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Documents/Interviews
1-Let’s jump now to the period of 1998-2000, the period of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. You are one of a significant number of EPLF veterans who had a distinguished military record and who had no military role during the border war. What exactly were you assigned to, then, during the Third Offensive? In 2000, I was in Asmara, waiting for my credentials to be an envoy to Syria. I was waiting for my accreditation from Syria. 2-So you were in the PFDJ Refrigerator [“frozen”, getting paid to do nothing] during this period? [Laughs.] You could say that… 3-What is the truth about the news that Syria rejected your credentials as an ambassador? In a sense, you could say they rejected it… Normally, if a country is presented with a candidate’s name, it should respond within three months. If it doesn’t approve your accreditation within 3 months, it is assumed that the application has been rejected. If they approve, you go; if they don’t respond, it is assumed they have rejected it. 4-Do you know the reason why Syria did not accredit you? I don’t think it was a rejection of me, as such. Usually, credentials could be rejected because of military or intelligence background of the candidate. In my case, I had been an envoy to Djibouti for 4 years and my CV [resume] includes other roles. I had been reassigned from the military to civil administration and I had been a regional governor, and an ambassador. I think the rejection had to do with Syria’s relationship with Eritrea vis-à-vis Eritrea’s relationship with Israel. 5-But to go back to the original question, if you had this long military background, why were you not utilized during the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, when Eritrea could have used every skilled military man at its disposal? I cannot give you a specific reason. Actually, this goes back to 1987. I was in the combatant units from my enlistment [1969] until 1987. In the 2nd Congress [of the EPLF], I was a member of the Central Committee. At the congress, the Secretary General [Isaias Afwerki] gave a report that stated that although the Front had made vast advances in the military arena, politically, we had quite a ways to go. Based on that, I was sent to Egypt. The prevailing culture then was not to ask “why” but to accept your assignment. 6-Let’s go back to 2000. What was your relationship with those arrested, and what do you know about their arrest? What kind of information can you share with us about this event? The conflict amongst the senior members of leadership and the ministers was not a new issue. It deteriorated with time; it was not something that was created in 2000. To understand this, we have to go back in time, to the time after independence. Actually, it precedes independence, but it became clearer after independence. After we got our independence, the Secretary General had a clear intent to get rid of the senior leadership of the EPLF. This manifested itself in the Third Congress of the PFDJ. It was a beginning of a pattern, and it became very clear in 1991 when the then Secretary General started talking about getting rid of the “old blood.” In 1994, during the 3rd Congress, the talk was about “renewal.” The talk then was that the leadership had burnt out (“meriHnet TesTisu”) and that “new blood” was needed. In reality, it had nothing to do with the so-called “burn out” of his colleagues; it was a means to dismantle the various power centers and consolidate them into one individual. It was intended to purge the leadership of the organization from people who had mass following. The 3rd Congress of the People’s Front was the worst congress. It was a shameful congress. It was a continuation of sentiments that had been worsening over the years. Its entire objective was how to get rid of the historical leadership who had a great following in the general population and who could have challenged his leadership. 7-We’d always heard about the members of the Central Committee having a vast number of followers in the population, and the armed forces. We had heard of how Mesfin Hagos got almost as many votes as Isaias Afwerki in the 3rd congress. But if they had the support of the army and the people, where did that support evaporate when they were being hauled to jail without charges or a day in court? Aha…this is an interesting question. You cannot say they had no support from the people; they were at the helm of power when independence became a reality. But the reality of the Third World is that if you have total monopoly of governmental institutions, the sentiments of the people have no role. The centralization of governmental institutions had been underway since 1991; it was all about consolidating power and purging the other members. And one of the problems was that they hadn’t been challenging it, and working against this campaign to isolate them, since 1991. One of the reasons for this was that they were not one entity. Even before independence, he had a goal of constantly creating enmity, suspicion amongst them, by drawing