Dr. Hassen Alturabi was released from prison on June 30, 2005 and received a congratulatory phone call from the Secretary of Eritrea’s ruling party, Alamin Mohammed Said, “on behalf of President Isaias Afwerki and the people and government of Eritrea” on July 1, 2005.   Given the tumultuous relationship between Turabi and Isaias, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the government of Eritrea has concluded that Turabi is a lynchpin to its plans in Sudan.  Not to be outdone, Turabi is attempting to parlay his newfound influence to reconcile the PFDJ with the Eritrean opposition parties.

Strange Bedfellows

In 1995, Hassen Alturabi was considered Public Enemy number one by Eritrean authorities.  According to a senior official quoted by the Middle East magazine (May, 1995), “Sudan is a major factor of destabilization in the region, and Hassan Turabi is the master mind of this policy.”  What accounts for the reversal in the relationship is Darfur.

By early 2003, the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed militia had practically destroyed the Darfur opposition groups, the SLA and the JEM.  Yet, within a few months, they, particularly JEM, re-emerged stronger than before: better armed, organized and financed.  Several Sudanese and regional agents are credited for this change—but none more so than the arms and training provided by the PFDJ, and the funding and organizational skills lent to them by Turabi, particularly to the JEM, which is predominantly of the Zagawa ethnic group (as is Turabi.)  It is for their role in strengthening the Darfurian opposition that the Bashir government arrested Turabi and filed numerous complaints against Eritrea with the UN Security Council.

Following his release, Turabi made a surprise visit to Eritrea, after a stop over in Qatar. Accompanying him was Ali Alhaj, his spokesperson and the deputy of Turabi’s new party, Sudan’s People Congress Party. 

While in Eritrea, he visited the training grounds of the Sudanese opposition groups and met with President Isaias Afwerki and PFDJ officials Yemane Gebreab, the party’s political director; Abdella Jaber, the party’s director of organizational affairs and Alamin Mohammed Said, its secretary.  No ministers were present.

At the meeting, Turabi offered to play in Eritrea the same role the PFDJ is playing in Sudan: to mediate between PFDJ and its exiled opposition parties.  He argued that PFDJ’s failure to do so would always be exploited by the Ethiopian and Sudanese regimes. Isaias Afwerki brushed off the idea and replied, “you know whatever so-called opposition there is was always your creation” but did not discourage the idea. 

After he returned to Sudan, Turabi pursued his idea through his intermediary, Mahboub Abduselam, who contacted representatives of two Eritrean opposition organizations. 

In December 2005, a large group of PFDJ delegates, chaired by its political director, Yemane Gebreab, visited Sudan for the country’s 50 year independence anniversary.  The two ruling parties had begun taking tentative steps towards normalization two months earlier, while the PFDJ continued to use Turabi to blackmail the Bashir government. For example, in March 2006, the government media provided a platform for Turabi to disclose that the 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Husni Mubarek was co-coordinated by Sudan’s second vice president, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha.

Ali Osman Mohammed Taha commended Asmara for its reconciliation efforts in July 2006 and visited Asmara in August to shore up PFDJ support for his party.  He was accompanied by brahim Ahmed Omer, Secretary General of the Inqaz party.

In a meeting with Isaias Afwerki, he, too, offered his party’s offices to mediate between the PFDJ and Eritrean opposition. Sudan, if given the green light, he hinted: “can mobilize the Islamists, the ELF, student unions, women’s groups and other Eritrean social groups to support the dialogue.”  Isaias Afwerki replied that they (Isaias and Ali Osman Taha) should discuss the East Sudan Front and leave the issue of the Eritrean opposition to be discussed between the two parties, PFDJ and Inqaz - Yemane Gebreab, Abella Jaber and Alamin Mohammed Said to represent the PFDJ in discussions with Inqaz officials.

Yemane Gebreab has no record of attempting any outreach to Eritrean opposition groups.

While proclaiming that “in principle, we are not against dialogue”, Alamin Mohammed Said has repeatedly dismissed the opposition groups are movements without goals.

Abdella Jaber has attempted to hold extensive talks with "Beni Amer elders in Eastern Sudan".  But his efforts have not been successful because of his “Denai problem.”  Mahmoud Denai, an ELF leader, was lured to Eritrea by Abdella Jaber with promises of reconciliation.  Mahmoud was later jailed and died in prison. His efforts are a continuation of past efforts to penetrate the opposition and weaken it. Both Alamin and Zemehret had previously floated calculated hints for a dialogue with the opposition. While Alamin's efforts didn't bear fruit, Zemehret's efforts had convinced a few elements to distance themselves from the opposition. 

The Sudanese government’s July 2006 decision to deny venue to Eritrean opposition groups was apparently made at the request of Abdella Jaber who convinced them that the Eritrea-Sudanese governments’ reconciliation efforts could be undermined by the image of Eritrean opposition groups meeting in Sudan.  

Meanwhile,  as it did with Eastern Sudan opposition groups of the Beja Congress and Free Lions (now Eastern Sudan Front), and six Ethiopian opposition groups including Kinjit and Oromo Liberation Front (now AFD: Alliance for Freedom and Democracy), the Eritrean government has managed the unification of Darfur opposition groups, Darfur’s SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; SFDA: Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance and JEM: Justice Equality Movement—joined forces to become NRF: National Redemption Front in Asmara on June 30, 2006, exactly a year after the release of Turabi from prison.  

Background

With a Ph.D from France’s prestigious Sorbonne, Dr. Turabi has been a fixture in Sudanese politics since 1964, when he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  When the party was banned, he was exiled to Libya, and returned to Khartoum in no small part due to Sudan’s familial politics.  (Among other things, he was the brother in law to Sudan’s prime minister; one of his nieces is married to Osama bin Laden, etc.)

He joined Numeri’s government as attorney general and when Numeri’s Sudanese Socialist Union government fell, he formed a party to run in the general elections.  His party came third in the polls, which led to his engineering a “bloodless coup” in 1989 that resulted in his being named the speaker of the parliament and the chair of the ruling party, National Islamic Front, effectively in control of the presidency. 

In 1991, following the first Gulf War, he founded the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference a global umbrella group for all Islamist parties, which, among other things resulted in Bin Laden’s move to Khartoum.  Throughout the 1990s, he antagonized all his neighbors, including an assassination attempt of Egypt’s Mubarek in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia.  In 1999, he lost a power struggle with his protégé, Omar Albashir, and was subsequently dismissed from the party he helped found.  He was arrested in March 2004 and, following Sudan’s peace treaty with the SPLA, and the anticipated unity government, he was released at the insistence of the SPLA and Eritrea on June 30, 2005.