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Al-Nahda
Once again, Eritrea is at crossroads. In the 1940s, Eritrea faced the issue of national sovereignty with the facts on its side but world opinion against it; Eritreans were divided into patriots and Ethiopian sell-outs, and our ability to conduct self-government was being severely tested. We chose wrong and it cost us fifty years of strife, war and civil war, displacement, exile. We are now facing a similar environment and must not make another bad choice.
When we looked back, we gave reasons. Ethiopia had a clear strategic advantage; Emperor Haile Selasse was a shrewd operator who surrounded himself by even shrewder advisors. Our political consciousness, in the parlance of the 1960s, was not developed. Our political leaders were divided. Different actors now, but the tongue of the Ethiopian Government is still forked. What Prime Minister Meles Zenawi says is different from what Comrade Meles Zenawi says which is similar, but not identical, to what Mr. Seyoum Mesfin says who may or may not agree with whoever occupies two by-definition-belligerent-positions of the State of Tigray: the chief and the speaker of the house. If you are thinking, as the French say, the more things change, the more they remain the same, here comes Mr. Paul Henze, EPRDF’s “chief melodist”, as the once-great Ethiopian Commentator once called him, to relay his one note: Ethiopia is great, Eritrea is not and, dammit, I wish my government understood that. The psychology of the TPLF is something that has occupied the minds of some of the most astute political hands (at least according to their business cards, they should be astute.) During the 1998-2000 wars, the conventional wisdom of the US State Department and the National Security Agency of the Clinton Administration was that there were “hardliners” and “moderates” within the TPLF. Meles Zenawi and Seyoum Mesfin were supposed to be moderates who were being forced to adopt hard-line positions to placate their constituencies and, if only the Eritrean government could be a little flexible here and there, things would go swimmingly. The position of the Eritrean government was (as first expressed by the Eritrean “Council of Ministers” back in May 1998) that the Federal government (Meles and Company) were being duped by the Tigrai regional state agitators and, if only we could have direct talks at the highest levels, we could make this abundantly clear. Thanks to Meles Zenawi insisting on using language and acts that were indistinguishable from that of the Tigrai local government (deportation of Ethiopians of Eritrean ancestry; recruiting Derg-era war criminals), the Eritrean government’s view evolved into the following: there are no hardliners, no moderates within the Ethiopian government; when it comes to us, they are all hard of hearing.
What has happened since has been chronicled well by many writers and it would be redundant to state them here. Instead, I’d like to address the choices we face and which one we should choose. Where We Are
Some Ethiopian intellectuals have argued that refusal to implement is perfectly justifiable as there are many, many unresolved border disputes in the world. The same people who used to argue that Ethiopia is right because “the rule of law” is on its side and Eritrea is wrong because it is reverting to the “law of the jungle” now have no problem ignoring the rule of law. And while not advocating the “law of the jungle”, they seem perfectly content with the “law of the dew”, a haze of ambiguity. Some have argued that the Algiers Agreement was bad; others have argued that the Boundary Commission’s ruling is not in compliance with the Algiers Agreement. Still others have argued forget arguing and Just Say No. Now, why does the Meles Zenawi regime believe that the delay strategy is a viable one? And what can we as Eritreans do about it? Here are our options: Option I: Do Nothing: There are some who argue that the Ethiopian governments conflicting policies are an act of desperation by a government that is about to collapse. If only we could say that the TPLF is a “minority” regime, the world will wise up and take strong steps against them; that, and the pressure of armed Ethiopian opposition such as the Oromo Liberation Front and the Sidama Liberation Front will take care of the rest. Unfortunately for us, these are the same people who have accurately predicted the Ethiopian government’s demise for the past 20 of the last zero cases. In other words, they are very wrong. In the post Cold War era, a uni-polar world with one boss, where governments have collapsed, it was either because they are significantly worse than the ones they replaced (Latin America) or the US was behind it (Iraq, Afghanistan) or they are just appallingly bad even by African standards (Liberia) or have declared war on strong nations (Zimbabwe.) Even then, some of the targeted governments hang on for what seems like eternity. Governments, especially African governments, have amazing tenacity even when every ingredient for their demise is there, they go on like the Energizer Bunny. (Now you know why Isaias Afwerki laughs his head off when he hears about armed opposition against him.) Take a look at the Sudan of the 90s: here was a government that was in a state of war with all its neighbours, was in the middle of a civil war, was declared a terrorist state by the US Department of State, who imposed sanctions, and many predicted its demise (in a few months, according to President Isaias Afwerki.