one while shunning the other. This was the premeditated work of the Secretary General but they were not conscious of this, and they were sucked into his trap. 8-But Abdella, these Central Committee members had, between them, about, what, 400 years of experience? These are people who commanded mighty military organizations, intelligence units; diplomatic initiatives…How could they not have known of his plans and how did they allow this to happen? This is such a long story I don’t think I can do the story justice in this interview. Who said what in which meeting? Where? When? Why? will take time. It will take time to be reviewed; it will take a lot of time to analyze. In general, what one sees is that he was constantly creating conflict and enmity between them. And he was victorious. The end result is that when he came after them, every one was on his own. The stage had been set earlier. Let me give you an example. There was a party meeting held just before the Third Congress, to discuss the upcoming meeting. Party members, cadres and the Executive Committee attended the meeting. There was no report, except one, which was presented by the president. The whole report of the president was summed up briefly and he said, “The leadership has failed; we should look for something new.” The entire leadership was present. Not a single individual attending the meeting asked, “Mr. President, is this your assessment or is it that of the Central Committee? Is this the report of the political bureau?” If they had asked that, they would have ascertained that it was his personal opinion and that it was, thus, illegitimate. If they had asked, “Can you give specifics on how the leadership has failed?” Or if they had said, “Our goal was to bring about independence and we did, so how did we fail?” he would have had no answer. He would have been stopped right there. But he said this because he knew that they all doubted and suspected one another. If, for example, Petros Solomon were to think of standing up to ask that question, he wouldn’t be sure if anybody would have stood behind him. So, even those who wanted to challenge him couldn’t because they were not sure that they would get a single support. Everybody was afraid because nobody wanted to be the lone dissenter. 9-Where was this meeting held? Embatkala? Belleneki. Five kilometers outside Asmara, just on the other side of after Ad Abeito, before Beleza. It was a secret meeting. We were transported there at night and we returned at night… 10-And who attended this meeting? The Executive Committee? The Central Committee? All, from the executive to the ordinary member….The point is that this kind of clandestine work was something he had been working on even during the armed struggle era…even people like Ibrahim Affa were not aware of his mode of operation…
11-Wait, wait…when you say “ordinary member” of the party, what party are you talking about? This is the Revolutionary Labor Party [secret party within the EPLF] 12-Does this party still exist? It had been dismantled in 1990. They said they reached a stage where they couldn’t differentiate the members of the RLP or EPLF, so they stopped it then. The party was formed by a secret proclamation and it was killed by a secret proclamation. It was brought back for this meeting and it “died” after the meeting.
13-Let’s go back to the political environment in Eritrea and Ethiopia just before war broke out in 1998. Did those of you in the leadership position have any hints about this or were you as surprised as everybody else? We knew nothing. We knew there was some sort of confusion in 1997, in Adi Murug, with the presence of the Ethiopian army there. We knew there was economic tension: the Ethiopians were complaining that the Asab refinery had gotten too expensive and they had decided to import refined oil directly. But these pieces of news were disseminated informally; no meeting was held to discuss them, as a government or as a front. 14-In a document distributed by the President’s Office in January 2001 [“Weyane’s Third Offensive & The Political Environment That Followed It”] the anonymous authors make the point that this issue of Ethiopians in Adi Murug was discussed, among the cadres, and that the prevailing view of the PFDJ and the people was to take retaliatory action. They describe the criticism that was directed at the President’s Office for its handling of the origins of the war as opportunistic and inconsistent with the stands of the front. What’s your view? Trying to present the cadres as if they were the people’s representatives, as if they had a say on whether the nation should pursue the military option or dialogue is far from the truth…. This is just an excuse to justify their action. In general, there was no formal communication, no meeting, no discussion. 15-When Ethiopia announced that Eritrea had invaded Badme in 1998, the Eritrean Council of Minister’s (CoM) met and it issued a response. Doesn’t the press release of the CoM formalize Eritrea’s position? Does the CoM not speak for the government? How does the CoM work, does it vote, does it discuss issues?
