed Said; it was not a coincidence that the accusation would be made in Hadas Ertra, the party newspaper. Isaias Afwerki had played off the founding members of the EPLF against each other and the long-neglected Alamin Mohammed Said (and his supporters) simply saw a political opening which they exploited for personal gain. Similalry, Hadas Ertra had boycotted the reformers, which meant that no rebuttal from the G-15 would be issued. Why did the G-15, many of whom had led armies in wars far worse than the border war, including the 6th Offensive, suddenly develop the jitters? Is blaming the war management skills of the Isaias administration and his generals the same as blaming There were no answers—only more accusations. The president’s loyalists—Yemane Gebreab, Abdella Jaber, Zemehret Yohannes--fanned out to the Diaspora to pile on the accusations in public “seminars.” Seminars which exempted them from any questioning of their role during the disastrous war. Without the benefit of debate, evidence, the public was read resolutions which they endorsed by clapping. In a surreal development, even the incarceration of 1700 On Tuesday morning, September 18, 2001, the Reformers were rounded up from their homes and arrested. They were accused of crimes against national security. The brave and popular private press would have asked, “if, as you claim, they committed crimes against national security in May 2000, what took you so long to arrest them? If, as you say, not all of them are guilty, why are you arresting all of them?” But they couldn’t: they too were arrested and made to disappear, and their press shut down. On what charges? The same throw-mud-and-something-will stick: they had no license to practice journalism, they were not professional, they are funded by foreigners, we are revising the press law and, finally, they are spies. In February 2002, the “national assembly” convened and, without seeing any evidence, passed a resolution condemning the G-15 and called on the president’s office to immediately share its evidence with the public. There hasn't been a national assembly meeting since. Today is the 5th year anniversary of their arrest; no evidence has been presented, and none even manufactured. The Bloody-Handed Dictators do not operate in a vacuum. While it is evident that ultimate responsibility for the lawlessness in First and foremost are the accusers—since they stepped up to accuse, they have the burden of providing the evidence. The loudest accusers were Alamin Mohammed Said, Yemane Gebreab, Abdella Jaber and Zemehret Yohannes.
Next are those who made career calculations to benefit from the system. These nouveau riche include Sebhat Ephrem, Alamin Mohammed Said (again), and the many generals and lieutenant colonels who have seen their fortunes rise after the arrest of the G-15.
Lastly, there are the elite of
Many fool themselves by saying they are reserving judgement until the border is demarcated or until the clouds of war are lifted. What they should know is that because of the environment they helped create, Eritrea is entirely incapable of defending itself--there has never been a war won by demoralized army looking for an exit every waking hour. Related Document |
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