(Now you know why Bashir is laughing.) Yet it is still there now befriended by some of its neighbours and considered a reliable ally of the United States in the war against terror. Take a look at the Ethiopian government. Is it worse than the Derg? Is there a wellspring of opposition against it by the Ethiopian people? Is there an armed military group that rivals what the Derg was facing? Are the Ethiopians who had supported its position in the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict more likely to remember the Mesqel Square celebrations after the “liberation” of Badme and Zalambesa or the ruling of The Hague reversing them? Don’t those two actions—the Ethiopian military victory that resulted in claiming Badme/Zalambesa and the Hague ruling reversing them--in fact, reinforce two Ethiopian myths: (a) Ethiopia never loses a war and (b) the world, as it did when Mussolini declared war on Ethiopia, is indifferent to Ethiopia. So why would the TPLF play a political price for this when it is just perpetuating the cherished myth? Whether they admit it or not, Eritreans who actually believe that the TPLF is facing a deep opposition and is on the verge of collapse have actually bought Meles Zenawi’s argument. After all, it is the same one he uses to hoodwink the US, the EU and the UN to go easy on him. There really is no way of knowing whether Meles will be in charge for one more week or one more decade, anymore than there is any assurance that whoever replaces him is more or less extremist when it comes to Eritrea. Thus, to place Eritrea’s future conditional on the demise of Meles Zenawi or the TPLF is foolish at best and dangerous at worst. It is as dangerous as placing the salvation of Eritrea on the goodwill of the TPLF. Option II: Do Something, PFDJ Style: Another option is to intensify the process being pursued by the PFDJ. This approach states that when it comes to Eritrea, the world (in reality, the US and Europe) should form opinions and pursue policies on the merits of the case, irrespective of what Eritrea does with its “internal affairs.” The world should look at the ruling of The Hague and then apply pressure on Ethiopia to comply. As for whether Eritrea has a constitution, an election, a free press, a progressive macropolicy, or acceptable human rights record, that is nobody’s business except Eritrea’s. The “non-intervention in the internal affairs” homily is, like many homilies, nice but meaningless. The fact is that Eritrea is part of “the family of nations” who have, through countless treaties, codified the right to be a busy body and interfere in one another’s internal affairs. At the local level, this is what gives IGAD the authority to tell Sudan what to do; it is what authorizes COMESA “to call on” this member state or the other to do XYZ. It is what allows the Arab League Secretary General to declare that the newly appointed Iraqi government is not acceptable because it is not elected (unlike, say, the previous one.) Nations join the clubs and the clubs enforce (sometimes selectively, sometimes absurdly) their club rules. That this is not consistently or even fairly applied is another matter; however, nations, specially strong nations, do make it their business to tell other nations and governments what to do. In fact, the competitive advantage Ethiopia and Djibouti and now, even Sudan and Yemen, have over Eritrea is that their governments are more amenable to this concept. In any event, over the last three years, the record has shown that the “international community” has strong opinions about Eritrea’s “internal affairs” which has shaped their attitude and policies towards the government, which means, for all practical purposes, the nation. The Eritrean government took the position that it needs to “play the game” and hired a PR firm. They insisted that they wouldn't change the product (mono-party, authoritarian governance), they would just change how they would market it ($50,000/month.) The test case of this was the government of Eritrea’s aggressive lobbying to get the United States to establish a military base in Eritrea. On the face of it, Eritrea should have been a clear and favourite choice: unlike Djibouti or Yemen, it didn’t have actual or potential Al Qaeda infiltration, it is secular, it doesn’t have ungovernable swathes of land, it has a military government which is in very good terms with the then commander of Central Command, etc. Yet, it lost out. And it lost because its “internal affairs” are the business of the United States. This is evidence that the status quo approach won’t work. Beyond that, it is dishonest because the Eritrean government itself acknowledges that how a nation runs its internal affairs should be the business of external forces. Otherwise, why would it continuously refer to the Ethiopian government as a “minority government”? Isn't that the "internal affairs" of Ethiopia? Or that the Sudan is a Jihad government? Or that Yemen is a tribalist government? Isn’t that attempt to tell the world that there is something wrong in how these nations are governed which directly impacts their external policies? If so, why does the government of Eritrea expect to be exempted from this assessment of the way it runs the country? Option III: Try A New Approach: Don’t Miss Another Opportunity There was a time (1991-1997) when the Eritrean government was the darling of the West. Many Eritreans aligned with the opposition may have been frustrated at this because they had information that was either unknown or considered insignificant by the rest of us, but to the rest of Eritreans and, indeed, the rest of the world, the Eritrean government was promise and hope bundled in one. It definitely was taking what appeared to be clear and tangible steps towards establishing a constitutional government. Clearly now, this is not the view of many Eritreans and most of the world. To some, that Eritrea could not manage to avert a disastrous war was sufficient reason to alter their opinion. To others (I dare say most), how Eritrea handled the post-war challenges was the cause for their disappointment. Those who believe that this is due to the “mischievous” work of disgruntled Eritreans overestimate the capacity of the disgruntled. The opinion-altering acts were brazen and every single one of them committed by the government. In