Sure, there is something called Council of Ministers. But if it were a real institution, it would have known programs, known schedules. The reality is that it shows up when it is called. It may meet every month, every six months, every year, and it may not even meet at all. It has no constitution, no programs. It serves the President, based on the agenda and schedule of the President. The “Council of Ministers” has no role in the political, economic, international life of the nation. It has no agenda; it has no regularly scheduled meetings. It is a body without content. It shows up when it is called, just like the “National Assembly.” 16-You were in Asab and Asmara in 1999-2000. People had different opinions on how Eritrea’s military and diplomatic campaigns were being executed. Some felt Isaias was pursuing the right policy; others disagreed. Yet, during those two years, and until four months after the end of the war, there was no meeting of the Central Committee or the National Assembly. Where did those who had reservations about the diplomatic and military campaigns of Eritrea convey their concerns? Teashops? Friends’ homes? When the war broke out in 1998, the role of those responsible was to execute orders they were given. There was no meeting, not one, to formalize concerns. There was no trust among one another. Even if you had concerns, you expressed your concerns only to those whom you trusted, because if you expressed your concerns directly, you will be labeled a “coward” or “anti-leadership.” People were just whispering their concerns. This was the environment. The prevailing view was that the nation was at war and the issues would be raised openly once the war was over. 17-Abdella, was the war the final divorce between EPLF and TPLF or is it a temporary conflict of interest? Strategically speaking, how the relationship between the two came about, the very close relationship, was a correct strategy and principled. It is in our mutual interest to do so. And this continued at a government-to-government and party-to-party level. In my estimation, after the establishment of statehood, things went astray. From the Eritrean regime’s perspective, it was based on advancing a narrow power interest, and not a national interest. How the relationship was progressing was not explained to cadres or political leaders. It was very narrow, and not based on the people’s interest. There was no broad basis for it; nor were the Eritrean people told the nature of the closeness of the relationship. Broad support or even understanding of the nature of the relationship was missing. This is why solutions couldn’t be found to the conflict, and the situation quickly escalated to war.
18- Three of the fifteen PFDJ dissenters, and members of the central committee (G-15) had held the position of Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are Mesfin Hagos, Petros Solomon and Haile Derue. According to the President’s Office, the three were responsible for Eritrea’s foreign policy between 1991-2000. Given this, they ask, how could these same people criticize the president for the mistakes of Eritrea’s foreign policy? How, they ask, could you criticize the president for the foreign policy of the country if you were responsible for the execution of the nation’s foreign policy? My question is: to what extent were the ministries responsible for their individual departments; did they have any authority, any autonomy, or were they simply executing policies passed to them from the presidential office? Foreign policy? I think they would have been better able to explain this issue since they were there. In general though, when we observe it closely, and since I was there in the foreign ministry, I can’t say we had a clear foreign policy. We had one that was executed as per the instructions that came from above. Let me give you one example to demonstrate this point. I was in a meeting right after independence and the president was asked about Eritrea’s foreign policy and he responded, “We have no policy; a nation that has no economy cannot have a foreign policy.” In this environment, the nation’s work is based on directives, not on studied policies or a clear strategy. It was all done at the President’s level, and even there it was ad-hoc and incoherent. In general, we didn’t have a clear foreign policy. The policy was based on how the president felt about specific issues. We didn’t have strategic policies, whether it is regarding neighboring countries or any other nation. 