9/18: The Bloodied and The Bloody-Handed

“I don’t believe that the situation will escalate to confrontation. Because solving problems through debate and discussion is a sign of civilized tradition, I hope we will resolve it that way” – Saleh Kekya, interview with Admas, June 27, 2000

On June 18, 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreements in Algiers, Algeria, ending a border war that started in May 1998. Although it would be another six months until a formal peace treaty would be signed (again in Algiers), the cessation of hostilities agreement was the trigger point for a natural post-war evaluation: How did we get here? And who will be accountable? All wars invite these questions, but even more so for a war everybody called baffling when it started, pointless when it dragged on and tragic when it ended. For Eritreans, the questions were how did we stumble to this war? And how was it so mismanaged that Ethiopia could penetrate so deep and so fast? And what must be we do to ensure that this does not happen again?

Open societies ask these questions—Israel is the latest example. So did Eritrea in September 2000: through its nominally functioning National assembly and its small fledgling free press. On September 18, 2001, these voices were strangled: the parliamentarians and journalists were arrested and the parliament and private press shut down. The individuals have disappeared; the institutions have not re-opened and Eritrea has descended on a slippery slope to full-fledged dictatorship from which it has yet to gain its footing. The engineers of this disaster are President Isaias Afwerki and a small cadre of advisors and cowards who benefited from the disappearance of the parliamentarians and journalists. This is the story of the bloodied and the bloody-handed.

Sharpening The Blades

Beginning in September 2000, the ruling party’s central committee (with 75 members) and the national assembly (the 75 central committee members plus 75 “elected” civilians) held meetings—a meeting they did not have throughout the 2 year war with Ethiopia. Tough questions were asked, including on the very secretive Isaias-Meles relationships that were shielded from the people, including their so-called representatives. In the end, the sessions passed three major decisions: (1) a post-war evaluation would be conducted by a committee established by the national assembly; (2) the party would hold a congress in February 2001 and (3) tangible steps would be taken toward establishment of a representative, multi-party system and elections would be held in December 2001. Two committees were tasked with drafting up electoral laws and party-formation laws.

In the good-cop, bad-cop routine that Isaias Afwerki and his chosen advisor (in this case, Yemane Gebreab, the political director) like to play, the bad-cop Yemane Gebreab stated at the meeting that multi-party system was not the right step for Eritrea to which the good-cop Isaias Afwerki responded that this is not a controversial subject since the party had already accepted in principle in 1987 (at its 2^nd “unity congress”) that political pluralism was the preferred governance for post-independent Eritrea.

Whether the parliamentarians who called for them truly believed it would happen and were betrayed or whether they knew all along that they would never happen but chose to take a stand and, as necessary, martyr themselves for the cause is unclear. What is clear is that all three of the promises were broken by the end of 2001. This was done by (a) isolating the reformers; (b) muzzling the free press and (c) hyping an imaginary war and creating another illusive deadline.

The Bloody

Stalinist organizations, and PFDJ is certainly one, are good at fixing derogatory labels on their challengers, all the more to marginalize them. This website resisted the “G-15” label for long and opted for “Reformers” because that was more accurate—they were individuals with long history with EPLF/PFDJ who were proud of their membership in the party and wanted to reform the one-man rule of their party and, by extension, the country.

Although the number of the reformers would ebb and flow—depending on the promises and threats delivered by Isaias Afwerki and his advisors—the final tally of those who signed the Open Letter were 15 (thus, the G-15.) The first isolation step taken against them was to separate them from their jobs (and thus their sympathizers.) Some were fired (Mahmoud Sheriffo), others were reassigned (Haile Weldensae, Petros Solomon) and others were frozen. All these moves were explained as completely unrelated to their calls for reform. The first person to refuse to be reassigned (from Ministry of Transportation to Mayor of Assab) was Saleh Kekya.

The second step taken was to try to divide and conquer them. Although each of the reformers signed several letters and made the same arguments—constitutionalism, institutionalization, regular meetings—they were telegraphed messages to make them doubt one another. The core of the G-15 were actually G-3, they argued, without mentioning who the three were.

The third step taken was to separate them from the party. In this regard, although the national assembly had agreed to hold post-war evaluation of the performance of the entire government at a committee level, the President’s office decided to have a post-war evaluation of the Reformers. In classic Isaias style, an unsigned, undated document called Woyane’s Third Offensive And the Political Campaign That Followed It (reminiscent of documents issued when PLF-2 was separating from ELF in 1971 and when EPLF was hunting down the Menkae movement) were distributed in party-meetings, beginning January 2001.

For eight months, the President’s Office threw every kind of mud to see whichever would stick. The reformers were “old blood” who are in the way of younger blood taking their rightful place at the party. The reformers were corrupt. The reformers were driven by personal grudges. The reformers were incompetent and had run down their ministries. Some were not even real Shaebia (as Tirgta, the party owned paper, mocked Hamed Himid.) In the same method that was perfected with Menkae, the G-15 were banned from these meetings and could not ask for evidence or rebut the arguments. When fair-minded individuals attending the meeting said that they are unable to make a judgment without hearing both sides of the stories, the president’s office planted witnesses who would make impassioned patriotic speeches calling on the arrest of these dangers to national unity.

The document is full of accusations and presents a perfect defense of President Isaias Afwerki which would be funny if it weren’t so tragic: the paper argues that the problem is not that he exercises too much power; the problem is that he exercises too little.