fact, no single individual has done more to dramatically alter the image of Eritrea for the worse than the president of the republic. Eritrea has another opportunity that were missed in 1991, 1993 and 1998. It has an opportunity to create a political atmosphere that accommodates every single Eritrean AND has the added benefit of instantaneously transforming Eritrea’s image. All that is required for the actors—the government, the opposition and we the people—is to take simple confidence-building measures that can go a long way towards transcending our current impasse: (a) The opposition, all opposition, must directly and unequivocally make their position known with respect to the Ethiopian government’s dangerous statements that are directed towards undoing the only good thing to come out of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war: a permanent settlement of the common border. No “we call on both parties” and no sneaking in of language meant to convey that both sides are to blame. Ethiopia is and should be told so clearly. To the extent that there is even a remote chance that somebody somewhere believes that any Eritrean, regardless of their political viewpoint, is willing to “be flexible” on the border issue, they must be disabused of the notion. The opposition must do this not to “prove their patriotism” or win converts but because it is the right thing to do and it is in the interest of Eritrea to do so. (b) The government must take immediate measures to implement the constitution; it must bring the arrested to a court of law and, if it has no evidence, it must release political prisoners. The government must do this not because it is tactical and a “game” but because it is the right thing to do and is in the interest of Eritrea. (c) The polarized people must reassess some of our assumptions and perhaps consider that some of the information they consider factual and sacrosanct could be false or widely exaggerated. Let me give some information that may be new to some Eritreans. Shortly after the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict broke out, in August 1998, the ELF-RC held its 4th regular session and adopted a position on the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. Concurrent with its condemnation of the PFDJ, the ELF-RC took positions on (1) the cause of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict; (2) the deportations of Eritreans from Ethiopia and (3) the ownership of Badme. Here are the relevant parts: On the cause of the conflict, it stated: “…the war is in fact the culmination of a series of economic, political and psychological factors which have been piling up and escalating between the leaders of the ruling parties (the EPLF and EPRDF), as well as the consequence of extreme rivalries and betrayals of conspiratorial agreements between the former allies.” On the deportation of Eritreans from Ethiopia: “Far from being security measures taken against those suspected of espionage or collaboration with the PFDJ, the measures that are currently being undertaken by the Ethiopian government against Eritreans living there are actually meant to satisfy the continued demands of extremist Ethiopian opposition forces who have been calling for Eritreans to be thrown out of the country. This is, no doubt, a cruel violation of human rights and constitutes a serious blunder that would inevitably leave its ugly mark on the future relations of the two neighbouring peoples for generations to come. The RC once again strongly condemned such actions, and renewed its calls on the Ethiopian government to reconsider and reverse its measures.” On the ownership of Badme: “The RC established the historical and legal fact that Badme is not only part and parcel of the national territory of Eritrea, but was one of many parts of the country which the ELF-RC had earlier liberated with heavy sacrifices. The ELF had been administering the area from the 60’s till the early 80’s, and Badme Eritreans had made their patriotic contribution for the liberation of the country on the side of the ELF-RC.” I don’ know what the position of the other Eritrean organizations was back then but I distinctly remember the ELF (“Abdella Idris”) affirming that Badme is part and parcel of Eritrea. Does the position of the ELF-RC look consistent with an organization that would "rape our mothers"? Or that it would "sell out" Eritrea? What is the limit of our threshhold on what we find credible? Let's now look at the political cost of Eritreans unique ability to write off its main asset: its citizens. While the TPLF was building a caravan that included patriotic Ethiopians who were conned into believing that “Ethiopian Badme” was being snatched from them; while the TPLF build its big tent and invited every stripe of Eritrea-haters including the “Greater Ethiopia,” maximalist who wanted to reclaim and swallow whole all of Eritrea to “Assab Is Ethiopian” activists; the “Ethiopia-has-never-lost-a-war-and-it-can’t-lose-this-one” rationalists; while the TPLF was courting utopian and Ethiophile foreign NGOs and diplomatic corps whose recent obsession is the Ethiopian “revolutionary ethnic democracy” experiment, the Eritrean government was, and has been, busy dismantling and disassociating an increasing number of Eritreans as well as foreign friends of Eritrea. There is no question that all politicians are ambitious: it is an occupational hazard. Is ambition enough of an incentive that it gets some people to compromise their nation’s sovereignty? Absolutely. But ambition is also enough of an incentive that it gets some politicians to falsely accuse others of treason. I believe the latter is more likely than the former. We the people must ask for proof, proof, proof before we accept the charges and counter charges of politicians. Otherwise, we will remain forever their tools, instead of their bosses. |
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