19-Another criticism of the PFDJ Dissenters that is leveled by the President’s Office is that their claim to be advocates of democracy is false. They claim that many of the “G-15” were in charge of ministries and departments and if they were true democrats, they would have run their ministries and departments according to democratic principles. They challenge the people to ask whether they had regular meetings and respected their employees. The answer would show that they were all after power and nothing else. What would you say to that? Since 1991, the mistakes we made “maeleya yeblun” (cannot be counted.) Maybe this was deliberate, because democracy is contradictory to the system’s self-interest. Political pluralism is seen as a competition against the organization’s [PFDJ’s] own interest. This is the cause of the mistakes, Saleh. In the areas of the economy, education, health, agriculture, there was a transitional view on how to take the society from “Sewra” (revolution) to “Dewla” (State). Who is to blame? One individual cannot do this. One cannot go against the norms of the system by holding meetings or being accountable. I think we can tackle that issue and we can be clear on who is guiltier than the other on this issue when we arrive at a legal process, but for now, what we can say is that we, EPLF/PFDJ, failed collectively. Beginning from me, to those in jail, on to those in power. I, myself, had a role in the execution of these policies and nobody can say, “I am without sin.” All of us are to blame. When we get to the details, we will see who is more to blame than the other. The EPLF failed in the transition. Without putting democratic institutions, nothing can be done. Political pluralism contradicts the narrow interest of the party, and that is the cause of all our problems. One institution alone cannot be democratic. If one were to say, “everything we have been doing so far is wrong; let’s begin anew, let’s have meetings, let’s be accountable”, he would be right. It is wrong to say, “you were not in the right path and therefore you are condemned to continue on the same path.” To accuse them of not doing it earlier and then to deny them the right to do it now is a sham. This claim of, “they didn’t use to hold meetings, so don’t listen to them” is no more than trying to find justification to extend the life of a flawed system. Then to call them “criminals” and “traitors.” If they are guilty, present them to The Law. If they are, present them to a court of law. This accusation is without basis. To begin with, they were members of the National Assembly and, by convention, they should have gotten parliamentary immunity. But if you can’t do that, for whatever reason, then at least present them to a court of law. But they couldn’t find any evidence for their accusation so they are just adding more accusations. 20- Abdella, you are saying everyone has made mistakes. What are you, individually, accountable for to the Eritrean people. What are your mistakes or “sins”, as you put it? Generally speaking, without saying, specifically, this year, this place, I should admit that I was part of the problem. And I want to become part of the solution. The Revolution had two goals: independence and freedom. The Front should be thanked for bringing about independence. As for bringing about freedom, freedom of the people--institutions of democracy, such as free press, free expression, and self-government—changes, all based on justice, it failed. After independence, one of our goals was to create an environment to unite the people, to bring about freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of labor. All of these freedoms would bring about economic advancement, and all of which can, in turn, reform the government. But we stopped after we achieved the first goal, independence. We failed. The front failed. And the front should acknowledge its failure. It is a diversion to accuse people of treason, of not holding meetings, of seeking power…To seek power is a right. Isn’t it because you want power that you have subjugated and caged them? Where did those in power get the right to keep power and on what basis do they deny it to others? To seek power, legally, is a right and it is not reserved just for you. 21-What exactly is the basis for the PFDJ to be in power, anyway? What is the source of its legitimacy? What is its appeal? On what basis are those who support the Isaias-led PFDJ supporting it? Is it because it is seen as a winner? Is it because they truly believe that those the PFDJ accuses as “traitors” are truly so? What is your opinion? During the Revolution, the support was based on its programs, the way it functioned. After independence, after the EPLF was transformed into PFDJ, the appeal was not principle-based….Some of its legitimacy is based on “legacy,” as the front that brought about independence. Some of it is based on self-interest: people calculate, “instead of being perceived as an opposition, it is better to get membership and pursue your interest.” It is difficult to say that this is based on political consciousness. This is, after all, a Front that claims that its membership is about 600 – 900 thousand Eritreans. Which is to say, almost the entire adult population of Eritrea. You become a member; you pay your dues. That is all. Most of those who are not members are those who believe that the People’s Front cannot save the country. Beyond that, anybody has a right to join any party. What I believe is that just like you expect your rights to be a member of the PFDJ to be respected, you should respect the rights of those who don’t believe in the PFDJ. One of our problems is this belief of, “if you believe what I believe, you are a nationalist. If you don’t, you are not a nationalist.” This is not right. It is this sort of thinking that should change in our political culture. We should be able to have this kind of maturity. 