As the party members were being told that the reformers were an imminent danger to the republic, the people were told that there was no problem at all. On June 25, 2001, in an interview with the private press, Isaias Afwerki was asked:

Does the current misunderstanding have internal and national security ramifications and pose a threat to the nation?

President Isaias Afwerki responded:

Absolutely not, I don’t feel that way. Nonethless, I have noticed that some people are anxious about this. And I’ve advised them to be patient.

But, he went on to say, there are laws for law-breakers. It is possible that Isaias Afwerki does not remember saying this and does not remember seeing what he was quoted saying because he made it clear that “I don’t read the private press and I have no intention to read the private press.”

That Isaias Afwerki would hold his nose and participate in an interview with an institution he despised (the Eritrean private press) is all the evidence needed that the nascent press had replaced the staid, state press as the reliable source of information by the Eritrean people. All the papers (which were weeklies or bi-weeklies) would be sold out every week—presenting platforms to Eritreans who hadn’t been heard before or since: critics of the government. In fact, most of their content were letters to the editor and analysis by guest columnists. In other words, it was exactly what Isaias Afwerki allegedly wanted: "let the people decide." And the people had decided that Isaias had too much power.

By August 2001, the president’s office had settled on one piece of mud that was sticky enough it had to be tried: the reformers were “defeatists” who had panicked, called on the president to resign, blamed “Eritrea” and beautified “Weyane”, and called for UN intervention, and demoralized the people. So accused Alamin Mohammed Said on August 8, 2001.

It was not a coincidence that this accusation was made by the Secretary of the party, Alamin Mohammed Said; it was not a coincidence that the accusation would be made in Hadas Ertra, the party newspaper. Isaias Afwerki had played off the founding members of the EPLF against each other and the long-neglected Alamin Mohammed Said (and his supporters) simply saw a political opening which they exploited for personal gain. Similalry, Hadas Ertra had boycotted the reformers, which meant that no rebuttal from the G-15 would be issued.

Why did the G-15, many of whom had led armies in wars far worse than the border war, including the 6th Offensive, suddenly develop the jitters? Is blaming the war management skills of the Isaias administration and his generals the same as blaming Eritrea? What penal code prohibits defeatism, even if they were guilty of such “crime”? These and other questions were asked in a rebuttal—published in the private press.

There were no answers—only more accusations. The president’s loyalists—Yemane Gebreab, Abdella Jaber, Zemehret Yohannes--fanned out to the Diaspora to pile on the accusations in public “seminars.” Seminars which exempted them from any questioning of their role during the disastrous war. Without the benefit of debate, evidence, the public was read resolutions which they endorsed by clapping. In a surreal development, even the incarceration of 1700 University of Asmara students and the eventual death of two students in the hands of their captors in the summer of 2001 was blamed on the Reformers.

On Tuesday morning, September 18, 2001, the Reformers were rounded up from their homes and arrested. They were accused of crimes against national security. The brave and popular private press would have asked, “if, as you claim, they committed crimes against national security in May 2000, what took you so long to arrest them? If, as you say, not all of them are guilty, why are you arresting all of them?” But they couldn’t: they too were arrested and made to disappear, and their press shut down. On what charges? The same throw-mud-and-something-will stick: they had no license to practice journalism, they were not professional, they are funded by foreigners, we are revising the press law and, finally, they are spies.

In February 2002, the “national assembly” convened and, without seeing any evidence, passed a resolution condemning the G-15 and called on the president’s office to immediately share its evidence with the public. There hasn't been a national assembly meeting since. Today is the 5^th year anniversary of their arrest; no evidence has been presented, and none even manufactured.

The Bloody-Handed

Dictators do not operate in a vacuum. While it is evident that ultimate responsibility for the lawlessness in Eritrea rests in the office of the president and the person of Isaias Afwerki, he is not alone. Far too many people are complicit in this injustice against not only G-15, who happen to be the most famous Eritrean prisoners, but against thousands of Eritreans.

First and foremost are the accusers—since they stepped up to accuse, they have the burden of providing the evidence. The loudest accusers were Alamin Mohammed Said, Yemane Gebreab, Abdella Jaber and Zemehret Yohannes.

Next are those who made career calculations to benefit from the system. These nouveau riche include Sebhat Ephrem, Alamin Mohammed Said (again), and the many generals and lieutenant colonels who have seen their fortunes rise after the arrest of the G-15.

Lastly, there are the elite of Eritrea—particularly those in Diaspora. Eritreans in Eritrea cannot be blamed because the president’s office continues to frighten them by insisting that war is about to breakout any minute now, which it has done since the peace treaty was signed in 2000. But those who consider themselves discerning readers and analyst of information, those on whom Eritrea counts to save her from the excesses of her politicians—particularly those who in Diaspora who participated in PFDJ meetings to pass condemnatory resolutions without seeing any evidence—and those who chose to be silent are as bloody-handed as those who ordered the arrests. And until they recant and correct themselves, there will be no justice in Eritrea.

Many fool themselves by saying they are reserving judgement until the border is demarcated or until the clouds of war are lifted. What they should know is that because of the environment they helped create, Eritrea is entirely incapable of defending itself--there has never been a war won by demoralized army looking for an exit every waking hour.

awateteam@awate.com