22-Another claim to loyalty by the PFDJ is its “competence,” isn’t it? Many follow the PFDJ because of its perception as capable of execution and getting things done. In this regard, President Isaias Afwerki outlined the party’s and the country’s accomplishments in his recent interview with Hidri magazine. Did you read it and what did you think of it? Do you see any change in their views or is it more of the same? I read it, all of it. If there is one thing the interview demonstrated, it is the degree of his underestimation of the Eritrean people (“Ne’eket Allewo.”) This magazine is read in Asmara; he knows the situation in Eritrea and he has to know that the residents of Asmara know of the situation in Eritrea. They know what kind of situation they live in, what kind of hardship they endure, they know the economic situation…the people know this well. Yet, he talks about a strong economy; he talks about how the situation of the Eritrean people is vastly improved over that of 1998. When you claim that the PFDJ is stronger than ever before... This view can come only either from someone who is in an ivory tower, detached from the people or from someone who doesn’t care about the people. It comes from a person who doesn’t care whether the people are in misery or not. As long as you are doing well, and they are obeying your orders, you do not care…This leads me to conclude that there isn’t even a trace of change in their thinking at all. Economically, if you had $200 in 1998, it is now worth $20 or $30. There is hyperinflation. There is massive corruption. To claim success in this environment is arrogance of the worst kind, one that cannot be reformed. There is no change in the thinking. It is a “front”: to hide weakness by exaggerated posturing of strength. The situation of Eritrea is known by all. To give you an example: The World Bank recently released a report that shows that Eritrea ranks 1st in the world, in terms of militarization...2nd after North Korea in allocating budget towards the military. Agriculture, industry, tourism industries are non-existent. There is shortness of labor because it is all directed to the military. The claims he made are no more than a mockery of the people. But whether they are being ridiculed or not, the people know: they know you are oppressing them and they know that the PFDJ is lying. 23-This brings up a question. When Saddam was deposed and they couldn’t find nuclear weapons, they couldn’t reconcile it with Saddam’s posturing as if he possessed these banned weapons. Some analysts trying to understand this said that maybe Saddam was lied to by his terrorized subordinates and he really believed he had something he didn’t have. Do you think Isaias truly believes what he is saying or are his subordinates lying to him? What is the source of his information? I know that he reads newspapers, listens to the radio and follows what goes on in the Internet devotedly. Besides, Eritrea is such a small country it is not hard to know what is going on. It is not like it has a population of 30-50 million people. It is hard to say he is being misled. His message is directed to others: to portray a false image of strength, that he is still capable of punishing his opponents, and that he should be feared. 24-Earlier, we were talking about PFDJ’s obsession to dominate all political space in Eritrea. Isn’t this sort of thinking a mentality of the Revolution? What used to be “the Eritrean field cannot accommodate more than one front” has been changed to “Eritrea cannot accommodate more than one party, the PFDJ.” It seems to me that many have accepted this view because the accusation against the dissenters should not have gotten any acceptance at all, and it has gotten some? Well, this culture, this belief of “One Organization, One Leadership, One Army” this kind of thinking goes all the way back to the Jebha (ELF) days. To reject alternative views… The ELF stated that the Eritrean field could not accommodate more than one front and they labeled the Popular Forces [PLF, later EPLF] “anti-revolutionaries” and gave them an ultimatum: to either join in or be liquidated. The Popular Forces used to claim that the Eritrean field can accommodate not one but ten organizations and disputes should be resolved through dialogue. When we had the upper hand, when the ELF was forced out, we in the EPLF adopted the philosophy of “the Eritrean field cannot accommodate more than one organization.” The EPLF began to mouth the ELF slogan: if another front existed, it had to dissolve itself and join the EPLF. We did not want to see anyone besides us. After independence, when it came time to test the “multi-party” slogan of the EPLF, which was adopted in 1987, it became obvious that that was just a “chirHo” (slogan.) We had no readiness to accept other organizations; they had to join in as individuals. This is what has brought us to our current condition. If we had accepted other organizations, if we had encouraged different opinions, if we had debated, then democracy and tolerance would have bloomed. Instead, what we have is this unchanging mentality of, “ I, and I only, should rule.” 25- Abdella, Let’s jump to 2002. Based on your background, when you left Sudan for London, people expected you to join the EPLF-DP. Why didn’t you? First of all, I had long-standing differences and issues that I used to continuously bring up and discuss with others, regarding the direction of the Front. In the end, when I concluded the practices of the PFDJ could not be reconciled with my beliefs, I reached the conclusion that I had to leave. Fundamentally, I had no contact with the DP. I know the brothers in the DP; we are comrades; I know them well. But this doesn’t mean that if you were with the EPLF you go to DP and if you were with Jebha you go to Jebha. I believe this kind of sentiment—if you are with EPLF, you go to the EPLF arena; and if you are with ELF you go to ELF arena—should not exist. This is politics and you should have choices. This does not mean that I have any quarrel or disagreements with the DP. On the contrary, I recognize them as members of the opposition and I have no doubt about their commitment to struggle. They are people I can work closely with. But this does not necessarily mean that I should be a member…It is possible I may have difference of opinions…and I am not a member. 26-You returned from London to Khartoum and, recently, you went to Ethiopia. In post-war Eritrea, the view regarding those who go to Ethiopia…you know what that is. As someone with background in the EPLF, you knew how that trip would be perceived. Why did you go? First, let me talk about my decision to go to the Sudan. I went there to meet with Sudanese officials. The situation in Eritrea impacts Sudan and other neighboring nations. I went there to discuss these issues. We reached at a mutual understanding. They support change in Eritrea, for the sake of the Eritrean people, primarily, and the security of their own security. We exchanged views. We had a common understanding that the regime in Eritrea is a cause of instability in the region. Second, my trip to Ethiopia may be different from my visit to Sudan. What makes it different is the two-year war. Moreover, the Asmara regime has a continuous propaganda of “The Ethiopian regime or the Weyane wants to violate Eritrean sovereignty.” This propaganda was extensive… There are those who accept this as truth; and there are many who do not accept this assertion. The reason I went to Ethiopia in this environment is because I do not want to be a hostage of the Eritrean regime’s propaganda. I have my own beliefs and I believe that I should base my actions on my belief. Other than that, those who perceive going to Addis Ababa as a mistake and want to make judgments on that based on the propaganda of the Eritrean regime…what I can say is that in the long run, the truth shall prevail. From my standpoint, Ethiopia is, for better or worse, a neighbor. Strategically, and in the long term, we have mutual interests; thus, we should have a relationship and we should meet with its leaders. What I talked about was the situation of Eritreans in Ethiopia; that the situation of Eritreans is bad; that the steps taken were wholesale and hurtful, and that this had affected many Eritreans. One of the objectives of the visit was to get their perspective on this issue. We discussed this in great detail. We discussed past relationships between Eritrea and Ethiopia; that we should have placed it in its appropriate level…that because it was based on the whims of an individual and, because it was not based on a strong foundation, law, and because it was not bound by a constitution, the result of that is what we have witnessed [border war and what followed]. How should the relationship continue? And what their assessment was. These were the subjects we discussed. On their side, they asserted that regarding the sovereignty of Eritrea, they have no intention of violating it and they have no vested interest in doing so. They explained that because this belief is based on principle, they had gone to Eritrea and blessed the event. [Eritrea’s independence.] They stated that they could not possibly revisit this issue, as it was a matter of principle. Regarding past relations, they said that they had concluded that there were some negative developments and that, in the future, the relationship was not going to be based on emotion but on the law and the constitution. Regarding the treatment of Eritreans during the war, they acknowledged that they had made mistakes. That they had made an assessment and that, in the future, they would improve and remedy them. They said that they want a lasting, and a good relationship with Eritreans. You can consider this a quote. These are the assurances I was given. We will see what happens to these promises. Generally speaking, if one goes to Addis Ababa, there is the accusation of “you sold your nation.” Patriotism is one’s own belief and will. It is not defined nor measured by the accusation of a government, a system based on revolutionary justice and a government whose very presence is illegal. The crimes it committed against the nation are so vast that it cannot possibly absolve itself by trying to incriminate others. This accusation can only affect those who don’t have self-confidence. If you have confidence in your views, your nationalism, you shouldn’t have any qualms about meeting with Ethiopians. In fact, you are short-changing Eritreans and absconding from your responsibilities if you do not meet with Ethiopians and exchange your views. The system in Asmara has no moral authority to determine “Halal” and “Haram” (what is allowed, and what is forbidden.) Regarding issues with neighboring countries, it is not forbidden to declare openly, “you were right, in this regard; and you were wrong, in this regard.” And it is for this reason that I went to Addis Abeba. 27-Who did you meet with in Addis Ababa, Abdella? I met with Foreign Minister Seyoum, two to three times, and with Prime Minister Meles. We met and discussed the issues I mentioned before… 28- Why I am asking you is for this reason: generally speaking, a Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of a nation do not meet with an individual. Time does not permit them to meet with individuals. Are they meeting with you as a representative of a group, an organization, or because they believe you are influential? Regarding how the invitation came about, and how they view you, do you have any assessment? How is it that they are meeting with an individual who does not represent any organization? Of course, I do not want to overrate my skills, or myself. But they know about my long experience and my various roles in the organization since its foundation. They know that I have served in different capacities of the government, as a Zone Administrator, as an ambassador, and that I was a member of the Central Committee for 17 years. Being a representative of an organization is not essential to arranging visits. It is a foregone conclusion that an individual with my background would have a political role. Moreover, we know one another before and after independence. I especially know the Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, as well as other officials, like Sebhat Negga, and others. Based on this, there was no problem in setting up a meeting. 29-We have spent some time talking about the political developments and the problems in Eritrea. As someone who has a long background in Eritrean politics, what do you think is the solution? What is the way out? How do you bring about change? This is a hard question. How do you bring about change? I don’t have an all-purpose answer, but I have opinions. I believe there should be resistance and there should be a way to involve the people. To those who are pinning their hopes on the PFDJ, my message is, “give up on the system. It is deformed and it cannot be reformed.” (“Qubuts E’yu.”) It cannot change. One who is mistaken can be corrected; but one who knowingly inflicts harm cannot be reformed. Even if it changes, it will change not by conviction-- but because it is cornered. (“Aqlu Ms Tsebebo.”) The opposition must change. It should adopt a more developed thinking; it must take bigger and bolder steps. It must free itself from the ELF/EPLF way of thinking. Let’s not be prisoners of our experiences. Let’s create new experiences. We have to find a way to connect with the people in Eritrea. The Diaspora-based movement alone cannot bring change; it has its role, but it must find a link with Eritreans in Eritrea, and transition the movement to Eritrea. There must be resistance in Eritrea; we must organize and raise the consciousness of the people. We must find a way to harmonize our message to make it appealing to the youth. We must offer an alternative and daily voice. Right now, all the people hear is one type of music: the trumpets of the [government owned radio] Voice of the Broad Masses. (“Turumba dimtSi Hafash.”) We should give the people a different voice. Every day. We must unify our efforts and adopt a common platform that guides all the opposition, based on minimum commonalities. We must continue to expose its unjust rule and wanton violation of human rights because, every day, all you hear about is another arrest. Diplomatic and coordinated campaigns must be launched to make all aware of the absence of diplomacy and human rights in Eritrea. 30-You have mentioned “resistance” and “struggle.” You have talked of “raising “consciousness” and “organizing.” The three part slogan of your old organization, the EPLF, was “Let the people be conscious, organized and armed.” So, is armed resistance or struggle justified in Eritrea? Is that a legitimate mode of resistance? In my opinion, it should be a peaceful struggle. The national army is the army of Eritrea. Who are they? They are Eritreans. If you engage them in battles, if you kill 15-20 people, all you are doing is creating a funeral ceremony for 20-30 Eritrean families each and every time. (“ny Hazen das ytkel.”) I am not one who believes that change cannot come about unless there is violence. Because, ultimately, the Eritrean army will not point its gun at the Eritrean people; it will stand with the people. Once there is a strong and unified opposition, the people will stand up. And once the people stand up, the army will stand with the people. 31-And what will your role be in bringing this about? I will have a role. As for what it is, let’s leave that to time. [end of this segment] Comments & questions: abdellaadem@awate.com | |
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